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ABSTRACT 
 
Julia Osman, The Citizen Army of Old Regime France 
(Under the Direction of Jay M. Smith) 
 
 
While the creation of the French citizen army is often attributed to the French Revolution, 
I argue that it is a product of the old regime.  In the seventeenth century, France’s 
aristocratic army began to crumble when Louis XIV first created a military bureaucracy 
that eventually ceased to effectively regulate army matters.  During the Seven Years’ War 
in the mid-eighteenth century, French officers’ apathetic attitudes towards fighting in 
Canada proved that French warfare had become only a vehicle for noble advancement.  
In the context of crisis and reform that followed, both educated society and military 
circles looked to the citizen armies of ancient Greece and Rome for military inspiration.  
French representations of the army and militias of the American Revolution as 
contemporary embodiments of ancient citizen armies supported reformers’ belief that 
patriotism would revitalize the French army.  In 1789, the National Guard 
institutionalized these ideas, making the French citizen army a forerunner of the French 
Revolution.   
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Introduction 
 By conventional wisdom, the citizen army of France arose in 1793 with the famed 
Levée en Masse, which intended to put the entire Nation of France under arms in order to 
defend against foreign threats from Austria and other liberty-crushing monarchical states.  
In contrast to the recruiting habits of the old regime, the Levée en Masse would enforce 
equal service throughout the realm that neither wealth nor class could corrupt.  All 
unmarried men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five were to serve in the army, 
but all citoyens and citoyennes were provided the opportunity to turn their patriotism into 
action.  As the National Convention proclaimed on August 23, 1793,  
From this moment on . . . all Frenchmen are in permanent requisition for the 
service of the armies.  The young men will go to combat; married men will forge 
weapons and transport food; women will make tents and uniforms and will serve 
in the hospitals; children will make bandages from old linen; old men will present 
themselves at public places to excite the courage of the warriors, to preach the 
hatred of kings and the unity of the Republic.1  
 
These words, while striking and inspiring, were not realized in the activities of the French 
army.  The Levée en Masse did raise over 100,000 men, but to quote Alan Forrest, it “was 
hardly a glittering success.”2  Despite the Convention’s initial decision not to exempt 
anyone from the service, people found ways of escaping military duty.  Young men, for 
example, could work as valets to the Generals, and be safe from the range of the 
                                                 
1
 Simon Schama, Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989), 762. 
 
2
 Alan Forrest, The Soldiers of the French Revolution (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990), 75. 
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muskets.3  Understandably, the Convention excused individuals who were ill or disabled, 
which, according to Simon Schama, “naturally provoked an immediate epidemic of  
mutilations.”4  Others found more open means of protesting the universal conscription by 
overthrowing recruitment booths or refusing to serve.  These protesters compared the 
patriotic call to arms to the hated milice of the old regime that had forced untrained and 
unwilling young men into service for the French army as cannon fodder.5 
 Historians evidently know of the problems with the Levée en Masse: that while it 
fully intended to stoke the fires of patriotism in the hearts of all citizens, it succeeded 
only in being a mass conscription army that many joined reluctantly or managed to 
evade.  I would argue that the Levée en Masse—far from announcing the birth of a citizen 
army—only built on and perverted an earlier ideal of a citizen army that had been based 
on patriotism, not conscription, and arose from the initiative of the soldiers and citizens 
alike.  This dissertation traces the development of that earlier ideal over the course of the 
eighteenth century and shows how the aristocratic army of the old regime, consisting of 
noble officers and “scoundrel” soldiers, gradually gave way to the ideal of a citizen army.  
This ideal had been meticulously defined in military manuscripts and published texts 
alike, both among military officers and interested civilians, and was finally manifested in 
the form of the National Guard, created from the initiative of citizens and soldiers.  
 I first examine the army of Louis XIV, its growth, and its institutionalization as an 
aristocratic force.  I then show how problems inherent in the aristocratic culture of the 
                                                 
3
 Jean-Paul Bertaud, From Citizen-soldiers to Instrument of Power, trans. R.R. Palmer (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1988),107-110. 
 
4
 Schama, Citizens, 762. 
 
5
 Forrest, The Soldiers of the French Revolution, 17, 73. 
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army led to the loss of the Seven Years’ War in Canada in 1763, an event that prompted 
the French army not just to reform its system, but to reinvent it.  Taking inspiration from 
the ancients, these reforms placed the French army on a trajectory towards the citizen 
army.  I argue that the American Revolution provided a contemporary example of a 
victorious citizen army, and allowed the French army an opportunity to reimagine itself 
as an institution that defended freemen and protected citizens.  Finally, the dissertation 
examines the long-standing contradictions working against the emergence of the French 
citizen army, and how mounting tensions surrounding the army’s reform efforts ruptured 
the aristocratic army of the old regime, making way for the citizen army.   
 The narrative I present of the creation of a citizen army on the cusp of Revolution 
finds support in Tocqueville’s thesis that the French Revolution represented a continuity 
with old regime methods, ideas, and principles, rather than a sharp break with the past. 
As Tocqueville stated, Revolutionaries “took over from the old régime not only most of 
its customs, conventions, and modes of thought, but . . . they used the debris of the old 
order for building up the new.”  By exploring the old regime’s propensity towards a 
citizen army and revealing the cultural and institutional mechanisms through which the 
ideal came to be realized, I provide a military example to support Tocqueville’s overall 
thesis.6 
 This dissertation contributes to the emerging literature that presents the coming of 
the French Revolution in a more global context, looking outside of France for forces and 
pressures that spelled doom for the old regime.  Bailey Stone has placed the end of the 
old regime and the French Revolution in a global historical perspective, and has 
                                                 
6
 Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the French Revolution, trans. Stuart Gilbert (New York: 
Anchor Books, 1983), vii. 
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suggested that the Revolution resulted from France’s desire to keep up with the progress 
of the nations surrounding it.7  Tom Kaiser analyzed France’s complicated relations with 
Austria, and has demonstrated how fear and hatred of this nation explains popular 
hostility towards Marie Antoinette and the royal court on the eve of the Revolution and 
motivated the French government and people to resort to terror during the Revolution.8  
Laurent Dubois has studied the dynamic between the French Revolutionary ideologies 
and developments in the French Caribbean.9  This dissertation further widens the 
parameters for study of the French Revolution by exploring North America’s cultural and 
military contributions to the end of the old regime army. 
 During the eighteenth century, France engaged in two wars in North America: the 
Seven Years’ War, fought mostly in present-day eastern Canada and Western New York, 
Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts; and the American Revolution.  This dissertation 
explores how French involvement in these two wars effected changes in the French army 
during and after the fighting.  Previous studies have argued that the Seven Years’ War, 
and its loss, increased patriotism in France and made reform necessary, but this 
dissertation examines the specific military reforms that responded to the loss of this war, 
                                                 
7
 Bailey Stone, The Genesis of the French Revolution: A Global-Historical Interpretation (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994; Bailey Stone, Reinterpreting the French Revolution: A Global-
Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
8
 Thomas E. Kaiser, “From the Austrian Committee to the Foreign Plot: Marie Antoinette, Austrophobia, 
and the Terror,” French Historical Studies 26:4, Fall 2003: 579-617; 579-588.  He also has studied the 
effect of the Ottoman Empire, as an example of the perfect despotic government, on French views of 
governance.  Thomas Kaiser, “The Evil Empire? The Debate on Turkish Despotism in Eighteenth-Century 
French Political Culure,” Journal of Modern History 72 (2000): 6-34.   
 
9
 Laurent Dubois, A Colony of Citizens: Revolution and Slave Emancipation in the French Caribbean, 
1787-1804 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004);  Laurent Dubois, “‘Citoyens et Amis!’ 
Esclavage, citoyenneté et République dans les Antilles françaises à l’époque révolutionnaire” Annales 58 
(2003): 281-304. 
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as well as the larger discussions on the importance of patriotism.10  French presence in 
America during the American Revolution has spawned many works on the French army’s 
activities in America, as well as the French army’s potentially revolutionary behavior 
upon returning to France.  Gilbert Bodinier and Sam Scott in particular have looked at the 
French army before, during, and after the American Revolution, but found it had little 
effect on individual French officers.11  This dissertation gauges the impact of the 
American Revolution by focusing not on the actions of the few officers who served in 
America, but on how it struck the non-participants in mainland France: the majority of 
French officers and interested civilians.  I argue that the French Revolution reinforced the 
trajectory of military reform already in progress, and that it confirmed existing ideas 
about the necessity of patriotism in France’s evolving army. 
 My argument concerning the changing relationship between soldier and citizen 
challenges a recent characterization of the French army by David A. Bell.  When 
discussing the creation of the citizen army during the Revolution, Bell argues that the 
“military came enduringly to be defined as a separate sphere of society, largely distinct 
from the ‘civilian’ one.”  Bell bases his argument on the fact that the word “civilian” did 
not exist in the French language until the era of the Revolution, signifying that there was 
                                                 
10
 David A. Bell, “Jumonville’s Death: War Propaganda and National Identity in Eighteenth-Century 
France,” in The Age of Cultural Revolutions: Britain and France, 1750-1820, eds. Colin Jones and Dror 
Wahrman (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 33-61; Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the 
Nation 1707-1837 (London: Vintage, 1996); Edmund Dziembowski, Un nouveau patriotisme français, 
1750-1770: la France face à la puissance anglaise à l’époque de la guerre de Sept Ans (Oxford: Voltaire 
Foundation, 1998). 
 
11
 Gilbert Bodinier, Les Officiers de L’Armée Royale : combattants de la guerre d’Indépendance des Etats-
Unis de Yorktown à l’an II (Vincennes : Service Historique de L’armée de Terre, 1983); Samuel Scott, 
From Yorktown to Valmy (Colorado: University Press of Colorado, 1998). 
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now a new, separate, non-military sphere in society that did not previously exist.12  Bell 
sees the creation of the National Guard as a reinforcement of his notion that the military 
and civilian worlds operated in separate spheres, arguing that it “served to create new 
distinctions between things military and civilian.”  Concerning service in the army, Bell 
contends that while men “generally accepted service as a patriotic necessity,” it was also 
“a distinct and extraordinary” part of their lives that “they would eventually leave 
behind.”13    
 Bell has a point in claiming that military experience acquired new importance in 
the Revolutionary era, but in this dissertation, I reveal a process that moves in the 
opposite direction from his main argument.  I argue that during the old regime, the 
military and civilian worlds had been very separate, but that they had melded together by 
the beginning of the French Revolution.  During the old regime, military and non-military 
worlds rarely mixed.  Officers operated in their own distinct culture as part of the French 
aristocracy, and the honor of serving the king separated them from the rest of society.  
Soldiers, once they joined the army, became wholly unwelcome in the civilian worlds, as 
they preyed on the people of France and their resources.  By the age of the Revolution, 
however, soldiers had come to think of themselves as citizens, and they joined in the 
efforts of civilians to recover food and property from the government; civilians likewise 
began to behave as soldiers in an organized military force.  The central idea behind the 
citizen army in France was that all citizens, regardless of wealth or class, could 
participate in the defense of their country.  By 1789 soldiers and civilians had become 
                                                 
12
 David A. Bell, The First Total War: Napoleon’s Europe and the Birth of Warfare as We Know It 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2007), 11. 
 
13
 Ibid., 125. 
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largely indistinguishable.  I argue that the creation of the word “civilian” did not reflect 
the emergence of two separate spheres, but indicates that the two worlds had intermingled 
to the point where distinguishing terminology became necessary; there was a need to be 
able to verbally differentiate between the two intertwined aspects of larger French 
society, as citizens had become soldiers and soldiers had become citizens. 
 Methodologically, this dissertation argues for a closer relationship between 
cultural and military history.  Clausewitz’s famous maxim that “war is a continuation of 
politics by other means” does not mean that war is only politics by other means.  While 
there is a predisposition in some circles of academia to view warfare as the 
uncomplicated expression of more consequential political and economic conflicts, where 
a nation’s military is deployed and how it conducts war have broad implications for all 
realms of society.  As with the French army in North America, this is especially true 
when troops engage with different military cultures that force them to amend both their 
tactics and their attitudes towards military structure and command.  Rather than being 
unproblematic extensions of pre-existing political aims, war and the military that wages it 
interact meaningfully with a nation’s character, society, and culture.  On its broadest 
level, I hope this dissertation speaks to the value of using cultural methodology for 
military history, as well as military institutions as valuable sites for cultural analysis.14   
                                                 
14
 Recently, self-labeled military and cultural historians have taken more notice of cultural and military 
history, respectively.  In French history, Bell put his cultural methodology to use in studying the 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic French army while the military historian John Lynn has considered the 
relationship between combat and culture: David A. Bell, The First Total War; and John Lynn, Battle: A 
History of Combat and Culture from Ancient Greece to Modern America (Cambridge: Westview Press, 
2003).  While both books were problematic, both tried to bridge the mutually-reinforced gap between 
military and cultural history.  Military historians in particular have been discussing the incorporation of 
new methodologies.  See Wayne Lee, “Mind and Matter—Cultural Analysis in American Military History: 
A Look at the State of the Field,” Journal of American History 93 (2007), 1116-1142. 
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 The first chapter examines the French army during the reign of Louis XIV, its 
aristocratic nature, its performance on the battlefield, and its relationship with civilian 
society.  Using recent scholarship on the French army from 1660-1750, I reveal the 
French noble officer corps as dependent on constant warfare.  Because noble officers 
received their high status in society by right of birth, they needed to participate in combat 
in order to justify their position in society, maintain their reputations for courage and self-
sacrifice, and win glory for the king, their families, and themselves.  Their soldiers, on 
the other hand, lived in miserable conditions and had little motivation to fight other than 
plunder and the theoretical promise of regular food, shelter and clothing.  These officers 
and soldiers practiced a type of warfare that was “limited” in rhetoric, but fierce and 
partisan on campaign.  Soldiers could be ruthless in their attacks, and officers purposely 
employed them against civilians, both in foreign states and to quell domestic uprisings, 
convert protestants, and collect taxes.  The use of the army as an instrument against the 
civilian populace fostered a hatred between soldiers and civilians in France.  Even the 
militia could not create a common ground between civilians and soldiers. 
 In the second chapter, all of the weaknesses inherent in the aristocratic army come 
to the forefront as attention shifts to the French army’s experience fighting in Canada.  
From 1754-1760, French and Canadian forces allied with Amerindian nations and 
repulsed British advancement into New France.  French and Canadian officers’ 
correspondence with the ministers of war and marine in France, reveal that the French 
officers exhibited more concern with gaining glory than achieving missions.  Because 
officers prioritized garnering medals, promotions and pensions from the war over the 
ultimate aim of defeating Britain, they dismissed the Amerindian warriors who had been 
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integral to defending New France.  Most officers refused even to consider adopting 
successful Canadian tactics, because such tactics would compromise the hierarchical 
structure so necessary to the French army.  The resulting loss of the Seven Years’ War 
sounded the death-knell for the aristocratic army, and alerted officers and civilians alike 
to the need for a complete reform of French military forces. 
 Chapter three considers the reforms proposed from the 1760s until 1781 that were 
intended to improve the condition of the soldier.  While the loss of the Seven Years’ War 
can be attributed to many military failings, most reformers agreed that the French soldiers 
desperately needed to feel more patriotism to be effective in their duties.  Inspired by 
Greek and Roman examples, French reformers, and civilians interested in military affairs, 
proposed improvements for the soldiers’ living conditions and morale.  Military writers 
such as Jacques Antoine-Hippolyte, the comte de Guibert and Joseph Servan seriously 
envisioned a new army that would practice citizen warfare.  Using both published sources 
on ancient warfare and reform mémoires addressed to the minister of war, this chapter 
argues that by the 1780s, reformers had “citizen-ized” their soldiers. 
 The American Revolution and its effect on this citizen-ization process is the 
subject of chapter four, which considers how the American Revolution was portrayed in 
France, and what meaning French writers invested in it.  Most people in France first 
learned of the American Revolution from French gazettes, which overflowed with news 
of the American army and militias.  The newspapers portrayed American military forces 
as composed of citizens whose patriotism compelled them to fight and who successfully 
defeated highly disciplined British forces.  French literature, poems, plays, and material 
culture continued and exaggerated this image, indicating that French readers had an eager 
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desire to learn more about this contemporary citizen army, and were, perhaps, even 
warming to the idea of citizens being soldiers themselves.  The American Revolution also 
provided the French army with the opportunity to reclaim its reputation as a virulent 
fighting force and to redefine itself as holding values consistent with a citizen army.  This 
new French army fought to defend citizens from tyrannical kings, and many French 
readers embraced this new image of the army enthusiastically. 
 The desire to create a citizen army met with resistance from some branches of the 
officer corps, as long-standing commitments to noble privilege in the army inhibited 
attempts at lasting modifications.  Reformers tried to professionalize the officer corps by 
providing equal opportunities for promotion, emphasizing talent and merit, and 
discouraging the corrupting influence of wealth, while also maintaining noble privileges. 
Such reforms proved nearly impossible as competing pressures for a meritorious officer 
corps stood in complete opposition to the privileges that court nobles expected to 
maintain.  This last chapter examines the contradictions working against the emergence 
of a French citizen army at the end of the old regime and the building tensions that 
eventually made way for a citizen army born of the initiative of citizens and soldiers. 
 This dissertation challenges long-held notions that that the French army operated 
as a consistently aristocratic force until the French Revolution introduced it to new 
revolutionary practices and mœurs.  I argue that the revolutionary changes in military 
thinking began in the wake of defeat in 1763, and they contributed to the outbreak of 
revolution of 1789.  In an effort to make their soldiers more effective on the battlefield, 
French officers began to discuss ideas about citizen armies that would translate into 
realties for the French army.  While the fall of the Bastille rightly marks the beginning of 
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the French Revolution, the army’s role in the coming of that Revolution began in 1763 
and evolved during the final decades of the old regime.  When the French army conceded 
defeat at the end of the Seven Years’ War, it began an intellectual and cultural process 
that would enable soldiers, citizens, and provincial nobles to overthrow an aristocratic 
model of warfare and with it the old regime itself.  As Roger Chartier has argued, 
“revolution” first has to become “conceivable” before it can be translated into action. 15  
It was during the three decades between the loss of the Seven Years’ War and the fall of 
the Bastille that a revolution in military thinking occurred, both in the officer corps and in 
the civilian world.   To quote Alexis de Tocqueville, “the old régime provided the 
Revolution with many of its methods,” including its citizen army.16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15
 Roger Chartier, The Cultural Origins of the French Revolution (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991), 
2.   
 
16
 Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the French Revolution, 192. 
Chapter 1 
  Poised to Perish: The French Army, 1661-1755 
 This dissertation will show how the French army transformed from an aristocratic 
army to a citizen army between 1660 and 1790.  Whereas existing historiography has 
pinpointed this transformation as an outcome of the French Revolution, I see this change 
as a phenomenon of the old regime, and argue that the creation of the first French 
“citizen-army,” the National Guard, was a smooth continuation of the reforms that the 
French army had begun in the 1760s.  These reforms began with the disastrous loss of the 
Seven Years’ War, when most French officers realized that their entire system of warfare 
required drastic change.  In the era of reform that followed, officers began to think of 
their soldiers in citizen-like terms, and non-military readers began to reconsider their 
relationship with the army, as well as their role in military affairs.  Especially during the 
era of the American Revolution, the French army began to think of itself not as an 
aristocratic army of conquest, but an army of liberation for the defense of free men.  The 
provocative ordinances of the Council of War of 1787-88, and the violence in Paris and 
the provinces in 1789, confirmed that the French army had redefined itself as something 
that closely resembled a citizen army, and the creation of the National Guard in that 
followed merely institutionalized changes that had already occurred. 
 In order to assess the drastic changes that transpired during this time, one must 
first understand the nature of the French army in the seventeenth and early eighteenth 
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centuries, principally during the reign of Louis XIV and Louis XV.  In this period, the 
French army represented the paragon of a European aristocratic army, even as it often 
relied on unconventional methods far from the aristocratic ideal.  This chapter will 
discuss the nature of the French army in three principal areas: its soldiers and officers, its 
style of combat, and its relationship with the rest of society.  These areas defined the 
character, parameters, and purpose of the French army, and all three areas drastically 
changed during the latter half of the eighteenth century. 
 The French army consisted of two main groups: officers (almost all nobles) and 
soldiers.  The French nobility, which primarily served the king as the officer corps for his 
army, operated under the ideals of honor and glory on the battlefield and received much 
of its education from stories derived from ancient Greek and Roman warfare.   They 
fought primarily to win glory for the king, for their distinguished families, and for 
themselves.  The soldiers who carried out their orders, on the other hand, could not 
expect to win glory or “noble” accolades.  They had either been pressed into service or 
had joined the army for the promise of shelter and plunder that the army provided.  This 
dynamic reinforced the difference in class that separated soldiers from their officers.  
Additionally, soldiers had little opportunity to advance from their position to an officer’s 
rank, regardless of their length of service or merit in battle.  Because the reasons for 
going to war in the seventeenth and early eighteenth century were largely dynastic or 
mercantile, neither group knew, or even cared, about having an over-arching cause for the 
war.  Rather than fighting for a patriotic or otherwise meaningful “cause”, both officers 
and soldiers found motivation in how the war would benefit themselves personally, 
professionally, or economically. 
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 In combat, the French army maintained a very strict code of conduct that honored 
the enemy and contrasted with the chaotic religious wars of the previous centuries.  After 
Europe had endured a series of religious wars between Catholics and Protestants, in 
which hundreds of thousands of people—including civilians, women, and children of all 
social classes—had been slaughtered in large wars and smaller domestic riots, warfare 
took on a more “limited” appearance.  No longer fueled by religious zealotry and hatred, 
monarchs and officers reasoned that they could fight in an enlightened, civilized, 
disciplined manner that spared civilians, and encouraged honorable surrenders that 
conserved the lives of soldiers and officers alike.   At the same time, however, French 
officers and the king often ordered their soldiers to terrorize civilians and relied on raids 
or scorched earth tactics to clinch a victory.  These partisan tactics appeared frequently in 
the Dutch Wars, the Nine Years’ War, and the War of the Austrian Succession.  This 
crudely violent partisan warfare undermined the official “limited warfare” policy, but it 
did maintain the ordered hierarchical structure of the French Army. 
 These dichotomies inherent within the philosophy and actual operations of the 
French army not only gave it a paradoxical edge, but over time rendered the French army 
less and less effective, until its nadir during the Seven Years’ War.  Part of the reason for 
the gradual decline of French efficiency was Louis XIV’s decision to institutionalize the 
French army and make it an instrument of the state.  Before 1650, the French army 
consisted of a loosely united collection of regiments that trained independent from any 
state regulation, but were deployed together when France went to war.  As part of this 
institutionalizing process, Louis XIV, with the help of his ministers of war, Louvois and 
LeTellier, designated high ranks as rewards for nobles who served him well or for court 
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favorites.  Over the next century, a side effect of this institutionalization process would be 
increasing the size of the officer corps to the breaking point, creating a situation where 
many officers were not qualified for their responsibilities and the army served only as a 
means for them to refresh their reputations and obtain advancement.   
 Probably the most drastic change that would occur between the seventeenth 
century, and the late eighteenth century was the relationship, or the development of one, 
between military and civilian spheres.  When considering the relationship between the 
French army and the rest of society, David A. Bell has argued that the two overlapped to 
such an extent during the old regime, that the word “civilian” was not even invented until 
the French Revolution.17  While Bell is correct that officers could glide between military 
and civilian life fairly easily, the common soldier and the ordinary citizens were entirely 
separate from, and even hostile to, each other.  From 1660 until 1789, no one could have 
failed to understand who served the king as an army officer, which was the most 
prestigious social position and who was a hopeful member of the “noblesse de robe,” 
who worked in the bureaucratic realm of the French government.  On the level of the 
soldiers and members of the third estate, the separation proved even starker, as soldiers 
preyed on civilians either as part of the logement, when they stayed in a town or village 
for the winter and resided in the homes of its residents, or as part of the royal force that 
extracted taxes or converted protestants.  Until the mid eighteenth century, subjects and 
soldiers considered each other enemies, and officers and ministers considered each other 
rivals.  Indeed, the separation between the army and the civilian worlds was so stark, that 
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the word “civilian” was not necessary until military and non-military spheres became 
nearly indistinguishable during the French Revolution. 
 While the French army sufficed in defending French borders and conquering 
beyond them during the reign of Louis XIV, the contradictions between its ideals and 
operations would eventually doom the army as an ineffective military force, unsuitable 
for completing missions in wartime.  Even at its aristocratic zenith, the army of Louis 
XIV contained the seeds of its own destruction. 
 
I. An Aristocratic Army  
 Understanding the officers of Louis XIV’s army requires understanding the 
prerogatives of Louis XIV, for the needs of the monarch and the needs of the aristocrats 
who constituted his officer corps built on one another, even after Louis XIV’s reign came 
to an end in 1715.  While France had had an army for centuries, Louis XIV united it, 
structured it, and placed it solely under his control, and therefore the control of the state.  
Indeed, Louis XIV’s army succeeded as an institution largely because he and the majority 
of the nobles who made up his officers corps seemed to meet each others’ needs.  Louis 
XIV’s army provided young, hot-blooded nobles with opportunities to establish and 
maintain their reputations according to their sense of honor, while at the same time 
uniting them under the king’s service, where they could be under royal control.  Louis 
XIV not only cultivated a strong army, but regulated his noble officers’ activities so that 
they would not waste France’s resources on inter-noble squabbles or dare to challenge the 
monarch. 
 17
 Louis XIV came to the throne in 1661 during a time of peace, thanks to his regent 
Mazarin’s effective diplomacy.  For a young king who had been taught that glory and 
greatness came through victory in warfare, inheriting a state during a time of relative 
peace caused great frustration.  His adult life confirmed this teaching as even women at 
court advertised their preferences for “soldiers” above all other men, for they, too, 
believed that the highest attainment of glory came through warfare.18  As Joël Cornette 
put it, “the king was thus invested in a formidable responsibility: to incarnate the ‘culture 
of war.’ . . . [F]rom his birth, the prince was raised with the idea of being the future king 
of war . . . He assume[d] these duties for his own glory, but also, and most of all, for the 
glory of the state.”19  Louis XIV needed to prove himself as an able monarch both to his 
subjects and to his European neighbors, and the most culturally accepted way to do so, 
especially in France, was through warfare.20   
 Louis XIV’s need for war also suited his officer corps, which almost exclusively 
consisted of men from the nobility.  They, too, had been schooled in war and needed an 
outlet that would allow them to prove themselves and to justify the privileges they 
received by right of birth.  For noble officers, courage, self-sacrifice, and honor were 
qualities that they needed to cultivate and display publicly in order to maintain their 
status.  These qualities determined their reputation and acceptance in society, but proved 
difficult to gain and easy to lose.  Officers had to continuously challenge themselves and 
overcome new obstacles in order to display their courage and honor before their peers.  
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Missteps in society or on the battlefield resulted in ridicule, disgrace, and a significant 
drop in social standing from which some nobles would never recover.21  Before the reign 
of Louis XIV, officers and nobles kept their honor and courage intact by participating in 
France’s wars, but also through duels and personal confrontations outside the realm of 
warfare.  Louis XIV harnessed their pre-existing desire for glory through violent 
confrontation and gave them a newly-organized venue in which to demonstrate it: a 
unified French army. 
 There had long been an army in France, but Louis XIV created a working military 
structure that tightened the organization and increased efficiency while further cultivating 
the officers’ thirst for gloire.  Because the purpose of the noble class for centuries had 
been to shed blood for the king, officers already based their self-worth on their 
performance as warriors.  As servants of the king, noble officers had the responsibility of 
building and maintaining their reputations and winning glory for king and country.  As 
Louis explained in his mémoires, “the name ‘French’ had acquired dignity, I do not 
consider it proper to leave my successor less than I had received.’”22  Louis felt pressure 
to bring glory to France and maintain its ‘dignity’, and he passed this priority on to his 
nobles.  When Louis XIV banned duels from his realm, he made it clear that the courage 
and honor derived from dueling must now be performed on the battlefield, as a part of his 
army.23 
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 French nobles prepared for these duties from a young age by studying the warfare 
and glory of ancient Greeks and Romans as well as their own family histories.  During 
the reign of Louis XIV, and continuing until the mid-eighteenth century, noble and 
military education consisted of a combination of book study and practical military 
experience.  As young boys, officers-to-be either attended a Jesuit college or received 
private tutoring at home and learned their letters and morals by the émulation of the 
heroes of antiquity.  This Jesuit-founded pedagogy emphasized a learn-by-imitation 
approach by having students copy Latin and Greek texts, thereby absorbing the language 
and writing style, while reveling in the laudable values of Caesar and Cato.24  According 
to educator Charles Rollin, who published a multi-volume series chronicling the exploits 
and virtues of ancient civilizations, studying the ancients naturally cultivated students’ 
critical reasoning, judgment, inquisitiveness, and good taste, while immersing them in the 
heroic deeds of the ancients, teaching them to love glory and virtue.25   
 By the mid-eighteenth century, the number of military schools had increased, 
including Louis XV’s Ecole Militaire, which provided instruction for poorer families of 
the noblesse d’épée and emphasized mathematics and military engineering.  In turn, the 
study of Latin and languages decreased for noble officers, but the emphasis on the 
ancients remained.  Officers were expected to understand tactical maneuvers of modern-
day generals and mathematics as well as have a thorough knowledge of ancient history.  
Studying the ancients provided French noble officers with a solid foundation for warfare 
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while also teaching them military virtues.  They drew directly on their studies of Sparta 
and Caesar in organizing and maintaining their regiments and in making battlefield 
decisions.26  Because of the general belief that military and political principles remained 
absolute, studying ancient warriors provided useful information and examples for 
contemporary militaires.  Military lessons, such as “distress[ing] the enemy more by 
famine than the sword” to achieve victory could best be learned by studying ancient 
authors and exploits, not accounts of more contemporary battles.27  From their earliest 
days, nobles learned that their duty in life was to imitate the ancients’ moral code and to 
use warfare as their primary means to achieve glory for the king and themselves.   
 Studying family histories contributed to this calling by providing more immediate 
examples of heroic deeds, self-sacrifice, and feats of glory.  These family histories served 
two principal purposes in the education of young nobles.  On one hand, they had 
examples before them of the “fine and glorious actions” for instruction on how they were 
to conduct themselves in battle, in court, and as a member of the family.28  At the same 
time, the fact that these stories came from young nobles’ ancestors inspired them, to 
“excite their nature and make them aspire to elevated things,” simply by “the 
contemplation of the fountain from which they derive.”29  These family histories further 
solidified the noble officer’s place in the continually unfolding story of his family and 
gave him a sense of his family’s expectations for his own life.  Stories of heroic deeds 
from his ancestors, whether true, fabricated, or exaggerated, served to cultivate a deep 
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sense of pride and even destiny in a young man of noble birth challenged to be worthy of, 
or even add to, his family’s name and legacy.30   
 In order to obtain gloire, noble officers relied on large, structured battles that 
allowed them to demonstrate military acumen and personal bravery.  Even when artillery, 
more than the sword, became the primary means of incurring casualties on the battlefield, 
officers found ways to exhibit individual heroism by exposing themselves to enemy fire.  
During the battle of Fontenoy, for example, 384 of the 5,161 casualties were officers.31  
These acts of courage only gained glory, however, if the officers’ peers witnessed the 
heroic deed, and if the officer achieved his mission.  As Vauban explained, “True gloire  . 
. . is only acquired by real and solid actions.”32  Officers gained glory by demonstrating 
their courage and exposing themselves to danger, but were not encouraged to do so 
lightly, or if doing so would gain little.  These acts of bravery also had to be visible to 
their fellow officers—and most French officers considered their appearance in battle as 
no insignificant detail.  They made themselves visible (and beautiful) by bringing some 
of the comforts of the court with them on campaign.  Even in combat, an officer’s dress 
and wig always properly adhered to the standards of his rank.  Their appearance 
accentuated the glory they won on the battlefield by maintaining their dignified 
appearance while winning it.33  Even though the world of war and the world of the court 
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seem to occupy opposite ends of the spectrum, the noble officers occupied both, and 
while on campaign two cultures intersected. 
 One of the officers who distinguished himself early in Louis XIV’s reign as the 
ideal exemplar of noble qualities was Henri Viscomte de Turenne, a Maréchal de France 
whom officers of all ranks respected highly until his death in 1675.  Though Turenne 
came from a relatively humble Calvinist family, he possessed a tremendous talent for 
warfare, and from his early days as a student, he showed great promise as an aspiring 
officer. 
 Turenne excelled at the warfare of his time, both by making wise tactical 
decisions and through his presence on the battlefield. He experienced one of his most 
glorious victories in the battle at Dunkirk, where he exhibited timely tactical maneuvers 
in the taking of Saint-Venant and demonstrated his bravery by exposing himself to enemy 
fire in the trenches that had been dug parallel to Dunkirk.34 He was personally involved in 
the battle by directing the siege, encouraging his soldiers, and instructing them how to 
advance under great stress and artillery fire.  While he performed well in sieges, he 
personally preferred battles of maneuver, and became quite adept at either avoiding 
conflict or by outmaneuvering his enemy before fully engaging him. He enjoyed a 
reputation for being a “father” to his men by ensuring that they never wanted for food or 
other necessities.35   
 As Turenne exemplified, the principles that governed France’s officer corps did 
lead to success in warfare.  Turenne had the talent and education necessary to be an 
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effective officer.  He dedicated himself to the glory of the king, and the advancement of 
the king’s interests, not his own personal gain.  To cultivate the most effective army 
possible, Turenne provided his men with sufficient supplies, meaningful training, and 
direct instructions during battle.  Turenne kept himself in a continual state of readiness 
for battle by spending a great deal of time with his men and shunning the excesses of the 
French court.  The principles of nobility were, therefore, conducive to the maintenance of 
a strong officer corps, and therefore an effective army.  Few other officers, however, 
embodied them so perfectly. 
 The soldiers who carried out French officers’ commands occupied and operated in 
a wholly distinct sphere at the opposite end of the social spectrum from the noble-
dominated officer corps.  They were, according to officers, derived from a lower order of 
human being.  Maurice de Saxe faulted recuriters for their “odious” custom of “putting 
money in [a young man’s] pocket and telling him that he is a soldier.”36  Jacques Antoine 
Hippolyte, comte de Guibert, an eighteenth-century tactician, referred to the soldiers with 
pity as “the most vile and miserable class.”37    While some scholarship can present 
isolated incidents indicating that there may have existed, despite these observations, a 
more polished and professional soldier, the impression that officers had of their soldiers 
remained poor.38 While nobles fought for honor and glory for the king and themselves, 
soldiers joined the army for other, baser reasons. 
                                                 
36
 Maurice de Saxe, Memoires sur l’art de la guerre (Paris, 1956), 8. 
 
37
 Jacques Antoine Hippolyte, comte de Guibert, “Essai Général de Tactique” in Ecrits Militaires ed. Henri 
Ménard (Paris: Copernic Press, 1977), 56. 
 
38
 Duffy, The Military Experience, 89; Lynn, Battle, 124. 
 24
 Many soldiers joined the army to escape debt, experience travel and adventure, 
and enrich themselves with pillage.  The army offered, at least in principle, these 
opportunities plus regular food, drink, clothes, and some form of shelter.  These offerings 
often proved less than ideal or nonexistent, and should a soldier become sick or wounded, 
he was more likely to meet his death in an army “hospital” than on the battlefield.39  
Soldiers also garnered little respect from serving in battle.  Guibert claimed that “the 
soldier, under his flags, continues to be unhappy and despised.”40  Because soldiers did 
not have any personal investment in the outcome of the war, and because they had little 
hope of advancement through the ranks, soldiers had little opportunity to attain the gloire 
that was reserved exclusively for the officers.  The lack of an apparent cause that justified 
the soldiers’ sufferings, which often included lack of food and common necessities, 
frequently led to desertion, which the Sieur de la Balme considered the “true scourge of 
the army.”  Deserters not only robbed the French army of well-trained soldiers (for 
training could take up to two years to complete), but were likely to “enrich the blood” of 
enemy armies, and be used against France.41  Such actions only confirmed the disdainful 
view most officers had of their soldiers.    
 Even though both officers and soldiers belonged to the same army, their interests 
and values remained utterly polarized, rather than united in a common cause.  Officers’ 
contempt for their own soldiers may have been part of the noble officers’ aristocratic 
“warrior mentality” that “presented the foot soldier, if at all, as crude and violent more 
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often than courageous.”42  By deeming the soldiers as ‘crude and violent,’ officers were 
able to cast themselves as the army’s only source of courage, honor, and self-sacrifice, 
made more apparent by the direct contrast with their troops.  Some officers believed so 
heartily in the vile nature of soldiers that they did not even wish to share the same field as 
the very men they commanded, often disdaining drill during peacetime and preferring to 
reside at court.43  Turenne’s treatment of his men—providing them with sufficient 
supplies and training and then accompanying them into battle—had made his campaigns 
largely successful, but few officers followed his example.   
 In fact, few officers possessed Turenne’s “je ne sais quoi” that made him such a 
successful military officer.  Turenne perfectly embodied the ideals of an aristocratic 
officer, but he also possessed other traits that made those ideals flourish.  Louis XIV tried 
to harness those qualities that made for honorable and victorious military officers, but 
instead he institutionalized a set of norms without capturing the noble essence that made 
those norms successful.  In institutionalizing the army, Louis XIV betrayed the noble 
ethos, by creating a set of standards that nearly anyone could achieve.  Although this 
brought a level of standardization to the army, something seen as a positive step in most 
military institutions, in this case it would reduce the French army from a results-oriented 
institution to a process-oriented one.  Eventually, so long as an individual met the 
requirements, he could receive high rank and accolades without achieving success on or 
off the battlefield or replicating Turenne’s victories.  Because the French army became 
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more like an orderly machine, people who would usually not be considered qualified 
could complete a series of steps to advance a career in the army. 
 This institutionalization of the officer corps proved to be its undoing.  By the 
death of Louis XIV, the number of soldiers had grown to 100,000, but the officer corps 
had ballooned to over 20,000 officers creating a great deal of disruption and tension in 
the army.  In regulating and creating standards for the army that measured personal 
gloire, the king had also made it possible for members of the nobility with little talent in 
military duties, but great wealth, to obtain a place, and even senior rank, in the French 
army.  The likelihood of having wealthy if unprepared officers became more attractive 
(and destructive) as armies grew in size and expense.  Because officers had to pay for 
their regiments, wealthy nobles were more likely to obtain rank than their poorer 
counterparts.  By the 1700s, it was not uncommon for officers from old, distinguished 
families who had held rank in the army for generations to go into such great debt trying 
to supply and maintain their regiments, that they had to eventually sell them to wealthy 
financiers’ sons, whose recently ennobled families lacked the prestige, history, and 
upbringing believed to be so essential in creating a worthy officer.44  While Louis XIV 
did not perceive any problems within the officer corps between old and wealthy families, 
his codification of aristocratic values would make this a problem in the eighteenth 
century.   
 
II.  Limited Rhetoric, Partisan Tactics 
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 The period from 1650 through 1789 consisted of a unique time when political, 
economic, and intellectual trends conspired to make the warfare of this period one where 
combatants “shoot each other politely.”45  Unlike the bloody and passionate Wars of 
Religion that preceded and Wars of Revolution that followed, the military culture of 
honor, reputation, and discipline of this era was intended to be consistent with the style of 
warfare of the period, which most historians classify as ‘limited.’  Warfare in the 
eighteenth century had specific and achievable goals usually involving the nationality of 
a sliver of land, or determining which monarch would have access to certain trade routes.  
Monarchs of the time respected the ‘balance of power’ in Europe, and did not want to 
overturn it by unseating a ruler or completely overtaking a country.46  The logistical 
difficulties of providing for the large armies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
restricted the campaign season to a period of about five months.  Battles and sieges could 
be costly affairs in both men and money, meaning that generals avoided combat if they 
could, and preferred to maneuver the enemy into a corner that would prompt immediate 
surrender.47 
 Beyond these practical matters, historians have presented this period of warfare as 
‘limited’ because it coincided with the enlightenment, and enlightenment reasoning 
supposedly affected the very means of making war.  Beginning with the era of Louis 
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XIV, and lasting through the eighteenth century, monarchs and officers adopted 
“enlightened” ideas of moderation and reason.  They discouraged violence against 
civilians, and had stringent rules to prevent their soldiers from plundering towns in their 
path.  Officers even agreed with Voltaire that the continued use of cannon and shot to 
settle disagreements between powers was obsolete in an enlightened age.48  If war was to 
be waged, it had to be waged as humanely as possible. 
 War during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is also often represented as a 
‘gentlemanly game’ between aristocrats, who supposedly felt more connected to each 
other through class and status than to their ‘nations.’  Officers of similar social ranks did 
believe in an obligation to treat each other with respect and chivalry.  French and English 
officers in particular sought to outdo each other in polite conduct on the battlefield.  The 
religious wars had brought on a “growing distaste for violence” that, until the national 
fervor of the French Revolution, demanded the lessening of violence during warfare.49 
 In spite of the prevailing mores of aristocratic culture and “limited” warfare, 
officers still inflicted brutal violence against civilians and often used less honorable, 
visible forms of warfare to obtain the victories necessary for obtaining gloire.  Even 
historians who study war in this time period and characterize battle as ‘limited’, cannot 
agree on the exact parameters of it, or which aspects reined in the violence.  Supporters of 
this paradigm admit that civilians often got caught in a vicious crossfire, and that war, 
even ‘limited’ war, was still “hell,” suggesting that perhaps warfare in the seventeenth 
                                                 
48
 Russell F. Weigley, The Age of Battles, The Quest for Decisive Warfare from Breitenfeld to Waterloo 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), 195; John Nef, War and Human Progress, an Essay on the 
rise of Industrial Civilization (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), 157, 165; M.S. Anderson, War 
and Society in Europe of the Old Regime, 1618-1789 (London: Fontana Press, 1988), 260; Preston and 
Wise, Men in Arms, 133-149. 
 
49
 Anderson, War and Society in Europe of the Old Regime, 189; Christopher Duffy, The Military 
Experience in the Age of Reason, 11-12; John Nef, War and Human Progress, 250-251. 
 29
and eighteenth centuries was not as “limited” as some historians of the period would like 
to believe.50  Even Turenne, the archetype of military honor and ability, consistently and 
plentifully supplied his men by preying on foreign civilians, allowing his soldiers to 
pillage and feed off undefended townspeople and villagers.51  Often unmentioned in this 
discussion of ‘limited warfare’ is the fact that there existed, alongside these big battles 
and sieges that inspired paintings and tapestries hanging in Versailles, a great deal of 
partisan warfare that necessitated extreme, murderous violence.  Although noble officers 
generally conducted honorable warfare that fulfilled their obligations to family and king, 
they also would not hesitate to put aside those ideals in order to ensure a victory or 
solidify a defense.  While officers conducted their sieges and large-scale battles on 
‘gentlemanly terms’, small warfare or petite guerre displayed an entirely opposite picture 
of war, one of surprising brutality. 
 While Louis XIV cultivated an army of honor in search of glory, he, his ministers, 
and his officers did not shrink from conducting warfare that went counter to their 
aristocratic values.  Partisan warfare, “petite guerre,” or small warfare, in which a handful 
of soldiers and an officer or sergeant would conduct small raids or brief violent 
encounters to harass the enemy, was employed for practical purposes and used brutal 
tactics.  The Dutch Wars present a plethora of examples when partisan warfare provided 
supplies, handicapped the Dutch army, prepared terrain for sieges, and pushed the 
country toward surrender.  While this use of partisan warfare was integral to winning the 
Dutch War, as George Satterfield argued, it also involved pure brutality.  None of the 
activity in the Dutch War, however, could compare with the unprovoked furor that Louis 
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XIV and his army unleashed against the German Palatinate at the beginning of the Nine 
Years’ War.  In large European sieges and battles, Louis XIV upheld the idea of 
‘gentlemanly war’, but in small warfare, Louis XIV encouraged brutality, and even 
though officers emphasized discipline, they also encouraged their soldiers to murder and 
pillage when it suited the army’s needs.  A clear discrepancy between behavior and ideals 
reveals the unique sense of morality that the French applied to warfare.  Rather than an 
‘enlightened’ European army, the French partisan tactics resembled something most 
Europeans would associate with the atrocities of the Thirty Years War or even the 
brutality found in the New World. 
 Unlike Louis XIV’s first war, the War of Devolution, which lasted only a year 
and won territory and glory for the young monarch, the Dutch Wars, while promising at 
the outset to be similarly short and glorious, turned into a prolonged, bloody, expensive 
entanglement, in which Louis XIV would have to outlast rather than squarely defeat his 
slippery Dutch enemy.  The reasons for the Dutch Wars are diplomatically complex, but 
in short, Louis XIV, and the majority of his ministers, agreed that obtaining the southern 
areas of the low countries would benefit France militarily and economically.  John Wolf 
downplays the pursuit of gloire in Louis XIV’s decision to go to war, but the fact that 
Louis XIV was a bellicose young king in search of a means to prove himself on the 
battlefield played no small roll in his decision to attack.  Louis XIV also intended to 
‘punish’ the Dutch for challenging France economically and politically.  To quote Paul 
Sonnino, they “had preempted the position of his kingdom in commerce, blown up his 
navy, and suppressed the authority of his kindred house of Orange in their state.”52 
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 The Dutch Wars saw small warfare and brief but forceful moments of violence as 
decisive in the overall conflict.  While the monumental and bloody sieges typically take 
center stage in histories of the Dutch Wars, such as Vauban’s masterful Siege of 
Maastracht, partisan warfare paved the way for French success in many larger 
encounters, and ensured French superiority in supply and communication.  These small 
raids, partisan fighting, and violent actions against non-combatants were therefore 
necessary for French victory.53  The type of violence most effectively employed by Louis 
XIV’s army resembled something from the religious wars, but with a more directed aim.  
Violence during the Wars of Religion and the Thirty Years’ War featured many atrocities 
that were the work of undisciplined soldiers on a rampage, or religious zealots venting 
their passions.  During the Dutch Wars, however, French officers harnessed that type of 
violence for their own purpose, and used partisan warfare for logistical and strategic 
purposes. 
 Partisan activity in enemy villages employed brutal measures to garner money or 
supplies.  Thanks to the ‘bureau of contributions’ that Louis XIV established during the 
War of Devolution, non-combatants of the Spanish Netherlands shouldered part of the 
burden to supply and fund French troops.  French dragoons threatened to burn and pillage 
a community if the residents did not pay the required ‘contribution’ consisting of money 
and supplies—a prospect frightening enough to ensure that most villages would pay their 
enemies to invade and occupy their territory.  In addition to supplying the French army, 
these ‘war taxes’ sapped resources that otherwise would have supplied the enemy.54   
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 Another means of obtaining lodging, money, and supply from non-combatants 
consisted of sending ‘safe-guards’ to protect the village from wandering troops.  Even if a 
village was not singled out for paying a war tax, it could still come to a fiery end if it fell 
in the path of a wandering band of troops in search of supplies and plunder.  French ‘safe 
guards’ consisted of small collections of French troops sworn to protect towns against 
wandering groups of soldiers—for a price.55  This price included quartering the safe-
guarding troops, a universally unpleasant task, and providing for the necessities every 
soldier required of his host for his upkeep: wood for fire, vinegar, candles, access to a 
bowl and cooking pot, and decent bedding.56 Unfortunately for the hosts, most troops—
even those sworn to protect the town or village—also stole food and animals, sold their 
hosts’ possessions, and preyed on the town’s women.  Safe guarding, therefore, not only 
consumed supplies that could have gone to the Spanish army, but it also sapped the 
morale of the populace.  The “bureau of contributions” and “safe-guards” provided two 
means for the French army to not only supply itself, but to consume its enemy’s supplies 
–all under the sanction of the French government. 
 French partisans further targeted civilians by conducting raids in villages adjacent 
to future battle sites in order to weaken the area so as to render it incapable of resisting 
any French action before anticipated battles or sieges.  Even though the primary goal of 
raids was to weaken an area before a larger battle by pillaging and burning, they were not 
conducted haphazardly by plunder-hungry troops.  Each band of partisan troops fought 
under the watchful eye and direction of an officer, and commanders strategically chose 
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the sites for raiding.  Any soldier who strayed from the exact location chosen for 
destruction, or who departed from established means of destruction and partook in 
unauthorized plunder, faced dire punishments, including hanging.57  Louvois directly 
ordered an increase in the frequency and intensity of the raids on villages in 1675 and 
1676, when he was pushing the war to a close.  He reasoned that if Dutch civilians 
reached their threshold of suffering, they would demand that their government end the 
war, whatever the cost.58  Calculated suffering of civilians therefore comprised part of the 
overall French strategy to bring long or costly wars to a close.     
 The partisans who carried out this effective, irregular, warfare were not trained by 
the French army to raid, burn, and terrorize.  Instead, the French army hired or 
incorporated highwaymen, criminals, or deserters from either the French or Spanish 
armies who were practiced at this kind of attack.59  These unsavory characters already 
possessed many of the skills required for petite guerre, based on their previous devious 
dealings, which made them especially suited for raids and ambushes.  Once incorporated 
into the French army, they fought in small groups.  Operating away from the main army, 
they sought cover and concealment during their raids, behind walls, barns, or bushes to 
stay hidden as long as possible and then be protected from return fire.60  Once they 
achieved their missions, they retreated back to the main army.  The officers assigned to 
direct their activities did come from the regular line army, however, and they, too, were 
often chosen for their abilities to lead small-scale missions.  Even if the French army did 
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not yet teach this style of warfare, officers from the highest-ranking commanders to 
novice lieutenants knew how to use it for their larger purposes. 
 While the Dutch wars provide an excellent laboratory in which to observe the 
practical uses of French partisan warfare, the Nine Years’ War demonstrates how 
destructive Louis XIV’s army could be on a large scale.  Louis XIV’s “great 
miscalculation” in this war was that he intended for it to conclude after four months, but 
it stretched from 1688 to 1697.  While Louis XIV’s intentions in this war were purely 
defensive—he wanted to fortify the borderlands between France and the German states—
the rest of Europe read his initial actions as offensive, trying to gobble up more land and 
power, a view that was not inconsistent with Louis XIV’s earlier conquests.  The Allied 
response against France proved to be quite forceful, and as France found itself entangled 
in a long, expensive war, it increased in savagery to force a peace.   
 The initial actions of the French army in the Nine Years’ War were not unusual, 
though they were little-mentioned in the seventeenth century.  When on campaign, armies 
would purposely turn the area around them into “belts of waste” not only as a means of 
supplying their own armies from the surrounding countryside, but also to make sure that 
enemy armies could not encroach on their newly-won territory.61  Not only would this 
support their own advance, but protect their bordering provinces from having to undergo 
the same treatment by enemy forces.  It is important to note, however, that these areas 
would not be entirely destroyed and burned to the ground, but weakened and sapped of 
resources only to the point where the area would be incapable of hosting another army. 
                                                 
61
 Ronald Thomas Ferguson, “Blood and Fire: Contribution Policy of the French Armies in Germany, 
1668-1715,” (Ph.D. diss. University of Minnesota, 1970), 16. 
 35
 While some level of devastation of occupied territory was customary practice for 
European armies—even the French treatment of the Dutch during the Dutch Wars was 
considered acceptable practice—the devastation of the German Palatinate garnered a 
particularly strong reaction of horror from European contemporaries.  The French army 
did not just destroy the targeted towns and lay waste to the surrounding countryside, but 
it terrorized the populace in particularly brutal ways that had not been seen since the 
Wars of Religion.62  In this instance, however, it was not the fury of religious zeal that lay 
at the root of this bloodshed, but according to Louis XIV’s senior military advisors, 
military necessity.63  Even this ‘military necessity’ has been questioned by 
contemporaries and scholars alike, as Louis XIV was not responding to an “immediate, 
precise ‘necessity’, but used strategy [that had been] decided upon and perfected in cold 
blood far from the places of combat, and [as] a ‘defensive strategy’ applied far from the 
borders.”64 
 Louis XIV declared war on the German states in a Mémoire des Raisons, which 
he released for circulation in September of 1688, then promptly began his campaign the 
following day, before the Mémoire would have even had the opportunity to arrive in 
German territory.  Louis XIV did not believe the war could possibly last more than three 
or four months, and foresaw ‘preemptive’ invasion of the German states as a way to 
further expedite the process.  His initial actions consisted only of taking German forts 
directly on the French/German border: Philippsburg, Mannheim, and Frankenthal, which, 
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surprised by the unforeseen French invasion, surrendered to the French army with 
relatively little conflict.  Over a dozen neighboring towns surrendered as well, and the 
fortress of Mainz conceded to the garrisoning of French troops.  Louis XIV’s army met 
with resistance, however, at Koblenz, which refused to surrender.  In response, Louis 
XIV ordered it to be bombed into submission, then gutted and burned.  The French 
monarch had expected that the German states would have surrendered by this point and 
the war would be over.  Instead, several German princes had allied against Louis XIV, 
and the Imperial Diet officially declared war on France in January of 1689.  The quick 
and dirty war that Louis had projected had now become a long and tedious affair. 
 Earlier in October of 1688, one of Louvois’ senior military advisors, Chamlay, 
had suggested entirely destroying the city of Mannheim, not just destroying the walls and 
using the buildings and homes to garrison soldiers during the winter, but to “put it to the 
sword and plow it under,” obliterating its existence completely.65  Now that the war 
looked to be a long one, Louvois and King Louis XIV himself agreed.  This destruction 
would consist of more than the usual collection of contributions from the local 
inhabitants, but of complete obliteration.  By laying waste to some of the region along the 
Rhine, Louis XIV would protect France from any possibility of being invaded by German 
forces and also punish the Germans for their obstinacy.  Louis XIV even plotted out the 
precise cities slated for destruction on a map, then unleashed his army. 
 The French army began with the town of Heidelberg on March 2, 1689, where 
they chased out all of the inhabitants and burned to the ground all but five buildings, an 
oversight which made Louvois furious.  They then turned their attention to Mannheim, 
where French officers gave the residents four days to remove their belongings, relocate to 
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Alsace, and, for efficiency’s sake, set their own homes on fire as they departed.  This last 
order the Mannheim residents refused to do, and on March 8, the French troops burned 
the town to the ground themselves.  The French army further forced some of the local 
young men to stay behind to help with the destruction of every building, from hut to 
mansion, so that the German armies would later be entirely incapable of finding any kind 
of shelter.  To complete this ‘belt of destruction’, senior commanders then ordered the 
obliteration of all towns within ten miles of Mannheim, over twenty towns in all.  Some 
of these towns, such as Oppenheim and Worms, had already surrendered to the French, 
and had had all of their fortifications destroyed, but complete destruction called for the 
razing of every barn and hut in the village, and the villagers displaced to French 
provinces. In some areas where the French army had demanded tribute, senior officers 
commanded, as a way to increase the rate of payments, burning of all the major castles in 
the area until the money was paid in full. 
 During this destruction, officers of course made an effort to keep their troops 
under control, but soldiers could not very well be told to burn down an entire house 
without first helping themselves to whatever plunder might still be inside.  In one 
infamous episode, a band of soldiers saved all the wine in the cellar of a doomed mansion 
by consuming it on the spot.66  Their subsequent condition did not, of course, lend itself 
to orderly conduct while razing the town.  The residents of these towns who had not had 
the time or opportunity to abandon their homes received appalling abuse. One writer in 
particular recounted how French soldiers found vent for their “evil passions” in the 
women of the towns, not stopping at gang-raping pregnant women in the streets or in the 
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cellars of their homes, even forcing the victims’ husbands to watch.67  These actions, and 
many more of their kind, of course led to brutal reprisals from the victimized Germans, 
further inspiring French troops to excessive violence, resulting in a cycle of destruction 
that lasted until the entire area had been laid waste.   
 French officers must have been conscious of what havoc their soldiers would 
wreak on the unfortunate populace; even if they offered token commands to maintain 
discipline and order, pillaging and assaults inevitably occurred.  Yet this did not seem to 
perturb the senior officers, who had proposed these very measures for the protection of 
French borders.  The entire event struck Europe as excessive, for even if creating pockets 
of uninhabitable land had become a typical measure for all European armies, the targeted, 
brutal violence against the populace, the size of the ‘belts’ of waste, and the totality of 
destruction seemed to have overstepped the rules for warfare in the late seventeenth 
century.  Europe had not seen anything like it in scope and intensity since the Thirty 
Years War, and pamphlets condemned French conduct as worse than that of “Turks and 
Devils” combined.68  Even though Europe witnessed similar violence in the Dutch wars, 
the extremity of the violence struck an ominous chord that reverberated throughout 
Europe. 
 These examples of French actions in the Dutch Wars and the Nine Years’ War 
characterize the extent to which the French army was willing to brutalize, terrorize and 
demoralize their enemies to achieve military goals.  The French army was rooted in 
contradiction.  Their military culture emphasized honor and obtaining glory for self, king, 
and country through the use of stringently disciplined troops.  They practiced war in an 
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era that promoted reason above violence and the protection of civilians.  When 
conducting large sieges or battles, in a ‘public’ arena, French officers exhibited these 
values of honor and restraint.  In much of the small warfare they conducted, however, 
when they were not directly pitted against the opposing army, but against smaller bands 
of troops or civilians, officers ordered their soldiers to commit atrocities, allowed them to 
pillage and burn in chosen areas, and planned the wholesale obliteration of targeted towns 
for limited gains. 
 The French army did not cease to use partisan warfare and scorched-earth tactics 
with the death of Louis XIV.  Another stunning example of successful petite guerre 
appeared in the War of the Austrian succession, which Louis XV waged from 1740 to 
1748.  The French army attacked the Netherlands with fury, recalling their attack on the 
same area during the Dutch Wars.69  Here again, the French hacked and pillaged their 
way through the Netherlands, committing the worst atrocities at Bergen-op-Zoom, the 
principal fortress of Dutch Brabant.   
 After having weakened the defenses of the fortress, French troops came bursting 
through the walls and over the ramparts on the night of September 15-16, 1747.  Dutch 
guards, sleepy and ill-prepared for the unexpected onslaught, tried to pick off French 
troops as they entered the fort, but could not present a united front against the invasion.  
French soldiers took advantage of the lack of preparation to utterly destroy the city.  One 
French narrator described them as “lions in fury . . . They massacred, raped and pillaged 
                                                 
69
 M.S. Anderson, The War of the Austrian Succession, 1740-1748 (New York: Logman, 1995), 172. 
 40
the town . . .”70  The next morning, the same narrator noted that camp followers bought 
up what remained of the plunder and immediately began to sell it as legitimate goods.   
 The French army at Bergen-op-Zoom in the aftermath of the attack presented a 
conflicting image of the French officers regretting the carnage, while at the same time 
accepting it for its benefit to the French army and its advances in the war.  It was no 
secret among the French officers that “our troops are crueler and harsher in pillaging than 
any others,” yet they did not seem perturbed by this incident.71  Lieutenant General 
Lowendahl, the second in command to General Choiseul by the end of the war, expressed 
a token regret over having been unable “to guarantee this wretched town from pillage.”  
He then immediately acknowledged that the ruin of Bergen-op-Zoom “has enriched the 
army prodigiously, and I hope that it will render it as audacious as it will humiliate that of 
the enemy.”72   From looking at the French reaction to their handy-work, it is clear that 
they were both sickened by it while simultaneously resigned to its necessity and not too 
eager to find alternate means to enrich their army and weaken the enemy.  Outright 
destruction appeared to achieve their goals sufficiently.  Both junior and senior officers 
had come to accept the bloody broken eggs that were necessary to make a victorious 
French omelet. 
 The known success of partisan warfare was also expressed in French 
incorporation of light troops into its standard units of soldiers.  The Marshale de Saxe had 
introduced a more regimented use of light troops to the French army based on his 
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experiences with the Hapsburg armies fighting the Turks in earlier wars.  After 1743, 
both Hapsburg and French armies regularly used light and irregular troops, even in 
pitched battles, to harass enemy flanks, disrupt communication, and aid with 
reconnaissance.73  While the French had used partisan troops for similar purposes during 
the Dutch Wars seventy years prior, by the 1740s, the use of partisans had been 
institutionalized.  French officers could receive special training and properly prepare 
French troops for partisan warfare, which was employed more regularly within larger 
operations, as opposed to outside or just before a major battle or siege.  
 From these three inspections of the Dutch Wars, the Nine Years’ War, and the 
War of Austrian succession, it is evident that the French army had a tradition of using 
partisan tactics and targeting civilians to achieve their ends.  These wars, and the other 
three major wars that occurred during this time period (the War of Devolution, the War of 
Spanish Succession, and the War of Polish succession), certainly feature the larger, more 
impressive battles and sieges that are typically showcased in the historiography.  More 
recent studies, however, are uncovering unconventional forms of fighting during this time 
period that suggest that European armies continued to use the extreme violence 
associated with the execution of battles during the religious wars, supposedly abandoned 
for more ‘enlightened’ or ‘limited’ means of making war.  These types of violence cannot 
be blamed on soldiers running amok, literally drunk with plunder and disorderliness, 
because the officers planned this type of violence, ordered it, and did very little to restrain 
troops.  As Hervé Dévillon observed, “These cruel operations in Holland and in the 
Palatinate show the emergence of a new form of war-time violence.”  Unlike similar 
modes of destruction during the Thirty Years’ War, which were acts of hungry and 
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poorly disciplined soldiers, “the recourse to destruction was . . . premeditated and made 
to serve a larger strategy.  The assumed necessity and the eventual benefits of such 
operations proceeded directly from a calculation effected by the central authority.”74 The 
study of these forms of violence is relatively new in European military historiography, 
and no doubt there are many more such instances that remain to be studied. 
 The War of the Polish Succession (1733-1738), a little studied event that offers 
more to the diplomatic historian than one interested in battle, may be the one example of 
an ‘enlightened’ war.  As John Sutton states, “this war was perhaps the best example of 
all” for limited warfare, because “the diplomatic and military conventions of the time . . . 
were observed with great care,” and these restraints, “kept the war within bounds.”75  
That this war is singled out as unique in its limited nature again proves that the nature of 
European warfare from 1648-1763 was typically bloody and untamed.   In the Age of 
Limited Warfare, there was only one limited war.   
 
III. French Amy and French Society in Conflict 
 France’s use of partisan warfare in a ‘limited age’ could be interpreted as an 
example of the extreme lengths the French monarch was willing to go in order to protect 
his people from outside invasion.  The burning of the German Palatinate was, at its core, 
a defensive, preemptive action to secure French borders.  Louis XIV’s use of the army to 
protect French territory was consistent, however, with the way he deployed the army 
against his own subjects.  In addition to protecting or extending French borders, the 
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French army also operated as a “federal” police force.  When French soldiers wintered in 
civilian villages or towns, and especially when they used coercive measures to extract 
taxes or conversions from the French populace, they used the same kinds of partisan 
violence as they did against Dutch or German subjects.  Even though the word “civilian” 
did not come into common usage until the Revolutionary era, civilians and soldiers 
operated in entirely different, and wholly conflicting spheres throughout the early modern 
period.76  While soldiers and civilians often intermingled in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, they considered themselves as different peoples and were 
endemically hostile to each other.  This use of French soldiers against French subjects, 
and the entirely different cultures of these two groups, meant that the French civil-
military relations were abysmal. 
 Unlike officers, French soldiers operated outside the sphere of honor and glory.  
Even if officers, war ministers, or the king himself ordered soldiers to enact horrendous 
violence against civilians, it would not necessarily darken their honor, because soldiers 
were expected to act on a more violent, less restrained plane than their refined, honor-
bound officers.  Officers used the soldiers’ reputation as a means to perpetrate violence 
against civilians in foreign wars and especially in domestic conflicts.  Louis XIV used his 
soldiers against his own subjects to collect taxes, convert reluctant protestants, and quell 
any domestic revolts.  Soldiers and civilians therefore viewed each other as natural 
enemies, a view that was constantly confirmed in violent exchanges between the two. 
 One of the more common ways in which soldiers and citizens of France interacted 
was through quartering.  Before and during the reign of Louis XIV, when official military 
barracks were few and far between, soldiers would lodge in homes in small towns or 
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villages.  The government regulated this logement carefully, but this practice nearly 
always imposed a heavy burden on the shoulders of the unfortunate hosts.  Hosts had to 
provide for the basic food and shelter needs of the soldiers, but often soldiers demanded 
more and became destructive: demanding that families entertain and serve their friends, 
stealing food, selling the family’s possessions when they felt they were not being 
properly fed or housed, and preying on the women.  Severity in these crimes depended on 
the individual soldier and the circumstances of his logement, but citizens regarded 
quartering with universal fear and aversion, to the point where towns would go to great 
lengths to avoid having to quarter soldiers, and women reportedly trembled at their very 
approach.77  Louis XIV could use quartering therefore as a means of coercing his people 
into paying unpopular taxes or converting Protestants.  Because soldiers had a 
frightening, violent reputation, they could coerce people using techniques that even Louis 
XIV would deem excessive, especially in the case of converting stubborn Protestants. 
 Louis XIV had considered the Protestants of France residing in the southern 
regions to be a blemish on his reign.  Before revoking the Edict of Nantes that protected 
protestant strongholds, Louis XIV wanted to force the conversion of as many Protestants 
as possible without appearing to be targeting them specifically.  He therefore ordered 
troops to lodge with protestant households until they converted.  Louis XIV never 
planned to convert or eradicate all of the protestants in 1681 when he sent the first batch 
of troops.  He planned to diminish the number of protestants in the area to a small enough 
minority (2 or 3 to 1) so that if and when he decided that he no longer wanted protestants 
in his kingdom, he could eradicate them without much resistance.  Louis feared reprisals 
from neighboring protestant nations, such as England, if they sensed his plan of 
                                                 
77
 Lynn, Giant of the Grande Siècle, 162-165. 
 45
exterminating the last wind of Protestantism in France.  He consequently instructed 
occupying troops to treat their protestant hosts well and to avoid all violence, but counted 
on the officers to look the other way when troops made themselves particularly 
unwelcome guests. 
 While staying with protestants, soldiers destroyed furniture, killed animals, and 
abused their hosts.  In his journal chronicling the dragonnade occupation in Poitou and 
his family’s eventual escape to Holland, Jean Migault recounted several incidents of 
property destruction and personal abuse from the soldiers, especially against his poor 
wife.  In one instance, Migault recalled witnessing the soldiers destroy all his wooden 
furniture to create a great bonfire in the house, then  
believing they would win [his wife] over with their threats, swore and 
blasphemed the name of God . . . saying that they would burn her if she 
did not convert.  And while these executioners took their turns torturing 
her, they did not win over her soul . . .  She was yet so weakened by this 
great heat, that . . . she afterwards showed hardly any sign of feeling or 
comprehension.78 
 
 According to Migault, the goal of the king was clear, for none of the ‘papistes’ 
were forced to host soldiers, and as soon as a family converted, the soldiers left their 
house to prey on the neighbors.  In the meantime, if a family resisted the conversion and 
did not pay the occupier a daily allowance appropriate for their rank or office, the troops 
would sell the family’s belongings and animals to obtain their desired salary.79 
 These actions did draw attention and protest from protestant princes in other 
states, and Louvois had to recall the army for a short period.  The coerced conversions 
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continued at a steady rate, however, until 1685, when the majority of Protestants had 
converted or managed, like Migault, to discreetly escape.  There remained, however, 
enclaves of stubborn Protestants who withstood all of Louis XIV’s coercive efforts, 
especially in Languedoc, southwestern France, and the Alpine region.  When Louvois 
gave the order to “diminish as much as possible the number of Protestants in the region of 
Bordeaux,” the resulting atrocities were apparently so horrendous that Louvois had to 
ensure that Louis never heard the worst of them.80  Even in cases when violence escalated 
to the point where the king himself would object, war ministers, officers, the soldiers who 
executed the violence, showed no compunction about executing violence against fellow 
French subjects—protestant or not.   
 Beyond unpleasant occupation, logement, or the threat of logement, sometimes 
resulted in civil war, in which soldiers and subjects engaged in actual combat.  When 
occupation or outright attacks occurred in towns or villages, civilians would take up what 
weapons existed at their disposal to defend themselves against the soldiers.  Civil war, for 
example, broke out in several places over the new tax policies of Colbert, which, 
rendered temporary taxes, implemented solely for the purpose of raising funds during a 
war, a permanent fixture for the provinces in 1661.  This caused a great deal of upheaval 
from the western region of Bordeaux—where the rebellion was quashed rather quickly by 
the king’s troops—to southern provincial towns, where the rebels made a more staunch 
resistance to the hated taxes.  Jean-Antoine du Roure, a petty noble with some military 
experience in the local militia, gathered 4,000 armed men who attacked the homes of the 
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wealthy nobility in the province as a protest against the tax.81  In response, an impressive 
army of about 4,500 soldiers assembled just a small distance from du Roure and his men.  
The soldiers and rebels never had the opportunity to fight an all-out battle, because the 
royal troops attacked the rebels in the middle of the night, killing them in their beds.82   
 In this situation, as with some of the other small tax rebellions in Bordeaux and 
Boulonnais, French peasant bands proved little match for the royal soldiers.  While the 
rebels might have the upper hand for a short amount of time, the arrival of French troops 
typically spelled doom for a rebellion, not necessarily because of any superior skill in 
fighting, but because French officers organized their troops’ attacks in conjunction with 
militia forces and often outnumbered the rebels.83  In several conflicts against the French 
protestants the fighting between subjects and soldiers became longer, harder, and dirtier.  
Here, the local protestants often had the advantage, for they fought in their own hilly, 
mountainous territory, used small-war, guerilla tactics, and enjoyed the support of the 
populace. 
 In 1685, Louis XIV turned his attention to the Vaudois, a small community of 
protestants living in the Piedmont region on the border between France and Italy.  The 
Piedmont was inhabited for the most part by Catholics, and for many years, the Vaudois 
had lived peaceably among them, paid their taxes to the king, and otherwise conducted 
themselves as model subjects.  Louis XIV viewed their religious security, however, as a 
poor example to the protestants he had tried so earnestly to convert, and he sent French 
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troops, led by the Duc of Savoie, to force the conversion of the entire community or 
imprison those who refused.  Savoie surrounded the region with small bands of troops, 
making escape impossible.  When governor Victor Amédée, offered to convert the 
Protestants in his regions by “gentle methods,” Louis XIV replied that he would send 
national troops if Amédée would not use his own.  Louis XIV was so committed to 
preventing protestants from escaping into Italy, that those who were found on the other 
side of the border would be brought back to either be converted or imprisoned. 
 Even after patrolling the borders and bringing in French troops, finding and 
subjugating the Protestants of the mountainous Piedmont region was not easily done.  
While the peasants could not fight an open battle against regular troops with much 
success, they used their familiarity with the difficult terrain to their advantage.   French 
troops had to reorganize themselves into small bands and fight in the uneven 
mountainous terrain.  Even after capturing 6,000 protestants, they did not know how 
many remained, or if those hiding in the mountains would reappear.  Unlike the 
Protestants of some of the other regions, who faced abuse by occupying soldiers but 
could stay in their homes, any armed Protestants of this region were either instantly 
hanged or imprisoned in such unbearable conditions that within a period of four months, 
nearly fifty percent of the prisoners had died.  By the time the French troops had swept 
through the area, and the Catholic militias had finished off any remaining opposition, the 
area of the protestant Piedmont region had been utterly devastated.84 
 The war against the Protestants reached its height at the dawn of the eighteenth 
century in Languedoc, where from 1702 to 1704 French forces concentrated on wiping 
out the entire Protestant population.  As in Piedmont, the terrain was tough, and French 
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troops had to battle the entire population, not just an isolated group of seditious peasants.  
Unlike the past campaigns against the protestants, however, the revolt of the Camisards 
(so called because of the white shirts the rebels wore) became a war against 
noncombatants.85  Civilians had surely suffered during coercive quartering, and had been 
taken prisoner in Piedmont if caught trying to escape, but in Languedoc at the beginning 
of the eighteenth century, French troops made war on civilians and targeted them 
specifically.  Not only was Louis XIV using French troops to subdue insurgents, but 
eventually his officers systematically exterminated whole protestant populations 
regardless of their part in the rebellion. 
 The revolt of the Camisards began shortly after the revocation of the Edict of 
Nantes in 1685.  In addition to the forced conversions brought on by the revocation, the 
protestants of Languedoc also faced increasing hardship due to increased taxes.  While 
many families had formally converted, several of the youth declared themselves 
‘prophets’, increasing the religious fervor among the unconverted and converted-in-
name-only alike.  The intendant of the region, Lamoignon de Baville, in conjunction with 
the fierce Catholics in the area, attempted to oppress the ‘prophets’ violently.  Rumors 
spread that one Catholic priest, the abbé Chayla, had a prison and torture chamber in his 
basement awaiting reluctant converts.  On the evening of July 24, Chayla captured two 
protestant sisters trying to escape Languedoc and had them imprisoned in his infamous 
cellar.  A group of about thirty protestants gathered to murder Chayla in retaliation.  They 
broke into his house, rescued the prisoners, and stabbed him to death.   
 From that point on, it was all out war between the French army and the 
Protestants of Languedoc.  The Protestants divided themselves into independent bands, 
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and would attack French forces in small groups, fight a harried skirmish, and disappear 
into the hilly mountain region of the Cévennes.  The rebellion expanded rapidly, and 
French commander Duc de Broglie found himself fighting not an army or even a 
scattered band of rebels, but an entire region.  Protestant fighters burned Catholic 
churches, murdered priests, and terrorized the Catholics at will, with little opposition 
from the French troops, who were too widely scattered in too few numbers to present a 
staunch opposition.  Finally, Maréchal de Camp Jacques de Julien arrived in Languedoc 
to take over one of the regions.  Unlike Broglie, Julien understood that in order to defeat 
the rebels, he would also have to defeat the villages supporting them, and thus began a 
war of extermination.  If a village gave help to the rebels, he argued that the French army 
should attack the town and slaughter every inhabitant they found.  While this involved 
killing the innocent as well as the guilty, Julien believed that it would result in a complete 
withdrawal of non-combatant support for the rebels and destroy the rebels’ morale.  The 
rebels who return to their village, he explained, “‘will find . . . . his wife with her throat 
cut, another will find his children, another will find his sister, another his father . . .’”86   
 This vicious chain of violence climaxed with the burning of a mill-turned-
protestant-temple.  On April 1, 1703, in the town of Nimes, approximately 150 French 
Protestants assembled at a humble mill in order to conduct their religious services.  As 
they worshipped, French officer Montrevel arrived on the scene and stationed soldiers at 
the doors and the one window of the mill with orders to kill anyone who emerged.  
Montreval then set fire to the mill and all 150 protestants—men, women, and children—
were burned alive.  After this incident, Louis XIV called in Marshal Claude Louis 
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Hector, duke de Villars, and the violence finally calmed to a more manageable level 
under his strategy of offering pardons to repenting protestant rebels.87 
 Even in these domestic revolts, when the French army acted as a police force, the 
violence again exhibits the French army’s proficiency in partisan warfare, as small 
groups of soldiers fought bands of guerrillas and insurgents.  Even more so than their 
wars against foreign states, these wars were challenging because the protestant or tax-
reluctant citizens were fighting on their home territory, which, especially in Languedoc 
and the Piedmont region, consisted of mountainous terrain that the rebels could use to 
their advantage.88  Nor, when the situation became desperate, did the French 
commanding officers shy away from using a ‘scorched earth policy’ on their own 
territory.  Witnesses attest that after the Protestants of the Piedmont region had been 
finally subdued, nothing was left. Catinat reported on 9 May, ‘The country is completely 
desolated; there are no longer any people or livestock at all. . . .’89  Even if French 
officers and soldiers considered Protestants as people who lived outside the French state 
because of their religion, they did not mind catching loyal Catholics in the crossfire as 
they converted and exterminated neighboring Protestants. 
 Using soldiers to quell revolts was not necessarily Louis XIV’s preferred method 
of calming domestic conflicts.  As Roy McCullough has illustrated, French troops acted 
in conjunction with local militias or occasionally foreign troops when quieting a rebelling 
populace. If Louis XIV could concentrate his trained soldiers solely on foreign enemies, 
he would, but he did not shy away from using them on French subjects if the soldiers’ 
                                                 
87
 Ibid., 209. 
 
88
 Camille Rousset, Histoire de Louvois et de son administration politique et militaire (Paris, 1873), 23. 
 
89
 Lynn, Wars of Louis XIV, 181. 
 52
presence seemed necessary or convenient.  Often Louis XIV would complete two 
missions with one motion when it came time to choose a winter quarter for his troops.  If 
there was a village that had revolted or been slow in paying taxes, Louis XIV would 
station his troops there, providing his troops with winter lodging while at the same time 
squelching any rebellion or punishing a feisty town. 
 This vinegar and baking soda relationship between soldiers and civilians was a 
reflection of Louis XIV’s absolutist state building.   State power directed the army 
against the society it was trying to manage, and this new relationship between state and 
society played out in the clashes between soldier and civilian.  Again, Louis XIV’s 
expansion and bureaucratization of the French army was significant, because the army 
was not acting on the behalf of individual noble commanders, but represented the state’s 
purposeful violence against French subjects.  The French army was not only a means of 
international military power for the monarch, but a heavy-handed instrument of the large 
French bureaucracy, used to coerce the people into enacting this bureaucracy’s bidding.  
The army was a vital instrument for Louis XIV’s building of state power and his 
repression of domestic revolt.  While it helped to preserve his absolute power and enforce 
his orders unflinchingly, it also brought criticism on him for being despotic.  Louis XIV’s 
mobilization of his army as an institution against the people created an intrinsically 
hostile relationship between his army and the state it protected, and his own people.   
 
IV.  War and Society: the Cultural Divide 
 Even outside of tensions over religion and taxes, mutual fear and suspicion 
marked the relationship between the army and the civilian population.  Historians of the 
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French army, such as John Lynn and David Parrot, might argue that French troops 
behaved viciously  towards peasant communities because they were not sufficiently fed 
and supplied by the army, and that as military administration improved, this “tax of 
violence” was replaced by a more organized and reliable provisions from the 
government.90  While French military administration vastly improved over this period of 
time, it did not lessen the suspicion, fear, and hatred that marked the relationship between 
the civilian and military worlds.  Soldiers and civilians reacted so violently against each 
other not only because of Louis XIV’s prerogatives, but because the two groups 
possessed opposing cultures.  This relationship continued well into the latter half of the 
eighteenth century and even appeared to be a permanent fixture of France.   Even the 
militia, which in other countries represented a bridge between army and civilian, did not 
provide much understanding between the two groups in France. 
 The soldiers-civilian relationship was so intrinsically hostile, that often the 
soldiers’ arrival on the scene increased the likelihood of revolt and violence among the 
populace.  The rebellions against the papier timbré in Nantes and Rennes in 1675 
provides one example.  When this tax on paper goods met with staunch resistance, 
Louvois sent an envoy of French troops to enforce it, and to add insult to injury, the 
townspeople had to host them in their own homes.   The governor of Brittany, the duke 
de Chaulnes, realized that these troops would be an especially obnoxious burden on the 
families who had not participated in the revolt, and he took every measure possible to 
ensure that the soldiers did not abuse their hosts.  He took out a loan that would pay for 
the food and lodging of the soldiers, and then forbade the soldiers from exacting any 
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services or goods from their hosts or from abusing their hosts with thievery or assault.  
Despite his efforts, the citizens of Nantes heavily resented the “invaders.”  As the new 
governor of Nantes, the marquis de Lavardin, wrote to Louvois, “‘I am doing everything 
I can to accommodate two things so antipathetic, the bourgeois and the soldiers, and am 
attempting to make both of them live together peacefully.’”91  After three weeks, the 
soldiers moved onto Rennes, and with their departure, the rebellious spirit among the 
populace died out almost instantly. 
 The town of Rennes was one of the few that had been spared from ever having to 
lodge troops, yet when the townspeople became increasingly violent against having to 
pay this stamp tax on paper goods, 150 troops made a showy, military entrance into town, 
marching in every gate of the city with their weapons primed.  Their mere presence 
immediately sparked a revolt, in which the town militia and royal soldiers quarreled over 
whom would stand guard at the Hotel de Ville, and the townspeople expressed their 
opinion by throwing stones at the soldiers.  As violence escalated, the townspeople 
attacked the governor’s mansion.  One officer wanted to order his men to fire on the 
crowd, but Governor Chaulnes forbade it, knowing that after firing into the mob, there 
would be no way to contain it.  Finally, a local militia convinced the crowd to disperse.  
The revolt against the soldiers succeeded, however, and within two days, they were 
gone.92 
 These two episodes are particularly telling of the relationship between subjects 
and soldiers, because even when the troops acted peacefully and even when the 
inhabitants did not have to provide for the soldiers’ food and lodging, the populace 
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greatly resisted the soldiers’ presence.  This suggests that it was not just the violence that 
the soldiers brought with them, or even the expense of paying for the soldiers that were 
occupying the town that caused the populace to resist their presence.  French townspeople 
found the very proximity of soldiers distasteful and heavily resisted any association with 
them.  At times the mere presence of the soldiers incited rebellion. 
 Historians studying the peasant-soldier relationship have agreed that the 
animosity between these two groups had deep roots.  As J. R. Hale posited, soldiers of all 
backgrounds found in the “peasantry an endemic secondary antagonist.”93  Having 
suffered together through rain, cold, hunger, and the unending discomforts of the 
soldiers’ nomadic lifestyle, troops may have even felt entitled to the goods of the 
sedentary peasant.  From a soldier’s point of view, the peasant, whom they protected 
from foreign invasion, seemed to live a life that consisted of comforting certainties: a 
reliable source of food, shelter, and family.  Of course, many peasants’ lives had few 
certainties, and they perceived their food, homes, and few possessions as hard-earned.  
They resented the vagabond soldier extorting money and food, destroying homes, and 
targeting the villages’ women. 
 Hale argues that soldiers despised peasants almost on principle, even if soldiers 
grew up in peasant communities themselves.  Despite sharing language and background, 
soldiers had different values that took root as soon as they turned their back on their 
home community and entered the army.  Yves-Marie Bercé argued that other than the 
conflict that resulted when both peasants and soldiers fought for the same scarce 
resources, the mutual hatred sprung from opposing sets of values.  Peasants who longed 
to travel, to escape what they might view as the claustrophobic confines of village life, 
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and to get closer to the nobility would join the army.  Aided by their new environment 
and new comrades in arms, they would turn their backs literally and metaphorically on 
their compatriots who stayed in the village.  In integrating themselves into the army life, 
ex-peasants were “driven by an urge to scorn and abuse their old environment.”94  Hale 
suggested as well that soldiers used the taking of garrison towns or the occupation of 
French towns to exact a “peasant’s revenge,” in which they enacted violence on the 
members of the middle class, such as merchants, who had cheated them or treated them 
with scorn in their youth.  Being agents of violence gave soldiers a license to exact the 
revenge that would be near-impossible for a peasant.95  
 The hatred between citizens and soldiers, and the royal will to use the latter to 
control the former, continued through the eighteenth century with the infamous guerres 
des farines, or “Flour Wars” of 1775, when the king’s financial minister, Turgot, sent 
25,000 troops to extinguish a revolt that occurred because of his own poor economic 
judgment. When the Flour Wars erupted in the Spring of 1775 in Paris and the 
surrounding countryside, Turgot had just made a poorly-timed decision to allow freedom 
of commerce in the grain trade within the kingdom, which might have flourished had it 
not been for the abysmal harvest of 1774 that already forecasted high prices.  The 
unregulated market only fueled fears that the shortage of resources would raise prices 
even further.  Turgot refused to reverse his policy in light of the scarce grain, and on 
April 27, the guerres des farines began in the market town of Beaumont-sur-Oise and 
continued in 300 separate riots over a period of 22 days.   
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 For almost a month throughout the Paris basin, angry rioters ransacked market 
stalls or bakeries, taking flour and bread and leaving behind what they would have 
considered a fair price.  Local militia did not offer any help, as it was ill-equipped to deal 
with widespread violence, which for the most part occurred too quickly for the militia to 
respond.  The French government called in 25,000 troops to guard Paris and the 
immediate surrounding area.  The troops proved to be effective in some places, where the 
riots died down within a week, but in other places they only exacerbated the violence.96 
According to the subdelegate of Gournay-en-Bray, “the troops [did] not make the buyers 
more docile, they [were] further inflamed.” One bold rioter, when met with cavaliers at 
the doors of a farm targeted for pillage, called to his compatriots to “pick up stones and 
let’s throw ourselves on these bastards.  They are made of skin and bones like 
ourselves.”97 
 This natural hostility between citizens and soldiers raises questions about the 
status of the milice, an institution that might seem to straddle these two often opposed 
groups of people.  Like militias in America or England, the French milice consisted of 
subjects who bore arms for the purpose of defense, domestic control, and to supplement 
the regular army in battle as necessary.  The French milice, however, hardly served as a 
mediating institution between the army and civilians.  It fulfilled two different functions 
for the French government, neither of which fostered good relations between civilians 
and the army.  On the one hand, the milice that existed for the purpose of domestic 
control and defense resembled much more an inefficient police force than an army.  They 
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did not fight foreign wars, or join the army in domestic campaigns.  Rather, their duties 
were to keep a night watch, man the town’s gates by day, and occasionally patrol the 
streets—duties that did not involve engagement in battle or confronting an enemy any 
more numerous or dangerous than a highwayman, town drunk, or rebelling peasant.  In 
other words, their duties consisted only of immediate local needs, and did not necessarily 
involve large-scale violence or the kind of training required of the king’s soldiers. 
 When called on by the regular army, the milice would play a part in quelling tax 
revolts, as they did in the town of Rennes, but it was not particularly effective.  Although 
McCullough argued that it was the milice that principally put down tax or grain revolts in 
the provinces, their typical disorganization meant that they could not always be trusted.  
Looking at a larger sample of revolts in the seventeenth century, William Beik argued 
that while in an ideal world the milice would be well-equipped to deal with local 
problems, the reality differed greatly.  If violence broke out in a town, the members of the 
milice and citizens of the town would not necessarily agree which side of the conflict 
deserved official support. Nor did citizens always necessarily respect the milice’s 
authority.  Dissenting citizens were very hard to control and contain, as they knew the 
topography of the landscape and the ins and outs of the towns as well as the members of 
the milice.  Furthermore, the milice dealt with revolts best when they developed slowly, 
allowing for members to exchange information and create a coherent strategy.  Few 
revolts afforded the milice that luxury.   Additionally, there was no guarantee that during 
a violent uprising, members of the milice would report for duty instead of protecting their 
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own homes, families, and property.  Ideally, the milice could be called on to squelch local 
revolts, but in reality execution proved extremely difficult.98  
 In addition to a rocky relationship between the milice and the citizens, there was 
constant conflict within the milice itself.  This is not surprising, considering that these 
men came from a variety of different trades, education-levels, and social standing.  It was 
difficult for the men of these companies to maintain professional military standards when 
working with their neighbors, with whom they had relationships, good or bad, outside of 
the milice.  As Beik stated, when mixing men of menial living with men of higher status, 
“quarrels arose between officers and men, and the ambiance of the tavern was transferred 
to the ramparts.”99  
 Nor does the second milieu in which one finds the milice—supplementing royal 
troops during foreign wars—reveal any closeness between soldiers and the civilians who 
temporarily served alongside them.  During times of war, parishes were responsible for 
furnishing a certain number of men for the king’s service, but this institution was 
thoroughly hated, and young men went to great lengths to escape it.  Wealthier men could 
buy out of serving in the milice or find a replacement, which, in some areas, resulted in 
too few men to tend the fields. As the inhabitants of Villeron stated, “The milice 
depopulates the country more than misery . . . men join it or escape it [by taking up] work 
in Paris.  And there are no more hands to work the fields.”100  The baillage de Nemours 
referred to it as “slavery” and Auxerre complained that because of the royal militia, “the 
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widow saw her only son ripped from her arms,” ensuring her certain destitution.101  In 
addition to being a hated institution among the populace who had to fill it, the royal 
milice provided very little training for its members, and the men served as little more than 
fodder for enemy cannons.   
 While the milice did serve at the behest of the state as private citizens when called 
to fight with the royal army or to enforce the collection of the King’s taxes, it differed 
from the militias of Britain and colonial North America.  Unlike these militias, the French 
counterpart did not nurture a sense of unity across the country or serve as the proud 
representation of a city, colony, county, or province.  Rather, the local milice acted as an 
early police force, and the royal milice as forced labor; it consisted of reluctant citizens 
forced into a soldier’s garb. 
  
Conclusion 
 The French army, as it stood from 1660 to 1750, appeared as a strong body of 
aristocratic officers and plundering soldiers that defeated its neighbors and subdued its 
populace.  Its position of dominance in Europe and in France, however, proved to be only 
temporary.  While Louis XIV had intended for the French army to become a permanent, 
state-wielded institution, his process of standardization did not smooth over the many 
disfunctionalities that existed within the French army, and the hatred between the French 
army and society.  Within the officer corps, the rhetoric of army officers emphasized their 
quest for glory, their distinguished families, and their model of the ancient Greeks and 
Romans.  Many officers, however, did not spend much time with their soldiers and 
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disdained military training.  When they did go to war, the nature of dynastic warfare 
meant that army officers were thinking more about their personal gains than the reasons 
behind the fighting.  Because part of Louis XIV’s plan for institutionalization included 
rewarding court favorites and long-time loyal officers with higher ranks, the army came 
to be seen as a means to measure loyalty and the king’s favor, not as the primary defense 
for France. 
 There were also glaring discrepancies between the officer corps and the soldiers, 
who had no part in the aristocratic culture.  Soldiers came from the lowest classes of 
society, and were separated from their noble officers by a chasm of class.  Because 
soldiers and officers could not even identify with each other over common ideals, causes, 
or institutional values, they had a weak, distant relationship that was not conducive to 
winning battles.  While Turenne was a “father” to his soldiers, most officers showed little 
concern for their troops’ well-being.  Furthermore, since soldiers rarely advanced far 
beyond their recruited status, officers had little impetus to invest time and effort in them.  
Poor training and conditions did not motivate French soldiers to fight, but to desert.  
While the officers might have flattered themselves with hereditary grandeur, the fact that 
soldiers were excluded from this culture gave officers little reason to invest in their 
soldiers’ development as military men. 
 There was also great inconsistency between the official ideals of warfare and 
some of the methods that French officers used to obtain victory.  While the larger battles 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were often restrained and practiced in a 
limited, gentlemanly, enlightened manner, the partisan warfare that happened on the 
fringes of battle undermined the very idea of “limited.”  French officers showed a great 
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deal of respect for officers who fought under different kings, but had little concern for the 
civilians whose destruction would benefit the army.  While officers viewed grand sieges 
and battles of maneuver as the venue for them to display their nobility in war, they also 
used soldiers and partisans to steal supplies or weaken areas before they would be 
attacked.  Underlying French enlightened warfare was the brutal partisan tactics, which 
were similar to the methods used in the religious wars and from which modern French 
warfare was trying to distance itself against.  By not being able to rely on limited warfare 
alone to gain victory, and by not embracing the partisan tactics as necessary for victory 
until 1747, the French army defined limited warfare as something that was ineffective on 
its own. 
 Finally, the greatest rift existed between the soldiers of the French army and the 
subjects that they theoretically protected.  Because Louis XIV used his army as an 
instrument of the state against his people, most subjects associated the French army with 
death, pillage, and rape.  Even civilians who were not under pressure to pay taxes or 
convert to Catholicism viewed soldiers as their natural enemies, and soldiers 
reciprocated, believing civilians possessed a culture that opposed their own.  The 
violence that French soldiers carried out against French subjects resulted in a country that 
was divided against itself, in which French subjects had a hostile relationship with the 
state. 
 Each of these disconnections within the institution and operations of the French 
army was a fissure that widened as the French army grew in size, to the point where there 
were not enough officer positions for the numerous nobles who vied for an opportunity to 
prove themselves in battle.  These fissures in the institution of the army continued to 
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widen and impede French effectiveness, until they were poised to break on the eve of the 
Seven Years’ War.  It was this war, in which the army would be engaged in three 
different theaters on three different continents against the combined forces of England 
and Prussia, that would destroy the ideal, and ultimately the reality of the French 
aristocratic army. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Two 
When Military Cultures Collide: The Seven Years’ War in North America, 1755-
1760 
 
The Seven Years’ War marked a turning point in the history of the French 
military primarily because it proved to be a disastrous loss.  In response to losing their 
North American and Indian Empire, officers reexamined their military institutions and 
their own role in society.  Historians highlight this war because losing it sparked a reform 
effort in which members of the nobility would struggle to redefine or “reimagine” their 
position in society and the role of the army.102  Indeed, the French era of reform, which 
will be discussed at length in chapter three, unexpectedly placed the French army on a 
trajectory towards revolution.  The actual period of fighting during the Seven Years’ 
War, however, also influenced the history of the French army because of the manner in 
which it exposed officers and soldiers to the problems inherent in their system and 
introduced them to the concept of citizen warfare.  This chapter will consider how the 
French army lost in Canada and show how rigid and hollow the aristocratic army of 
Louis XIV had become.  In 1756, French troops arrived in Canada to supplement the 
French Canadian forces already at war with the English colonists over control of the Ohio 
Valley.  For the next five years, French forces intermingled with Canadian and 
Amerindian fighters, who challenged French notions of aristocratic and hierarchical army
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structures.  Their conflicted interactions show how the inadequacies of the French army 
in the 1750s would eventually make way for the military organization and approach to 
warfare characteristic of a citizen army. 
The Seven Years’ War began in what is now Western Pennsylvania with the 
famous meeting between a young George Washington, his Amerindian allies, and a 
collection of French Canadians who came to blows over the disputed borders between 
French and English territory in North America in Western Pennsylvania.103  The colonial 
dispute of 1754 grew to a world war by 1756.  Jean Amrond Baron Dieskau arrived in 
Canada with French troops, but was seriously wounded early in the war and replaced by 
Louis-Joseph, marquis de Montcalm.  Montcalm, in turn, operated under the command of 
Pierre de Rigaud, marquis de Vaudreuil, who was the governor general of Canada and the 
strategic mind behind the whole war.  After making a promising beginning, French forces 
fumbled their control of the war, and after the dramatic defeat on the Planes of Abraham 
just north of Quebec, France surrendered Canada to the control of the British. 
Problems began from the start.  French officers first of all resisted and resented 
the Amerindian warriors who proved indispensable for obtaining victory in the New 
World.  General Montcalm especially cringed at using Amerindian allies in battle.  
Christian Crouch has argued that French officers felt dishonored by associating with 
Indians who used extreme violence in their warfare such as scalping, torturing and even 
eating their prisoners.104  In addition to whatever distaste they may have had for the 
Amerindian’s fighting techniques, however, I will argue that French officers felt 
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threatened by Amerindian success.  Specifically, they resisted ceding any role to the 
Amerindians as protectors of French interests.  Coming from a culture that required 
officers to constantly renew their honor and reputations in battle, French officers became 
competitors with their Amerindian allies.  Officers required the opportunity to fight 
bravely in battle for the king, and Amerindians also expected to win the war trophies and 
prisoners that their cultures required.  French reluctance to incorporate the Amerindians 
into their warfare contributed to their loss of the Seven Years’ War in North America, 
because French officers preferred, at least unconsciously, to sacrifice the war itself rather 
than to see their duties as defenders of France usurped by “barbaric” warriors.  Many 
French officers prized their personal involvement and desire for recognition above the 
successful defense of Canada. 
While in Canada, the French army also worked with something resembling a 
“citizen army” for the first time.  The Canadian militia, which included all men between 
the ages of sixteen and sixty, fought in conjunction with the troupes de la marine, the 
French military branch that served in the colonies.  Together, these two forces formed a 
loose military system that closely resembled a citizen army, in which all eligible males 
participated in defending the colony from Amerindian raids and the encroaching English 
colonists.  While much has been made of the different styles of warfare practiced by the 
French Canadian forces and the French army, I argue that French officers, though 
preferring linear European tactics, recognized Canadian techniques as “petite guerre.”   
Officers were more challenged by the Canadians’ loose hierarchy and command structure 
than by their partisan tactics.  The seemingly egalitarian Canadian militia conflicted with 
the French army’s strict hierarchy and rigid command structure.  Combining forces 
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encouraged indiscipline among French soldiers, who mingled contentedly among the 
Canadians and became difficult to monitor, let alone drill or train.  The soldiers’ affection 
and respect for members of the Canadian militia further challenged French authority over 
their own soldiers, as soldiers seemed more eager to fight and live in Canada than obey 
their officers.   
These two frustrations for the French army, combined with a “defeatist attitude” 
towards the war in general, expressed themselves in part through an increasing emphasis 
on zèle, the officers’ zeal for serving the king, over actual success in battle.  The gradual 
bureaucratization of the French army made it necessary for officers to keep careful track 
of their struggles and sacrifices in their efforts to present a convincing dossier to the 
ministry of war for the rewards they believed they merited.  Letters to the minister of war 
consisted largely of accounts of wounds received and sacrifices made for the king rather 
than accomplished missions.  Officers described their sacrifices for the king in great 
detail in hopes of obtaining pensions, military decorations, and promotions.  Recording 
their zeal, however, also caused officers to be seemingly more concerned with how their 
individual sufferings could gain them personal benefits than with winning battles.  The 
attitude in these letters suggests that in Canada, French officers were not concerned with 
winning so much as they were concerned with behaving honorably in the face of defeat, 
which would not only benefit them personally, but restore a sense of honor to the French 
army as a whole.  Whereas the army under Louis XIV fought for gloire, which implied 
completing the mission, winning a battle, and bringing glory back to the monarch, the 
army during the Seven Years’ War fought to demonstrate their zeal, a goal in which 
intent apparently counted far more than outcome. 
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These three components of French failure in Canada point to a larger shift in 
French military culture.  Increasingly, French officers’ primary concern veered from 
victory on behalf of the monarch and France to the maintenance of honor in the face of 
defeat.  This transformation is most apparent in Canada perhaps because in Canada the 
French army was forced to work with two military cultures, the Amerindian and the 
Canadian, that were so contrary to their own.  The French also had to fight in conjunction 
with allies who excelled at warfare, forcing the French officers to delineate which group 
would get credit for what action.  This pattern of neglecting larger duties while searching 
for personal distinctions would ultimately shape the reform movement that would follow 
the war, because it would lead to a shift in officer-soldier relations and a rethinking of the 
nature of motivation.  
 The letters that French officers wrote to the minister of war presenting their 
candidacy for leadership roles in the new conflict reveal the centrality of military service 
in their lives.  In 1755, when rumors began circulating among the court and provinces 
that war was on the horizon, officers had been itching to fight and prove themselves for 
seven years, since the ending of the War of the Austrian Succession in 1748.  During 
these years of peace, French officers had had little to occupy their time and talents, and 
they were eager for new opportunities to prove their merits.  The ministry of war received 
hundreds of letters from officers seeking positions and commissions in the new conflict.  
M. de Caulincoud, for example, begged the minister of war, “to pull me from the 
lethargic state in which I languished during the peace.”105  War with Prussia and England 
would allow French officers to fulfill their purpose as the defenders of France. 
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 Because Louis XIV and Louis XV’s use of commissions and rank as rewards had 
caused officer ranks to swell, there also existed a great deal of competition between 
officers for prominent roles in the upcoming war.  By 1750, the officers corps had 
ballooned to the point where there were far more officers wishing to serve than there 
were available commissions.  Men sent letters to the minister of war pleading for 
positions for themselves and their sons.  M. de Caulincoud argued, for example, that the 
minister of war “could not possibly employ anyone who is so desirous to merit your 
friendship and who has more zeal for his profession.”  He also requested a regiment for 
his thirteen-year-old son who would soon be of age for military command.106  M. de 
Bauffremont pleaded that his late father’s position would be awarded to him the next 
month, as “the only grace the king can bestow is the position that had been in the family 
for more than two centuries.”107 
 In return, of course, the officers guaranteed their unfailing service.  M. de 
Bauffremont understood that “my life and my possessions are the king’s, and I give them 
to him with all my heart.”108   If included among the general officers running the 
upcoming campaigns, Bauyn de Perreuse promised that he would “endeavor to merit this 
grace by my attachment to service.”109   
And Bourlamaque, who would serve in Canada, promised that he had “no other ambition, 
Sir, than to be able to serve in a manner that is essential [to the army].”110  These and 
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hundreds of other officers made the same pleas for the same roles for the same reasons 
and all promised their highest level of service and utter devotion if they received the 
coveted positions.   
 For French officers, defending France, advancing her interests, and winning glory 
for the king represented of the very reasons for their existence.  French officers needed 
this war in order to fulfill the duties and destinies to which they had been born.  In a 
sense, officers no longer existed for the purpose of waging war on behalf of France.  
Rather, warfare existed for the purpose of allowing noble officers to justify their position 
in society, to give them a métier.  The significance of warfare for their identity intensified 
the challenges they faced in the Seven Years’ War.  In Canada, as well as in the war 
waged on the continent and in India, their utmost dedication would not be enough to 
bring glory to France.  War in the Canadian theater, especially, would challenge their 
concepts of warfare, rank, and social hierarchy—the very essence of their military 
system.  These challenges would have immediate effects on the destiny of New France 
and long term repercussions for the entire French army. 
 
I.  Warrior Rivalry: the Threat of the Natives 
 Any idea that Canada was indeed “New France” dissolved when these eager 
French officers arrived with six battalions of troops in1755 under the command of Jean 
Amrond Baron Dieskau.111 The terrain differed greatly, as the vast majority of New 
France consisted of an intimidating wilderness. Little had been done to tame it beyond 
the forts and towns that the residents of New France had slowly built since 1632, when 
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missionaries had first established a permanent stronghold in Canada.112  Most of all, New 
France was inhabited by three types of people, none of whom the French would 
recognize as “French,” though some customs and religious practices may have 
overlapped.  These three types were Canadians, officers and soldiers from the troupes de 
la marine, and of course the Amerindian nations who traded and warred with the above 
groups. 
 Whatever their French origins, the Canadians that French officers encountered 
when they landed in New France struck them as more “Indian” than French.  Unlike the 
British colonial system, which worked to establish a landscape and a lifestyle very similar 
to the home country, the French colony in North America required a heightened degree of 
cooperation, and even assimilation, with the Amerindians who inhabited the territory. 113  
This cooperation consisted primarily of trade and warfare, as residents of New France 
became gradually incorporated into the complex and ever-shifting “middle ground” of 
competing interests between various Amerindian nations, French colonists, and Anglo-
Americans.114  As a result, Canadians, whose families had been established in Canada for 
some generations, struck most French officers as much less polished than their 
contemporaries in France, and their style of fighting as far more “Indian” than French.115   
 Slightly more familiar to the French forces landing in Canada would have been 
the troupes de la marine, the branch of the French military responsible for colonial 
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fighting.  They came under the office of the Navy, and were considered rather mediocre 
forces.116  Ever since 1665, the French government had sent groups of them to help the 
Canadians during colonial wars.  During these wars, the troupes de la marine would 
execute subaltern missions, while the Canadian militia and Amerindian warriors would 
conduct destructive raids.  Still, since 1690, the troupes de la marine had fought only in 
small groups, fighting “guerre à la Sauvage,” a style that Europeans would have 
recognized as petite guerre.117  Some of them would elect to stay in Canada, even after 
the rest of their regiment returned home to France, and eventually those who stayed 
resembled Canadians born in New France more than soldiers raised in the home 
country.118  While the troupes de la marine still officially operated in different sphere 
than the Canadians, they combined forces in war and at home, and had become more or 
less an almost indistinguishable part of the Canadian people.119 
 The third group of people with whom the French would fight was the Canadians’ 
Amerindian allies, who acted as auxiliary troops to the Canadian militia and troupes de la 
marine.  To Canadians, Amerindians formed a natural part of the landscape.  Members of 
the Canadian militia trained their sons in matters of war from an early age, and it was 
likely that these boys grew up near, and may have even played with, Amerindian youths, 
who, when grown, would also be warriors and allies.  Just as for Europeans, war for 
Amerindians was a cultural fact, intimately connected with the nature of their societies; it 
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provided opportunities for the young to prove themselves, or to enrich their nations with 
prisoners and war trophies.120   
 These Amerindian allies would present the greatest difficulties to French officers.  
Despite their different forms of warfare, the Amerindians became rivals to French 
officers for glory on the battlefield, and for the credit due at the end of the conflict.  The 
correspondence between Louis-Joseph, marquis de Montcalm and Pierre de Rigaud, 
marquis de Vaudreuil, the governor-general of Canada, shows how indispensable 
Amerindians proved to be as auxiliary troops despite French reticence to use them.  Part 
of this reticence likely sprung from French officers’ Eurocentric prejudices, but most 
officers mentioned more specific ways in which Amerindian warfare impinged on French 
honor. 
 One of the reasons for the French dislike of the Amerindians as allies consists of 
the type of violence that the Amerindians practiced in their warfare.  Scalping, for 
example, a “custom of these barbarians that revolts nature,” horrified French 
sensibilities.121  Christian Crouch has argued that fighting with the Amerindians and 
claiming them as allies offended and countered the French sense of honor in warfare and 
empire.  The type of violence and raids that Amerindians executed on behalf of the 
French, Crouch argues, was rejected, “as overly damaging to the crown and nobility’s 
martial pride and honor.”  Because maintaining Canada as a French colony necessitated 
using a type of warfare that impugned French honor, Crouch suggests that the Crown 
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decided to sacrifice the colony, fighting only in European fashion in North America 
rather than keeping a colony that would dishonor them.122   
  Native warriors were not more “war-like” than French officers—indeed they 
competed with each other for a share in the combat, the glory, and the trophies of war—
only the manner of warfare, apparently, distressed the French.  Gilles Havard and Cécile 
Vidal have pointed out that “the taste for war of the natives . . . resonat[ed] in the elite 
cultures, whose writings were saturated by military themes.”  Citing Joël Cornette’s essay 
on the relationship between warfare, military glory, and sovereignty, Havard and Vidal 
have argued that French officers and Amerindians would have shared a common need for 
military valor.  While the “rituals of Indian war, with their procession of cruelties 
(scalping, torturing prisoners, cannibalistic feasts), often aroused terror in missionaries 
and French administrators, what shocked the majority of observers was the unruly 
character of combat, the fact that the Indian warriors were elusive in the middle of the 
woods.”  In other words, it was the individual rituals and the manner in which the 
Amerindians conducted war that went counter to the rules of French society, not the 
passion that the Amerindians had for war.123   
 But were those practices really so different and shocking?  Even if the French 
voiced their revulsion at this particularly “barbaric” means of making war, their army was 
no stranger to similar forms of violence.  The burning, murder, pillage, and rape that 
occurred in many French campaigns had most recently contributed to the taking of the 
Fortress of Bergen-op-Zoom in 1747, just eight years before French troops arrived in 
North America.  French officers did complain about the “barbaric” nature of Amerindian 
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warfare, but the institution of the French army was no stranger to scorched earth tactics, 
such as in the German Palatinate.  The army had terrorized people on the borders of 
France, such as during the Dutch wars, and had killed women and children in cold blood, 
most infamously against French protestants.  The “unruly character of combat,” the 
ability for the Amerindian to hide in the woods during a skirmish also would not have 
seemed strange to French warriors.  As discussed in chapter one, the French army had 
been using partisans and petite guerre in both their international and domestic conflicts.  
Especially in fighting the Protestants in the south of France, French troops and officers 
had to work in small bands across mountainous regions.   
 There were, of course, certain practices that Amerindians used against their 
enemies which did not exist in French warfare.  Scalping, or the need for war trophies 
that came from the victim’s conquered body, was foreign to European warfare.  Nor did 
Europeans exact revenge on their enemies by slowly torturing (or even eating) a prisoner 
of war.  These practices did horrify Europeans.124  At the same time, however, this kind 
violence was not unknown to them.  Even if torture was not officially considered a part of 
European warfare, soldiers were known to torture their hosts during a logement, 
especially if that logement served coercive purposes, the poor wife of Protestant Jean 
Migault, for example, comes to mind.  Furthermore, European justice included torture 
either as means of abstracting testimony or punishing a particularly heinous crime.  
During the Seven Years’ War, Louis XV’s would-be assassin, Robert-François Damiens, 
underwent execution by having his skin torn off with hot pincers, his hand burned with 
sulfur, his now skinless areas filled with molten lead, boiling oil, and other such 
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chemicals, was drawn and quartered by four horses pulling off his limbs, then was 
burned, with his severed limbs, at the stake. 125  With the exception of scalping and 
cannibalism, therefore, the types of violence that the French allegedly found so 
dishonorable were not unknown in French society.  Warfare, of course, possesses its own 
senses of values, codes, and restraints.  It is entirely possible, therefore, as Crouch has 
argued, that French officers rejected their Amerindian allies because of the type of 
violence they enacted endangered French honor.  But there were other motivations 
behind French rejection of the Amerindians, considering the vital role these allies played 
in the war effort. 
 Vaudreuil, who had been chosen as governor-general of Canada partly because of 
his ability to negotiate with the various Amerindian Nations, had cultivated relationships 
with several nations before the arrival of the French, and continued to renew alliances 
and create new ones during the war.126  He understood that it was vital to French interests 
to keep the Amerindians on the side of the French, and not to give them any cause to ally 
with the English.   In his letters to Montcalm and his superior, the minister of the marine, 
he boasted of his popularity among the natives.  At one meeting, they responded to his 
call for their military aid by declaring, “your presence today is like a new sun whose rays 
draw in all our members and our hearts.”  They were ready to fight with a “new ardor for 
our hearts to serve under you—ho!”127  Even if, as some might argue, Vaudreuil 
exaggerated the natives’ affection and respect for him, the fact that he included such 
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information in his letters demonstrates how necessary he found the alliances.  In the 
beginning of the war, he assured the minister of the marine of “the care that I took to 
assure myself of [the friendship] of the Five Nations.”128  Later in the war, Vaudreuil 
assured him that “the affair of the Flat Head Indians gets better and better.  The 
negotiations that I had initiated” are going well. 129  Accord to M. Dumas, “they all rise 
up to go attack the English.”130  As governor general of Canada, and as the commander of 
the war in North America, Vaudreuil evidently believed that a large part of his 
responsibility involved diplomatic relations with the Amerindian nations, who proved 
invaluable in harassing the enemy and conducting destructive raids on the Anglo-
American frontier. 
 If there was one thing at which the natives excelled, it was removing settlers, or 
getting settlers to remove themselves, from the frontier.  As early as 1755, the minister of 
war received word that, “The natives during winter burned many English homes and took 
a great quantity of prisoners and took many scalps.”131  Amerindian raids would destroy 
whole families of settlers and turn an entire village and the land surrounding it to ruin.  
Montreuil, one of the French officers serving under Montcalm, reported to the king in 
1758, that the “natives . . . burned a small forest near forty houses  . . . and there took 100 
prisoners comprised of women and children that they sent to their village.”132   Their 
raids included not only taking prisoners and scalps, but “kill[ing] animals, burn[ing] large 
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numbers of magazines [of ammunition] and ravag[ing] lots of grain.”133  Just as in the 
partisan warfare examined in chapter one, these kinds of raids took supplies from enemy 
forces and rendered towns uninhabitable.  Even the marquis de Montcalm, who would 
become one of the natives’ greatest enemies, happily reported to the minister of war in 
1757 that “our last news of Fort Duquesne . . . confirm[ed] the good dispositions of the 
natives, the continuation of their ‘courses’ that bring desolation to the English colonies . . 
. During some diverse small partis, they sent more than 200 prisoners or scalps.”134  A 
parti differed from a simple raiding party.  In using the term, Montcalm implied that the 
natives acted in a coordinated fashion as a group, with a defined hierarchy of 
commanders and warriors carrying out an official military mission.  As presented by 
Montcalm, the raids of the natives were not carried out pell-mell simply for their own 
enrichment of war trophies and prisoners, but were coordinated attacks executed in a 
manner to benefit the French position in Canada as a whole.   
 Vaudreuil reveled in the success of these raids and the positive effect they had on 
the war effort.  He praised them to his superior, the minister of the marine: “The 
excursions of our natives are quite intimidating,” as “many English families retreated to 
the provinces of Philadelphia and Pennsylvania to escape the fury of our natives and to . . 
. search for asylum and establish themselves between Ft. Augustin and New Georgia.”135  
By attacking the Anglo-American frontier and taking prisoners, Amerindian fighters 
created an atmosphere of such fear that terrified settlers left the frontier on their own 
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accord rather than risk finding a raiding party in their own settlement.  Francis Parkman 
imagined the plight of the Anglo-American settler vividly when he described “the nature 
of these frontiers [which ran] along the skirts of the southern and middle colonies . . . for 
six or seven hundred miles [as] a loose, thin, disheveled fringe of population,” in which, 
“buried in the woods, the settler lived in appalling loneliness.”  Returning from hunting, 
the settler found, “among the smoldering logs of his dwelling . . . scalped and mangled, 
the dead bodies of wife and children . . . breathless, palpitating, his brain on fire, he 
rushed through the thickening night to carry the alarm to his nearest neighbor, three miles 
distant.”136  With his stirring account, Parkman captured the fear that Amerindians 
inspired in the settlers.  As effective raiders and implementers of fear tactics, the 
Amerindians created plenty of reasons for Anglo-American settlers to remove themselves 
from the frontier or to be removed by force through scalping or kidnapping. 
 The natives and their effective raids further allowed for the French forces to 
attack in more than one place at the same time.  Vaudreuil recounted, with satisfaction, 
being able to defeat his enemy on two fronts simultaneously. “While I harassed the 
enemy,” he said, “I struck them equally on the side of New York.”  In order to 
accomplish this, he had “a party of Wolves [Wolf Indians] who were sent there on my 
order.”  After their successful harassment of English soldiers, they “returned, with a 
prisoner, and a number of scalps . . . [we] caused great hurt to the enemy, in burning their 
houses and destroying their animals.”137  Because Vaudreuil had numerous nations of 
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Amerindians willing to fight for them, he could apply strategic pressure by planning 
attacks that would strike the English in several places at once. 
 In conducting these raids and by harassing enemy troops, natives demonstrated 
that even if the French found them to be “dishonorable” in their fighting, they could be an 
asset to the French army.  By frightening settlers, killing them in cold blood on their 
farms, making prisoners of their families, and destroying their settlements, the natives 
achieved the destruction and intimidation of the settlers without the French officers or 
soldiers having to sully their national reputations.  The Amerindians were also useful in 
that they could bear the responsibility for fighting one type of warfare against the 
English, allowing the French troops in America to concentrate all their energies on the 
larger line battles and defending their territory. 
 Finally, natives came in handy to French officers as scapegoats.  When Dieskau 
was defeated by Colonel Johnson in September of 1755, it was because of his own 
tactical error.  In his letters to France, however, he blamed the Amerindian allies. “The 
Iroquois played me a bad turn,” he stated in his report to the minister of war, “and it is 
unfortunate for me that I did not anticipate it.”138  Dieskau liberally blamed the natives 
for what was, in actuality, his poor decision making, and since the natives did not have a 
representative in court to defend them, Dieskau’s scapegoating would be accepted as 
truth.  Rather than take responsibility for their own errors in strategic judgment or tactical 
execution, French officers could blame the seemingly fickle, superstitious natives, and 
keep their reputations intact in court. 
 French army officers, however, did not fully embrace the Amerindian allies or 
appreciate their essential role in the war.  Junior officers could not seem to work with the 
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natives, in what were probably some mutually frustrating situations.  Natives responded 
well to the direction or coordination of the few Canadian officers who typically 
accompanied them on escapades to harass the English or Anglo-American troops.  
Vaudreuil, for example, stationed “ . . . 800 Canadians or Savages near the bay . . . to 
harass the enemies on the road to Chouaguen [to] interrupt the communication.”139  When 
raids or skirmishes involved staying in the woods for some time, Amerindians and the 
Canadians who accompanied them could live in the woods and travel relatively light, 
carrying only ammunition.140  When Montcalm would attempt to place French officers in 
charge of groups of natives, the results must have been fairly damaging to the French-
Canadian-Amerindian alliance—as Vaudreuil explained, “the Canadians and the natives 
do not work with the same confidence under the orders of a commander of the troops of 
France, as with the officers of this colony.”141  It is not surprising that French officers, 
having never worked with Amerindians and new to their culture and methods of warfare, 
proved less adept at overseeing the actions of Amerindians than the Canadians.  It is also 
unsurprising that as troupes de terre, who were in their own minds the most elite of the 
warriors in North America, they would desire to have further control over the actions of 
their auxiliaries.  The fact that they could not exert the same authority over them as over 
mercenaries or European auxiliary troops was one source of friction between the French 
officers and the Amerindians.142 
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 The poor relations between the two, however, went beyond command 
disagreements.  Montcalm exhibited quite damaging and insulting behavior towards 
Amerindian allies.  Even the Mission Indians, who had willingly adopted European 
religion and customs, complained of poor treatment from him, including verbal insults 
and exclusion from activities that they felt they had a right to participate in.  These allies 
were so insulted and so angered by their encounters with him at Fort Carillon that they 
told Vaudreuil that they “would never want to return to that place while [Montcalm] is 
the commander.”  Vaudreuil was “angry not to have been warned that they would be 
treated publicly in this manner.”  He “did not neglect anything to make them overcome 
their prejudices” and was certain they would “forget the past.”143  Montcalm dismissed 
these complaints, saying that he “was not surprised,” having “received them as I usually 
do, and then refused them some things they wanted to take,” including “some whiskey.”  
Montcalm also “complained about the disorders that they committed in the camp, killing 
and pillaging the provisions of the hospital.”144  It is not surprising that Montcalm 
resented any kind of “disorder,” but this correspondence also demonstrates that he did not 
know how to maintain the sense of military discipline and hierarchy he craved with 
Amerindians in his camp.  For Vaudreuil, however, the Amerindians were far too 
important to the French war effort in Canada to risk their alliances with relatively petty 
disagreements or altercations.  “I beg you, Sir,” he wrote to Montcalm, “to have for these 
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nations all the regards that they merit.  It is the intention of the king; they have 
contributed for a long time to the honor of his army and to the defense of the colony.”145 
 This reply holds a clue to why Montcalm and many of his officers found it so 
difficult to accept Amerindian allies.  The fact that Amerindians had “contributed for a 
long time to the honor of the [King’s] arms” impinged on the territory of the French 
army—who believed that job to be their sacred duty, a task for which they had been born 
and for which they believed themselves to be uniquely capable.  When Vaudreuil 
emphasized the Amerindian allies as being indispensable for the “defense of the colony,” 
it must have riled French officers.  Were they not the elite warriors who were born to 
fight, who had come across the Atlantic to save Canada and defend French territory from 
the English?  Was it not their duty to shed blood for the glory of the king and France?  
Vaudreuil, either out of genuine appreciation or a desire to defend his alliances with the 
Amerindians, praised their zeal and service for the king in his letters to the ministers of 
war and marine.  One anonymous letter reported to the minister of war that the “natives 
performed marvels” against the English in one raid.146  Vaudreuil, on the eve of the battle 
of Quebec said of the Canadians and natives, that “zeal” and “ardor promise[d] the 
happiest success.”147  He praised the loyalty of the natives to the minister of the marine, 
recounting how the Illinois nation sent him “two young warriors . . . [who] assured me on 
behalf of their chiefs and their entire nation . . . that they were entirely declared for the 
French.”  He went on to explain that “they had given me proof [of this] in the combat 
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against General Braddock when they delivered him into our hands, and they have 
resolved to never leave the French and to die with them.”  Vaudreuil added that he 
received these troops graciously as a way of convincing others “to follow in the same 
path.”148  Vaudreuil also took pleasure in presenting medals to the natives to honor chiefs 
who had expressed support for the French or whose warriors had behaved particularly 
courageously in battle, accompanied by commissions very much like those read to French 
officers.   These medals bore some similarity to the Croix de St. Louis, which French 
officers coveted, even if they were intended for native recipients.  With the Indians 
receiving these rather French signs of approval, though, it would not be difficult to 
imagine French officers feeling slighted in North America. 149 
 The French army seemed to be caught in a difficult position.  In the past they had 
fought alongside troops from their own country, such as the troupes de la marine, who 
were considered a secondary force, or the milice, which, as discussed in the first chapter, 
consisted of untrained temporary fillers.  The lower status of these auxiliary fighters had 
never been in doubt.  Alliances with other countries in Europe usually involved separate 
battles on separate fronts.  In North America, however, French officers had to adapt to 
fighting with Amerindian allies, who were elite warriors in their own right but who 
practiced a different kind of fighting.  Moreover, they would not humble themselves 
before French authority, even when they fought in conjunction with French troops.  
When they did not dishonor the French army, as they did when breaking European 
conventions of surrender during the Fort William Henry “massacre,” they received a 
great deal of the credit for victories in the North America.  Vaudreuil’s praised the 
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Amerindians to his superiors as the indispensable force, more integral to French victory 
than the French army itself.  As French officers had been eager for wars specifically so 
that they could exhibit their courage and military prowess, it is not surprising that they 
would have resented being upstaged by the natives. 
 French feelings of jealousy towards the natives would explain the universal 
elation the French officers expressed over their victory at Carillon.  In July of 1758, the 
British attempted to storm Fort Carillon, a French stronghold known today as Fort 
Ticonderoga. Montcalm and his French defenders, along with some troupes de la marine 
and Canadians, put up a staunch resistance against British soldiers who outnumbered 
them two to one.  After charging several times and being repulsed, the British withdrew, 
suffering nearly 2,000 casualties, whereas the French suffered less than 400.  Doreil 
credited the bravery of the officers in the battle, “the staunchness of Mr. the Ch. de Levis 
and of M. le Bourlamaque.  The first received many rifle shots without being wounded, 
and the last was wounded dangerously,” and “M. le Ms. de Montcalm exposed himself 
during all the action . . . like the least soldier. . . .”  What made the victory stand out in 
French minds, however, was the fact that it was won with “only French troops.”150  
Vaudrueil, when hearing that the fort was in danger of attack, had sent a large contingent 
of Canadians and natives to help, but they did not arrive until several days after the 
victory, and “the natives of the Five Nations” were merely “spectators” to the French 
triumph.151 
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 Montcalm and Doreil took great pleasure in describing the French valor in the 
battle and trumpeted their victory, but the absence of the natives seemed to count as the 
greatest achievement of all. As Montcalm crowed to Vaudreuil, “the [French] army, who 
had only 2,900 combatants of our troops and 400 Canadians or soldiers of the colony, 
resisted all of the attacks with a heroic courage.”  Throughout the battle, “the officers 
here did incredible things . . . and their example encouraged the soldiers to do incredible 
things as well.  The troops of the colony and the Canadians made us regret not having 
more of them.  . . . What a day for France . . . here is a great action, and perhaps the first 
that there’s been in Canada without natives!”152  Doreil took great glee in writing to the 
minister of the marine to inform him of the victory, “Messieurs the commandants of the 
corps and officers made particularly brilliant examples of valor, and nothing was 
comparable to the courage of the list of the soldiers.”  However, Doreil said that more 
than French valor, “what excites the most admiration and public joy is that no Native 
contributed to this great event, something that has not ever happened in this country; 
there wasn’t even one!”  This lack of natives, and the ability of the French troops to 
overcome the difficult conditions in Canada entirely on their own, made “the glory of the 
general and the French troops . . . the most grand.”153 
 Up to this point, all the of the French victories, even those orchestrated by 
General Montcalm, such as the siege of Fort William Henry and the victory at Fort 
Chouagen (Oswego), had included bands of natives who likewise demonstrated their zeal 
for the service of the king and brought glory to his arms.  With the battle of Carillon, 
though, the French army did not have to share any of the credit for the victory with the 
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Amerindian Allies, who had up to this point prevented the French officers from gaining 
the glory and prestige they needed to maintain their social and political rank and family 
reputation.  As Montcalm wrote to Marc Pierre de Voyer de Paulmy comte d’Argenson, 
the secretary of war, “You will learn with pleasure that without natives, with only our 
battalions, not having but 400 Canadians, I came and saved the colony, having withstood 
a combat as lively and tenacious that lasted from one in the afternoon until dusk against 
an army of at least 20,000 men.”154 
 The victory was a costly one, however, for the French exultation in their Native-
less victory resulted in losing a number of their allies. Vaudrueil considered the French 
eagerness to fight without the natives to be in poor taste diplomatically.  He reported to 
the Comte de Noailles that his brother and the natives were “quite mortified not to have 
participated in the brilliant victory of M. the Ms. de Montcalm. . . .”155  A solo French 
victory meant that the natives lost an opportunity to gain war trophies, prisoners, and 
glory for their nations. Vaudreuil received complaints from the Amerindians, who, when 
they finally arrived on the battlefield ready to fight, resented Montcalm’s gloating.  “My 
Father, we are here to give evidence of the real pain that we feel in the way M. de 
Montcalm received us at Carillon. . . . we were quite mortified not to have participated in 
the victory.”  According to the natives, Montcalm “brusquely” received them when they 
arrived after the battle, and said, “‘I do not have need of you, you have come only to see 
corpses.’”  The next day, when the natives again approached him, they reported that 
Montcalm “banged the table and said . . . ‘go to the Devil if you are not happy!’” 
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Montcalm then threw a discontented Amerindian out the door.156  Even if the reports of 
Montcalm’s treatment of the natives are exaggerated, it shows that in creating a situation 
where the French officers could claim all credit and glory for a victory, they isolated and 
rejected their most important allies. 
 Vaudreuil could see the writing on the wall.  He complained to the minister of the 
marine that, “M. the Marquis de Montcalm was so transported with joy, that he forgot the 
moderation with which he should hold himself.  He exalted his victory in such 
intemperate terms that he produced in his army the most slanderous remarks. . . .  He did 
not think much, Sir, of your recommendation in favor of our natives. . . . You will judge 
of their unhappiness by the council [report] attached to this letter . . . I would not hope to 
find the same docility in the nations of the Pays d’en Haut that avowed to me that the 
most angering things happened to them.”157  
 Eventually, as the French refused to acknowledge the importance of the 
Amerindian allies to victory in Canada, they began to lose their allies.  Shortly before the 
battle of Quebec, which would seal the fate of Canada, Vaudreuil sent an alarming 
message to the minister of the marine that the English had raised a great deal of 
Amerindian support to help them “reestablish peace” in the Ohio Valley. 158  French 
insistence on being the only army worthy to fight for France resulted in the loss of some 
of their most important allies, and with them, the colony. 
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II.  Competing Hierarchies 
 French officers considered the Canadian militia a more acceptable fighting force 
than the Amerindians.  While the Canadians were also praised for their “zeal” for the 
service of the king, they did not receive special honors or awards and could be more 
easily incorporated into French plans.  French officers did not seem to compete as 
rigorously with Canadians for the glory and credit that comes from a successful attack or 
from showing zeal for the king.  Canadians did, however, challenge established French 
concepts of warfare.  Canadian military structures appeared much less hierarchical to the 
French, and as French forces combined with Canadian ones, French soldiers became less 
disciplined and even took on some of the “republican” aspects of the Canadian militia.  
The general indiscipline that resulted is part of the reason why the French lost the war in 
Canada.  French and Canadian disagreements over fighting a “European war” in America 
revolved around the different kinds of military hierarchies as much as it did around 
tactics.  Participation in Canada challenged French notions about the proper way to 
organize an army.   
   Since the early days of New France, French settlers had handled the defense of 
the colony on their own.  While they received periodic help from the troupes de la 
marine, these forces only operated on a temporary basis when European conflicts spilled 
into the colonies.  The French army had also never entered Canadian soil until 1755 when 
the hostilities over French and English claims had become more urgent.  Until this date, 
Canadians, and other colonists living in the French territories around the world, defended 
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their territories by their own means.159  These circumstances put the Canadians directly in 
contrast with the inhabitants of mainland France, who were not responsible for defending 
French borders against foreign enemies.  French peasants only resorted to violence in 
regulating their own villages or protecting themselves from the king’s troops who were 
theoretically defending them.  The conditions in Canada, unlike the conditions in France, 
therefore, gave rise to the Canadian militia as the primary defense for the country.  
Because the Canadian militia consisted of all able men from the ages of sixteen to sixty, 
it constituted a citizen army.   
 As citizen soldiers, Canadian militiamen precariously balanced fighting and 
farming.  During a lull in the fighting in Canada in 1757, Vaudreuil recommended that 
the members of the Canadian militia “profit from a little tranquility that they have now, to 
work seriously at everything that they have with relation to their lands and their 
homes.”160  The fact that the same men responsible for growing food for the colony had 
also to fight in the militia during the war created a crisis in the food supply.  Vaudreuil 
had to write to the Minister of the Marine to beg for more supplies for the Canadian 
families who suffered from either losing someone to battle or from the inability to 
maintain their usual level of food production. 161  The militia men fighting for their 
homes, families, and way of life was both a blessing and a curse for the war effort.  On 
one hand, Canadians fought tenaciously because they had stronger motivations than 
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soldiers in the troupes de terre.162  On the other hand, members of the Canadian militia 
were given to desertion if they had been called into service for too long. 163 
 The militia men were also fighting on home territory, which both helped and 
hindered the war effort.  As “natives,” Canadians understood how to navigate the terrain 
and use it to their advantage.  They were “very adept in the war of the woods” and could 
traverse it in all seasons and weather.  At the same time, the “immense, uninhabited 
land,” of Canada also apparently bred indiscipline.  By French accounts, the wide, open 
terrain encouraged Canadians’ sense of individuality and autonomy and contributed to 
their seeming military laxity.  One French writer noted that the very “land and the air” of 
Canada fed the Canadians’ and the natives’ disorderliness.  These accounts portrayed the 
Canadians as predisposed to an army structure that emphasized the individual initiative of 
militia men.  This type of army organization clashed sharply with that of the French.  
While the individual autonomy present in the Canadian army may have allowed the 
Canadians to fight their enemies more effectively, French officers viewed “the militia” as 
something that contained “neither order nor subordination.”164 
 Despite some of the drawbacks to being a citizen army, the Canadians worked 
effectively with their Amerindian allies, and even the French troops when they first 
arrived, to repel English forces.  The style of warfare that the Canadians practiced was 
heavily influenced by their experiences fighting Amerindians.  As W.J. Eccles argued, 
the “Canadian military tradition” was born in 1707 during a war with the Iroquois.  After 
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initially suffering heavy losses at the hands of these forest warriors, the Canadian militia 
mastered their own form of “guerilla warfare” using ambush, surprise, and swift attacks.  
This war, in combination with fur trading, sharpened their skills for war in the woods.165  
Phillipe Jacquin, who argues that the French experience in Canada was a long story of 
“native-ization,” agrees that the Canadians exhibited great skill in this kind of warfare 
and had their own form of elite troops, the coureurs de bois.  These “wood runners” 
would venture deep into the Canadian wilderness, without permission from French 
authorities, to engage in the fur trade.  Jacquin argues that the skills garnered from this 
experience made one ideal for warfare in Canada, for “one does not trick the forest, she is 
a school that punishes the weak without pity,” and even the natives feared meeting this 
warrior on the wrong side of the hatchet. 166  While the coureurs de bois have become 
romanticized in Canadian history and literature and scholars debate their importance to 
warfare in Canada, their skills as woodsmen would have been especially valued during 
long marches in the woods or covering their tracks.167  French officers were less 
complimentary in their view of Canadian skills at warfare.  As Montreuil alleged, “the 
Canadian is . . . appropriate for petite guerre, very brave behind a tree, and very timid 
when he is discovered.”168   
 Even if “timid when discovered,” Canadians enjoyed early victories against their 
English foe.  One of the first reports received by the minister of war included news that 
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“200 natives and some Canadians entirely destroyed a detachment of 164 English” near 
Fort Carillon.169  M. Bellêtre witnessed the success of the Canadians and their 
Amerindian allies working in conjunction with French troops. “In sight of the first fort, 
he [Bellêtre] decided to attack, the enemies fired the most lively fire from their muskets, 
but the intrepidness with which M. de Bellêtre and all the officers and Canadians of his 
detachment advanced, joined with the cries of the natives, frightened the English to the 
point that the Mayor of the town of the palatines who commanded in this fort opened the 
doors and begged for their lives.”170  Amerindian warriors, Canadian fighters, and the 
disciplined troops from France would be frightening enough on their own, but when their 
attack was coordinated and concentrated on a single fort, the fear of their combined 
attack apparently sufficed to force a fortress to surrender.  The combination of these 
forces received similar praise from Lieutenant Colonel Monro.  In surrendering Fort 
William Henry to the French, he was, according to Vaudreuil, “impressed” by the “the 
celerity of our work, and the intrepidity of our troops of the marine, Canadians, and 
natives,” even to the point where “his loss was inevitable.”171 
 As part of a citizen army, Canadians possessed one value that no one else in this 
war could claim: patriotism.  The idea of patriotism was not new to the French in 
Europe—it had been praised as a worthy virtue in ancient Greeks and Romans and 
considered partly responsible for their military successes—but before the Seven Years’ 
War it had had limited relevance in contemporary Europe.  In Canada, however, 
Vaudreuil used patriotism to rally his Canadian fighters, even after the fall of Quebec.  
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As Vaudreuil explained to the minister of war in France, his desire to retake Quebec 
came from “the sad state of the Canadians, their sentiments of zeal for the service of the 
king and their attachment to the patrie.”  Vaudreuil’s use of the word indicates that the 
Canadians felt a particular emotion for their homeland that could not come from any 
other combatant.  Vaudreuil further desired “finally to procure their ancient liberty and to 
deliver them from tyranny.”  To take the fort, Vaudrueil had ordered “a considerable train 
of artillery and a powerful army of troops, Canadians, and natives,” but it was their “zeal 
and ardor [that] promise[d] to make the happiest successes.”   Vaudreuil proclaimed: 
“Therefore, brave Canadians, [I call on] you . . . to risk all for the conservation of your 
religion and to save your patrie.  The Canadians of the government and those of the three 
rivers delighted to contribute to extinguishing your miseries, [therefore,] march with an 
inexpressible zeal; you should invite them on all points to join your efforts to theirs and 
even surpass them.”172  Canadian patriotism did not succeed in retaking Canada, but 
French officers and soldiers witnessed and perhaps experienced this element of making 
war. 
 French soldiers in particular appeared satisfied with fighting and living with a 
citizen army. Unlike the peasants of France, Canadian inhabitants played an active role in 
the defense of their country, and did not resemble the “lazy” peasant who lived in relative 
comfort and disdained the soldier for his profession.  The rapport between soldiers and 
citizens here was therefore remarkably pleasant.  Reports and correspondence from 
Canada do not mention any thievery or crimes of the soldiers among the populace,173 
though Vaudreuil reported an instance early in the war when French soldiers pillaged 
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their defeated enemy’s goods.174  Soldiers got along so well with their fellow fighters that 
Montcalm considered them “like brothers with the Canadian and the Native.” 175  Some 
had such an affinity for Canada that they married Canadian women and settled there 
permanently after the war.  Montcalm considered this arrangement to be beneficial for the 
king and colony, because it would establish good troops to protect the colony when the 
army returned to France. 176  Even two of Montcalm’s officers married canadiennes and 
other men bought parcels of uncultivated land to farm after the war had finished. 177 
 These pleasant relations also caused a marked dissolution of discipline among 
French soldiers.   French officers had been inconsistent with enforcing discipline as a 
whole for the past century, but what control they maintained over their troops 
disappeared in Canada.  In order to house the soldiers, Montcalm found it necessary for 
them to be “scattered in the homes of the inhabitants.”  It caused discipline problems, 
because “there he lives in a state of independence far from the view of the officer or 
sergeant.”  Regular call for drill or training was nearly impossible, as “the habitations of 
the Canadians are not grouped together like the houses in villages in France; they are 
very distant from one another.”178  This lack of discipline among the troops did not seem 
to perturb Montcalm.  When he placed French troops in Canadian homes, he knew that he 
had “relaxed the discipline” among them.  Montcalm considered “a little indiscipline” to 
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be “inevitable in this climate,” and seemed pleased that overall “the mood of the soldier 
[was] good.”179   
 If the soldiers’ mood was good when it came to relations with the Canadians, the 
officers’ mood was not.  French officers and officers of the troupes de la marine did not 
get along at all, and M. Montreuil observed that “the officers of the colony do not like the 
army officers.” 180  This general dislike sprang from the French metropole’s apparent 
preference for the officers of the French army.  Both sets of troops had been sent from 
France, but the troupes de la marine already had a reputation for being less adept at 
warfare than the troupes de terre, and also fought in Canada for so long that they had 
been somewhat absorbed into Canadian society.  It is not surprising, therefore, that 
commissions were almost always awarded to the troupes de terre, sparking “a great deal 
of jealousy between the officers of the colony and the officers of France with regard to 
treatment.”181  There existed between the three types of forces in Canada “a general 
misunderstanding on how to share the authority” that hampered all efforts of working 
together.182  The Minister of the Marine feared, and rightly so, that these conflicts would 
complicate any hope of winning the war in Canada.  “There is nothing more needed to 
assure the success than to keep unity between the officers of the troupes de terre and 
those of the colony.”  At first he had not believed “that the service had suffered much,” 
but the thoughts of the arrival of English troops made him, “fear that the small 
altercations could only harm the operations of the common defense” and therefore he 
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could not “desire too much the union and the intelligence between the troupes de terre 
and those of the colony.”183 
 Disagreements between officers deepened over the course of the war, and 
contributed to a general sense of competition between the French officers and the 
Canadians.  Montcalm seemed eager to prove to the Minister of War that French troops 
could fight just as effectively in the New World as the Old, despite adverse conditions 
that they had never encountered.  After the army’s first exhausting six-week march 
through Canada with the militiamen and troupes de la marine, Montcalm sent boastful 
reports to France about the army’s success. “These Canadians were surprised to see that 
our officers and soldiers did not cede anything in the genre of marching in which they are 
little accustomed.  It is necessary, in effect, to agree that one has no idea in Europe of the 
exhaustion where one is obligated for six weeks to march and sleep half the time in the 
snow and on the ice, to be reduced to bread and lard, and often to drag or bring supplies 
for fifteen days.”  But the French soldiers and officers “did not cede to them a thing.”  
Rather, he said, “we bore it with much gaiety and without the slightest complaint.”184  It 
is dubious that the French soldiers, as tough as they might be, would weather such a 
march as easily as Montcalm described.  It seemed important to Montcalm, though, that 
his army would not be bested by a group of local militiamen; they would appear as 
superior warriors.   
 Montcalm also demonstrated a general impatience with the Canadian fighters.  
Vaudreuil reported that his brother, Rigaud, who led many of the Canadians through their 
various raids and battles, “was obliged to plead the case of the Canadian who had 
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emptied his horn of powder during the action, having wanted to refill it . . . it was some 
trouble to obtain this consideration from M. de Montcalm.”185  Vaudreuil considered the 
Canadians to have “suffered much from the intensity and the anger of M. de 
Montcalm.”186  Montcalm remained impatient with their lack of discipline (though it was 
something that he apparently tolerated in his own troops), and with what he called their 
“boasting.” 187  Montcalm seems to have resented having to fight with these troops, 
though officially he should have kept his grumbling to himself.  While he and Vaudreuil 
shared command of Canada, Vaudreuil was, until late in the war, the commanding 
general of all operations, and Montcalm had been ordered to “be subordinate in all 
things” to him.188  This position obviously irked him, and he complained so heavily to the 
ministers of war and marine that they finally promoted him in to Lieutenant General in 
January of 1759, and he became supreme commander of the operations.189  Many 
historians have cited Montcalm’s personality as rather distasteful and found him to be a 
vain and unflattering character.190  While Montcalm’s papers certainly do not leave much 
evidence to contradict these judgments, his disposition towards the Canadians may be 
part of a larger set of problems within the French army as a whole. 
 Montcalm again exhibited his reluctance to accept Canadians’ approach to 
warfare by insisting that they conduct themselves as European troops and fight in a linear 
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European fashion, especially when he combined the troops at the end of the war and in 
the battle for Quebec.  A disciplined European soldier—one who could hold the line, 
advance on the enemy, fire in unison with his fellow soldiers, then receive the fire of the 
enemy—took two years to train, and the Canadians had not received any such 
preparation.  Among the reasons Montcalm was faulted for the loss of Quebec, according 
to Vaudreuil, was his misuse of the Canadians.  At Quebec, Montcalm’s “army was 
largely composed of Canadians, whom everyone knows is in no way appropriate for 
fighting in battle lines.”  Montcalm could not have been ignorant of their unsuitability for 
such warfare, yet he insisted on fighting that way.  It was generally known that the kind 
of war one “pursues in Canada is not the kind that one pursues in Europe.”191  It is 
therefore indicative of larger forces that Montcalm insisted on applying the European 
warfare in Canada. 
 The Canadians had been fighting wars in the vast terrain of the Canadian 
wilderness for a century, and they had developed a system that worked well for the 
terrain and the type of fighting that they encountered.  Montcalm and the troupes de 
terre, however, insisted on maintaining a European system of warfare.  Montcalm and his 
officers were not blind to the difficulties of executing this kind of warfare, nor do I think 
that they considered the Canadians to have ineffective tactics.  The crux of the 
disagreements between the officers, the amity between the soldiers and the Canadian 
militia, and the sense of competition that hovered among the forces was a struggle over 
hierarchy.  As the juxtaposition of the Canadian militia and the troupes de terre reveals, a 
change in the type of warfare employed in America necessitated a change in hierarchy as 
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well.  To fight the war as Vaudreuil had recommended, focusing most of their energies 
on raiding the long frontier that stretched from the great lakes down towards Louisiana 
would necessitate a further breakdown in discipline and the subdivision of French troops 
into smaller units.  Even if the French army stayed whole and let the Canadian militia 
conduct most of the fighting, French forces would see little action. 
 European armies, especially the French army, were not foreign to this type of 
warfare that included fighting petite guerre in small groups, conducting raids, ambushes, 
and fighting in difficult, mountainous terrain.  It was important to Montcalm, however to 
execute a European way of fighting that would maintain the strict hierarchy of 
aristocratic warfare.  Montcalm complained shortly before the massacre at Fort William 
Henry, that the lack of order among the Canadian personnel had forced him to take on a 
commanding role.  “The officers, the interpreters, and the missionaries,” he said, “have in 
general the spirit of republicans, and I have the misfortune that the natives seem to have 
confidence only in me!”192  Montcalm regarded the Canadian’s “republican” methods to 
be more egalitarian, less ordered, and therefore less reliant on the strict hierarchy 
essential to the regular French army.  Canadian laxity was also evident in the soldiers’ 
embrace of the Canadian and Amerindian fighters as well as the difficulties French 
officers had in accepting them—Canadian warfare favored the soldiers. Montcalm came 
from a military culture that emphasized military rank and associated one’s place in the 
army with one’s place in society—a “republican” force like the one in Canada affronted 
his sense of hierarchy and his place in an aristocratic fighting force.  Montcalm was not 
just defending Canada with his army and his arms, but he was also defending the 
hierarchical system of warfare that defined him.  
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 This inflexibility that Montcalm demonstrated in his treatment of his Canadian 
allies, combined with his disdain for Amerindians, indicate that he had allowed his 
preference for European warfare to take precedence over his pursuit of victory in Canada.  
This approach to warfare—one that focused on individual achievement and maintaining 
socially-reflective hierarchies above what was required to defeat the enemy—inhibited 
the French army from harnessing its resources in the Canadians and Amerindians towards 
a joint victory.  With this view on warfare, France could not hope to win.  But perhaps 
winning Canada was not the top priority for French officers in the first place. 
 
III.  Of Zeal and Defeat 
 Montcalm and Vaudreuil evidently disagreed a great deal over the course of the 
war, from how best to incorporate the natives (or not) to what type of warfare to use in 
Canada and therefore what kind of hierarchy to enforce.  But these two generals 
disagreed even more on their very priorities in defending Canada.  Vaudreuil saw the 
preservation of Canada and its people as most important, whereas Montcalm had to 
balance that goal with the need for French officers to demonstrate their zeal and obtain 
medals, rank, and pensions.  Montcalm’s priorities were symptomatic of a general 
defeatist attitude that permeated the French army and government with regards to the 
North American war.  While Canada might have been low on the priority list to defend 
during this global conflict, the French army’s sense of honor required that the French 
army fight for the colony that they would inevitably have to surrender. 
 Vaudreuil understood that many officers wished to demonstrate zeal in the course 
of battle.  He sent the minister “the best accounts of the officers of the milice of the 
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colony” who “distinguished themselves particularly at the expedition of Fort Georges . . . 
by their zeal . . . and their merits.”  Vaudreuil hoped that his account would allow these 
troops to “have some part in the distribution of the favors of the king” who had been 
making commissions available for Montcalm to distribute to worthy members of the 
troupes de terre.  The two commissions that Vaudreuil had already awarded “had 
contributed much to making their zeal untiring.”193  By recognizing “the zeal” they have 
exhibited in the midst of the “trouble [that] this war has caused” the king’s favors would 
spur the Canadians to fight harder.194  Vaudrueil, in response to some of the less 
complimentary reports Montcalm sent to the ministers of War and Marine about the 
troupes de la marine, also made sure that this body of troops received due credit for its 
efforts in North America.  He wrote that he had “no stronger ambition than to . . . inform 
you of their constant service,” with hopes that they would receive what “is due to 
them.”195  Because the king seemed to reward zeal in their counterparts of the troupes de 
terre with commissions and awards, Vaudreuil hoped he would do the same for the 
troupes de la marine since it had such inspiring results. 
 The increasing probability that England would take Canada further stoked 
Vaudreuil’s and the Canadians’ patriotic motives.  Considering, he said, “. . . the situation 
that we find ourselves in . . . we are determined [to go to] the greatest extremes to 
conserve this colony,” and he cited their “natural inclination and essentially our zeal for 
the service of his majesty” as the source of their determination 196  The primary goal of 
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Vaudreuil and the Canadians to conserve the colony stemmed from their love for their 
homeland.  Even in the midst of fighting General Wolfe’s troops, who wholly destroyed 
the homes and land surrounding the walls of Quebec, “the promises, the threats, the 
cruelties of General Wolf did not have any effect [on]. . . the zeal of the Canadians, for 
the service of the king was a rampart that ferocity never crossed.”197  Here, when 
Vaudreuil cited Canadian zeal for the service of the king, it was not in pursuit of 
recognition or commissions that might inspire the Canadians further.  Rather, it 
demonstrated how the zeal itself enabled the Canadians to brace themselves when 
fighting desperately to beat back the English.  Even after losing Quebec, Vaudreuil 
refused to admit defeat, and he, along with a conglomeration of the troops that had been 
fighting in New France, had plans to retake the colony.  His “steadfastness” was 
“generally applauded, [and] it penetrated all hearts as each one of us said loudly that we 
would [continue to fight] under the ruins of Canada, our natal country, sooner than 
surrender to the English.”198  Vaudreuil’s zealous calls to battle, however, did not match 
Montcalm’s approach to defending Canada.   
 By Vaudreuil’s account, Montcalm simply used the war in Canada as a means to 
further his career and those of French officers.  Shortly after the victory over General 
Abercromby, Vaudreuil sent additional information that Montcalm had failed to report.  
“I will not relate to you all the exact details of the brilliant victory that we have just had,” 
as “Monsieur the Marquis de Montcalm has the honor of telling you very detailed 
accounts [of how] all the officers distinguished themselves as well as the troops in 
general.”  To whatever Montcalm had reported, Vaudreuil asked that they would allow 
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him “to add [that] . . . the troupes of the Marine, the Canadians and the small number of 
natives that he had with him exhibited the same ardor and the same zeal as the troupes de 
terre.”199   
 Vaudreuil met with a great deal of resistance from Montcalm when he ordered the 
marquis to execute certain plans for the defense of the colony.  Montcalm, though he 
insisted that he had “enough zeal . . . for the service of the king and the defense of this 
colony,” apparently thought the “obstacles that he envisioned” were sufficient to call off 
the attack.  Vaudreuil countered that Montcalm’s concerns only stemmed from the fact 
that he did not know the colony thoroughly enough, and in order “to assure the success of 
his expedition,” he must execute the plan faithfully regardless of the obstacles he might 
encounter.  Vaudreuil ended his final letter by assuring Montcalm that he would 
“attribute to him all the glory,” of the completed attack.200  According to Vaudrueil, 
Montcalm only seemed concerned with winning glory.  He complained that “It is [to] the 
true and more solid interest in the colony that I attach myself, [and] . . . instead of that, 
Mr. de Montcalm admitted that the troupes de terre want only to conserve their 
reputation and would desire to return to France without having suffered a single 
difficulty.”  In short, “they think more seriously of their particular interests than of saving 
the colony.”  In response to this attitude, Vaudrueil promised to resist Montcalm’s 
designs on every issue concerning their future campaigns.201  Montcalm apparently 
looked at all “the actions of the colony in the unique view to attribute to the troupes de 
                                                 
199
 SHAT, 1 A 3499, Vaudreuil to Bellisle, Montreal, 3 August 1758. 
 
200
 AN Colonies, fonds ministerials f/3/14, Vaudreuil, Montreal, 13 August 1756. 
 
201
 AN Colonies, C 11A, vol. 103, Vaudreuil, 30 October 1758. 
 105
terre all the advantages that we have over the enemy.”202  That said, Vaudreuil did not 
seem displeased with the troupes de terre themselves, whom he could not “praise 
enough.”  He only contested the motives and the prerogatives of Montcalm and his 
officers.203  
 There was one officer, however, that Vaudreuil did not object to: the Chevalier de 
Lévis, a French officer who was universally admired by the troupes de terre, the 
Canadian militia, the troupes de la marine, and the Amerindian allies.  He, in return, 
seemed to make the best use of everyone’s talents, and held the defense of the colony as 
his first priority.  He was the only officer of the troupes de terre who did not gloat over 
the absence of the natives at their victory at Carillon, and both Montcalm and Vaudreuil 
wrote to the ministers of war and marine to recommend him for promotion.  When 
Montcalm fell at the battle of Quebec, Lévis took charge of the troupes de terre, and it is 
tempting to wonder what would have happened in the war if he had taken command 
earlier.204  
 Doriel, a French general and firm supporter of Montcalm, argued that Vaudreuil 
was “jealous without a doubt of the glory that M. Montcalm had acquired.”  The 
ministers of war should therefore ignore any ill reports of Montcalm that he received 
from Vaudreuil since “all [the] disagreements  . . . M.  the Ms. de Montcalm was exposed 
to since the first moment of his arrival” stemmed from this jealousy.205  Vaudreuil may 
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have had personal reasons of his own for disliking Montcalm and his style, but the 
marquis nevertheless provided ample evidence in his own letters that concerns other than 
the safety of Canada remained uppermost in his mind. 
 While the rivalry between the two and their evident dislike of each other is 
important to consider in these damning accounts of Montcalm that Vaudreuil has 
supplied, Montcalm’s letters and those of his officers do reveal a preoccupation with 
promotions, commissions, and military decorations.  As Montreuil confirmed the 
officers’ “zeal and exactitude,” he added that “M. the marquis de Montcalm has the honor 
of asking you for a pension for me.  I dare to flatter myself, sir, that you would . . . honor 
me with a rank of Brigadier . . . I will make the greatest efforts to merit it.”206  Evidently, 
Montreuil had not performed either long enough or well enough to merit the promotion, 
but if it was provided, he promised to live up to it.  Montcalm then ordered “some favors 
that I might . . . have the honor of telling [my officers] in a distinguished manner that 
they serve the king.” 207 He further worked to assure that his officers received medals for 
their service.  When M. Basserade did not receive a medal that Montcalm had 
recommended him for, Montcalm reasoned that “his actions and his wound would 
procure it for him the next year.”208 
 When medals and favors did not arrive, Montcalm was quick to alert the minister 
of war.   “I would make you observe that . . .  we have not yet received the Croix de St. 
Louis or the orders for pensions and gratifications that have been accorded in the month 
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of March, 1757, [and] that I have not received the cordon rouge that the king was going 
to honor me with.”  He seemed perturbed in his observations that “M. the Ms. de 
Vaudreuil has made the same demand for the troupes of the colony.  He received the 
crosses and the cordon rouge; for us, we have received nothing.”209 
 Montcalm and his fellow officers’ obsession with medals, rank, pensions, and 
other favors of the king is emblematic of a larger culture of reward that existed within the 
French army among the officer corps.  As explained in the last chapter, Louis XIV and 
XV had bestowed ranks and commissions as a sign of his favor, and by the Seven Years’ 
War, the bureaucratization of the French army had made these rewards seem almost 
expected compensation for brave actions, wounds, or honorable retreats.  Wounds 
especially seemed to merit reward.  In the correspondence between troops of the armée 
de terre both in Canada and in Europe and the minister of war, many officers seem much 
more concerned with their personal gain from the war than the actual outcome of it.210  
 When concerning rank and pensions, officers were often in competition with one 
another, which disrupted their professional relationship.  Montreuil, for example, 
expressed extreme displeasure at not being promoted when another officer less senior 
than him advanced in rank.  “I am pained,” he said, “to have not yet received that last 
promotion for the rank of brigadier that I had hoped to have merited by the services that I 
rendered during the affair of July 8, at Carillon.”  That rank had instead been given to 
“Bourlamaque with a pension of 100 pistoles after the siege of Chouagan.  This officer, 
less senior than I, [and] having been wounded at the beginning of the action of July 8,” 
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had not been able to “contribute as much as I was able to do at that victory.”  Montreuil 
had, in fact, contributed so much that “M. le Ms. de Montcalm . . . had the goodness to 
give you advantageous evidence of my courage and my activity and to incessantly 
applaud this affair, the cool sense that I observed during all the times in action, before all 
the officers of the army who were witness.”  To these reasons for the promotion, 
Montreuil added that, “I was not less distinguished at the affair of the 2 of April in front 
of Quebec. . . . I dare to flatter myself, sir, that knowing my zeal for the service of the 
King, you would well have the goodness to . . . ask for me from his majesty the rank of 
brigadier that I will merit even more by my devotion to his service.”211  In looking at 
Montreuil’s reasoning, it is clear that he kept a laundry list of the reasons for his 
promotion over Bourlamarque’s.  The fact that Bourlamarque had been wounded, though, 
despite Montreuil’s “courage and activity,” might have been the reason for his promotion, 
as the shedding of blood for “the zeal of the king,” seemed to be ample reason for 
promotion or favors.  In a similar way, Montcalm had earlier assumed that M. 
Basserade’s “wound” would procure him the Croix de St. Louis. 
 Montcalm recommended another wounded officer, the Sieur de Claireville, for a 
coveted retirement position.  “The Sieur de Claireville,” he proclaimed, “lost an arm in 
glorious fashion in a combat on the sea.”  Since this man “would not know how to serve 
in this colony with an arm and a half,” Montcalm requested that they provide him a 
pleasant retirement at the Invalides.212  The importance of wounds or near-death 
experiences is further evident at the end of the war when members of the troupes de la 
marine prepared to reenter service in France and needed pensions, commissions, and 
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promotions.  They continually cited injuries, having horses shot from under them, and 
dangerous interactions as proof of their “zeal for the king.” They rarely mentioned 
completed missions, victories, or actual contributions to the war effort.  These were 
perhaps in short supply during the French war in Canada, but they also appeared to be 
less important than bodily sacrifice.213 
 This emphasis on wounds and the inter-officer competition for rank and awards 
calls the priorities of the French army and the French state into question.  Did the French 
army ever expect to win, or was the war in Canada a vehicle for something else?  W.J. 
Eccles describes Montcalm and the entire French state as “defeatist.”214  While some 
historians may find Eccles’ perspective on the indifferent French attitude towards Quebec 
a little extreme, many of Montcalm’s letters do contain rather pessimistic sentiments 
about his situation in Canada.215  “It is difficult for a well-intentioned general,” he 
bemoaned, “to find himself 1500 leagues away [from France], to serving outside and 
under a department and to have always to fear the necessity to justify it.”  While he 
would “never diminish” his “zeal nor [his] constant attention to maintaining the union 
between the diverse troops,” his “health, the work, the worry, and chagrin,” of working in 
Canada placed him in a “sad situation.”216  Part of that sad situation consisted of constant 
battles with Vaudreuil over how to run the war, which troops to use to what purpose, and, 
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of course, who would claim the credit for whatever actions transpired.  Montcalm assured 
the minister of war that “the personal disagreements never alter my zeal for the service of 
the king.”  He further declared, “I will willingly spill the last drop of my blood and would 
give the last breath of my life for his service.”217  These sentiments are noble, indeed, but 
they express Montcalm’s dedication to the service of the king, not saving Canada.  Other 
officers asserted strongly to the Minister of War in 1758 that “Canada is lost if peace is 
not made this winter . . . one must count that [Canada] will succumb infallibly the next 
year.”218  It appeared that for Montcalm, and for many of his officers, that service to the 
king and saving Canada were not the same thing, and that serving the king might even 
mean sacrificing Canada. 
 As discussed earlier in this chapter, Montcalm and most of the French officers 
seemed reluctant to fight alongside Amerindian allies and were thrilled when they 
achieved an all-French victory without the need for an ally who had been indispensable 
for the Canadians in their victories.  The French army, as the primary defender of France, 
needed to fight the war on their own terms, even if it meant their defeat.  Montcalm 
similarly refused to sacrifice the French army’s hierarchy in order to fight the partisan 
type of warfare required.  In serving the king by keeping the French army from 
sacrificing its own values, systems, and hierarchies, the French army lost Canada.  That 
might have been a sacrifice, however, that the French army as an institution and the 
French state were willing to make. 
 When the Seven Years’ War began in earnest, France had to deal with three 
theaters of war simultaneously in North America, India, and most importantly, on the 
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continent.  The colony in Canada, which Voltaire famously described as merely “some 
acres of snow,” might not have received the full strength of the French army because it 
was less important to maintain than the borders of France threatened by the Prussians.  
From the beginning, France had sent 3,000 troops to Canada, and Montcalm, who 
replaced the original Dieskau at the beginning of the war, had never won a single battle 
during his service in Europe.219 When the French army sent reinforcement troops in 1757, 
they were low-level, untrained, conscripted recruits who could offer little support to the 
French army, especially when paired against the large number of well-trained troops that 
the British army had provided to General Wolfe for the assault on Quebec. 220  If the 
colony in Canada was truly important to the French state, it did little to show it.  Even the 
Chevalier de Lévis hoped that “the king will be satisfied with all the efforts that were 
made for the conservation of New France,” especially since, when in desperate need for 
more supplies, weapons, ammunition, and troops, only “one single frigate arrived . . .” 
with support from the metropole.221 
 France already operated in a European culture of war that required armies 
inevitably facing defeat to fight for a time, rather than instantly surrender.  Especially 
during the age of Vauban, the great fortress engineer for Louis XIV, it was understood 
that a besieged fortress would most likely fall to its attackers.  If the fortress held out and 
honorably defended itself for a time, then the attackers would allow the fortress to 
surrender peacefully and its defenders would maintain their honor, military colors, and 
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soldiers.  This was still true, as the siege of Fort William Henry proceeded in exactly this 
manner.  Perhaps Canada was a relatively low priority for the French state, but the laws 
and traditions of war would not allow the French to merely give up Canada without 
attempting to defend it.  In order to maintain its honor, the French army would have to 
honorably defend Canada, even if facing certain defeat.  This attitude would explain why 
Montcalm refused to renege on any established European methods for conducting 
warfare, and why he clashed with Vaudreuil’s more urgent win-at-all-costs approach.  As 
Christian Crouch has argued, the primary priority of the French army in America in the 
Seven Years’ war was to maintain its honor, even at the loss of the colony.222  
 The priorities of the French army in Canada can perhaps be best expressed by an 
article that appeared in the Gazette de Leyde, a French language paper that circulated 
widely in France and catered to the French reading public with their news.  During the 
entirety of the Seven Years’ War, the paper had often printed the latest news on the war 
in Europe, including thorough descriptions of battles, troop movements, surrenders, and 
treaties.  Its coverage of Canada, however, was restricted to one lengthy article that 
appeared at the end of every year to provide a general update on the state of the colony.  
When the French army lost the battle of Quebec and the entire French empire in North 
America, the newspaper reported that, “We await more detailed news of the different 
actions in Canada during this last campaign.  One knows that the officers and the troops 
of all the corps who were employed there gave the greatest proof of zeal and of 
courage.”223  So long as this last point was true, one wonders if the rest of those details 
really mattered. 
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Conclusion 
 The Seven Years’ War was the last hurrah, so to speak, for the aristocratic army 
as Louis XIV had envisioned it.  In this war, especially in Canada, the French army 
exhibited crippling frailties.  In many ways, the French army in Canada positioned itself 
for defeat in the war for the colony.  First, the army isolated its most important allies, the 
Amerindian nations in North America, because of a preoccupation with being the only 
force that could defend France.  The rejection of these valuable allies demonstrates the 
extent to which the French army had become more concerned about its own role in a war 
and being responsible for any achievements than about achieving the overall victory in a 
conflict.  The French army was also inflexible in its hierarchy.  French noble officers 
such as Montcalm, Doriel, and Montreuil were accustomed to fighting in an army whose 
ranks determined social standing and this culture did not mesh with the needs of a war 
that centered more on the individual decisions and actions of the soldiers than the 
leadership of the officers.  In order for the French army to take full advantage of the 
Canadian militia, who approached the war as a citizen army, it would have had to 
sacrifice its aristocratic nature.  With Canadians untrained for European warfare and 
lacking the tight sense of discipline (which French soldiers soon lacked as well, under 
their influence), the French army would have had to concede how they fought.  French 
soldiers, who embraced the style of life in Canada and its warrior-inhabitants, seemed 
eager to adopt this kind of residential militia that they found in Canada.  The officers, 
however, refused to compromise their aristocratic nature, and instead forced the 
Canadians, in the final battle, to attack in a European fashion entirely foreign to them—
and entirely detrimental to Canada. 
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 Finally, in Canada the French army revealed that it was no longer an army of 
glory, as it had been under Louis XIV, but an army of zeal.  “Glory” had required the 
completion of a mission, the winning of a battle, or the seizing of a fortress.  Zeal, on the 
other hand, could be proven with wounds, sacrifice, or any show of effort.  The goal of 
the army of Louis XIV had been to bring glory to the king, and by extension the French 
state.  Officers also had to fight for the reputations of their families and their personal 
honor.  By the Seven Years’ War, most of the officers seemed more preoccupied with 
winning medals, pensions, and higher rank than with bringing glory to France by 
defending and securing Canada.  For these officers, the war in Canada provided a vehicle 
for their own advancement, rather than a chance to win glory for the King, much less 
fight for the colony and its inhabitants.  Whether Canada was saved or lost, therefore, 
mattered little so long as the officers sufficiently demonstrated their “zeal.”   
 The battle of Quebec, the final battle for Canada, had been a monumental French 
failure, embodying all of the frailties of the French army.  By this battle, some of the 
Amerindian allies had left the French to join the British forces, which were more inviting 
to these allies and allowed them ample opportunity to win war trophies.  Montcalm had 
enrolled Canadians to fight in the line army with French soldiers, even though the 
Canadians had never received the necessary training.  Montcalm chose an unfortunate 
moment to attack the English, and rode off with the troops, his sword drawn, to meet the 
English forces that heavily outnumbered his own.  Such an action demonstrated a great 
deal of courage and zeal, but had no hope of contributing to victory.224  Montcalm’s 
death, the ultimate display of zeal, did nothing to help win the war, but it may have 
secured him a favorable legacy in the French army, despite his many mistakes in Canada.  
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Montcalm has always been heavily criticized by historians, but his actions in the Seven 
Years’ War may have been more emblematic of the problems that haunted the entire 
army than individual incompetence.   
 All of these events in Canada demonstrated that the French army was much less 
capable of winning wars than it had been under Louis XIV.  The loss of this war, and the 
mistakes that had caused their defeat in all three theaters made French officers, military 
tacticians, and government officials realize that the army required a great deal of reform.  
Officers of all rank then entered a period of thinking, writing, and proposing ways to 
reinvent the French army and the relationship between officers, soldiers, and the citizens 
of the state. 
 It is therefore ironic, in retrospect, to assess the reasons for the French loss in 
Canada, because in Canada the French army caught a glimpse of what it would look like 
within the next thirty years.  The Canadian army had been a type of citizen army, relying 
mostly on a militia that included every capable man between the ages of sixteen and 
sixty.  Canadians had learned how to hunt, track, and fight since childhood and all men 
were expected to contribute to the defense of the colony.  Canadians felt a strong sense of 
loyalty and patriotism for their “natal land” of Canada, foreshadowing the sense of 
patriotism and even nationalism that the French would also feel about their patrie.  When 
the French army emerged from a thirty-year reform period, it would resemble the 
Canadian militia more than the aristocratic army it had been under Louis XIV.
Chapter Three 
From Soldiers to Citizens: New Thoughts for an Old Army, 1760-1781 
 
 The French army lost the Seven Years’ War in humiliating and disastrous fashion 
in all theaters, not just Canada.  In India, France conceded defeat to General Robert Clive 
and his British and Indian troops.225  In Europe, France’s army proved no match against 
the Prussians, who completely routed France in a number of traditional, linear battles.  
Just as the French army’s abilities at partisan warfare could not surpass those of the 
Amerindians and Canadians in the former New France, so its abilities at traditional 
European linear warfare paled in comparison to Prussia’s.  While the French bemoaned 
the loss of their Empire (though they did maintain some of the sugar islands), the deepest 
humiliation lay in the loss to Prussia.  As discussed in the previous chapter, it is unlikely 
that French officers viewed keeping Canada as their first priority, and therefore used the 
combat in North America as a vehicle to demonstrate their zeal, with a focus on receiving 
medals, pensions, and promotions.  The French army had not counted, however, on losing 
the war to Prussia, a small state with a fraction of France’s population and wealth.  While 
France lost the Seven Years’ War for many reasons, including naval inferiority and 
incompetent generals, one of the most discussed and accepted explanations emphasized 
the lack of discipline among French troops compared to the renowned discipline of the 
Prussians.  Having a smaller army than most European states, the Prussians were drilled
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to perfection by their General-King, Frederick the Great, and executed discrete attacks 
that would target small parts of enemy armies, such as supply lines or other lucrative 
targets that were necessary for the function of the army as a whole.  French officers had 
underestimated Prussia and overestimated their own troops’ abilities and discipline as 
well as their own decision-making capabilities.   
 Because warfare played such a large role in French culture and social structure, 
these defeats caused the country to spiral into a time of intense introspection.  To quote 
Jay Smith, this “demoralizing loss to the English and the Prussians in the Seven Years’ 
War led to a collective soul-searching the likes of which the French had never 
experienced.”226  On one side, non-military thinkers and writers, both from the noble and 
educated non-noble classes, viewed the Seven Years’ War as confirmation of a longer 
decay that had occurred in French society since the days of Louis XIV.  Many of these 
writers had become disenchanted with the corrupted relationship between the monarchy 
and the nobility, and saw the decadence that Louis XIV had in effect increased among the 
noble class as a continually corroding element.  Many of these writers’ ideas to restore 
“virtue” to French society and government on a large scale involved rethinking and 
recasting the French army.  Reclaiming political virtue, in particular, seemed to involve 
rethinking the relationship between the army and the rest of society.  Members of the 
French educated classes saw themselves not just as loyal subjects, but as citizens who had 
an active role in the character and fate of the patrie.  In addition, military reformers, 
operating inside the institutions of the army, looked to make tangible changes within the 
military system that would render the French army more efficient and more effective.   
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Both groups recognized that massive reforms would be necessary for the French army to 
restore itself to its former glory.  Contemplating these potential changes placed the 
French soldier at the center of the success of the French army.   
 Instead of taking measures to increase the amount of discipline in the army, 
however, French readers and reformers alike supported decisions to develop a stronger 
sense of patriotism among society and soldiers.  The Seven Years’ War marked a turning 
point in the emergence of French nationalism, in which subjects who actively advanced 
the interests of France acquired the title of “citizen,” and the French army’s focus on 
patriotism was consistent with this movement.  Focusing on patriotism allowed the 
French army to develop what they believed to be their natural inclination to protect their 
country instead of trying to out-discipline the Prussians and risk becoming disciplined 
“automatons.”  Since the French officer corps and educated elite had been well schooled 
in ancient Greek and Roman history and lore, they eagerly consulted ancient sources on 
the keys to military success and found that the most militaristic ancient civilizations—
Sparta and Rome—relied heavily on patriotism to motivate their citizen soldiers and 
produce victories.  French readers in particular studied the ancients carefully and viewed 
their example as leading the French army to a patriotic “promised land,” that would in 
turn restore virtue to a decadent society operating under a despotic government.  French 
readers’ study of the ancients intertwined with the search for institutional military reform 
in the works of the comte de Guibert and Servan.  Both of these authors pulled from 
ancient examples, as well as their extensive experience as officers, to propose methods of 
reform that struck a chord with the army’s external critics and with military reformers.  
Both Guibert and Servan endorsed and advanced the attractiveness and feasibility of the 
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patriotic citizen army model.   While there were of course differences and debates 
regarding certain areas of reform, almost all reformers drew heavily from ancient 
examples to support the idea that patriotism, more than discipline, would be the key to 
reviving French military prowess.     
 This chapter will focus on the reforms proposed from 1750 to 1783, and pay 
particular attention to proposals that focused on the common soldier.   Indeed, when the 
French army entered this era of reform, it was not interested in just revising tactics and 
tinkering with the current system.  It was prepared to reexamine the foundation upon 
which the entire French army was built. What made the French army tick?  What was the 
impact of French society and culture?  What were a Frenchman’s natural talents?  How 
could the French army draw on those talents to improve military operations?  These 
questions led officers and philosophers to reject nearly all attempts at increasing 
discipline in the army with external or artificial means, such as the incorporation of harsh 
corporal punishment.  Instead, reformers inspected the basic building block of the army, 
the soldier, and saw the transformation of his role as key to reviving the French army.227   
 The patriotic armies of the ancients could all be described as citizen armies, and 
French reformers and readers viewed this model as both an interesting ideal and a real 
possibility.  In the French view, all of the truly great ancient states had called on their 
citizens to serve in the army in order to defend their way of life, homeland, and country.  
This “natural” armed force seemed to avoid many of the French army’s current problems 
with their soldiers—lack of discipline, poor execution, and desertion—since a properly 
motivated citizen soldier would love his country and as a result exhibit loyalty, train 
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enthusiastically, and fight fiercely.  Whereas most countries that had tried to institute a 
citizen army had turned the citizens into soldiers, the French approached the reform from 
the opposite angle, and tried to “citizen-ize” their soldiers. 
 Prior to and continuing through the Seven Years’ War, French soldiers were not 
considered or treated as citizens.  As mentioned in Chapter 1, the French soldier did not 
have much to recommend him or his profession.  He usually came from the lowest 
classes, had little education or sense of purpose, lived in poverty, and likely died at a very 
early age from poor treatment of wounds or disease.  For his pains, he was utterly 
despised and loathed by the general population he theoretically had been trained to 
protect.  French reformers pitied his state, and acknowledged that these harsh realities 
only dampened soldiers’ morale.  Reformers wrote many mémoires to the minister of war 
and the king suggesting better recruitment practices, better food and living conditions, 
better training, and an enviable retirement: all of the things one would expect a grateful 
state to bestow on its citizens who had spent their lives in its defense.  In addition to these 
physical improvements, however, French reformers also spoke of the soldier’s sense of 
dignity and honor.  In their written proposals for reform, they in effect turned the most 
despised member of society into a righteous citizen whose newly appreciated sacrifices 
would naturally facilitate the recruitment of more young men to serve their king and 
country.   French noble officers, for the sake of creating a more effective, more efficient 
military system, elevated the status of the soldier, infusing him with citizen-like qualities.  
French noble officers had no desire to create a Republic, upset the delicate social 
structure in France, or diminish their own role in the French army.  They proposed these 
reforms solely with the purpose of creating a more effective French fighting force.  While 
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still subservient to his officers, the soldier was given a more respected role in society, 
which in French reformers’ minds, brought him closer to his ancient Greek and Roman 
counterparts. 
  
I. From Patriotism to the Citizen Soldier: military solutions to a corrupted society 
 
 The problems with the French army at the end of the Seven Years’ War struck its 
non-military critics as all-too apparent, since many of the issues stemmed from societal 
troubles.  As discussed at the end of Chapter 2, Montcalm’s poor decision making did not 
just reflect his incompetence, but seemed symptomatic of larger problems within the 
French army.  Indeed, many of the internal problems within the French army that had 
been festering for years “hit the fan,” so to speak, during the Seven Years’ War.  To 
quote Walter Dorn, during this time, France “lacked all unity and coherent direction.”228  
Religious strife, economic instability, and political intrigue all distracted the king and his 
council from the three-pronged war effort.  French officers found their units ill-equipped 
and too disorganized to fight effectively.  The French navy suffered a lack of leadership, 
finances, and able crew at this critical moment and could not break though British 
blockades in order to deliver necessary supplies to French troops in the colonies.229  The 
French army also experienced its own problems with leadership, and lack of funds.  
French generals in particular displayed insufficient military thinking, and the coup d’œil 
that French officers considered to be part of the inborn talent they possessed as nobles 
seemed to have gone utterly blind.   
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The French army had been host to a number of problems before the Seven Years’ 
War, but many of these problems did not seem urgent or important until they surfaced 
during and after the humiliating loss.  Those interested in the army’s affairs could not 
escape the conclusion that the army had suffered badly on account of its incompetent 
officers and poorly trained and unmotivated troops.  There was a widespread perception 
among contemporaries that many nobles lacked the necessary experience and expertise to 
merit their ranks.  As disparities in wealth increased within the nobility, it had become 
apparent that the deciding factor in military promotion had shifted from talent and 
experience to the financial ability of the officer to adequately outfit his soldiers and fund 
a campaign.  Because high military rank derived from high social rank, and because 
Louis XV (like Louis XIV) used the military as a means of rewarding court favorites, the 
officer corps became bloated with inept nobles vying with each other for military 
positions and the corresponding social status.  As a result of inexperienced and 
incompetent officers, the troops were undisciplined, ill-trained, and prone to desertion.  
As discussed in Chapter 1, the typical soldier had a reputation as either an indifferent 
mercenary or an apathetic conscript.  The majority of the French troops had little interest 
in cause or country, and had similarly little motivation to stay in the army if their pay 
arrived too late or the training seemed too rigorous. In an effort to keep the soldiers from 
deserting, young officers hesitated to enforce discipline or train the troops too 
rigorously—an approach that had serious repercussions on the battlefield. 230   
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 Even educated members of the French public who had little connection with the 
army felt this embarrassment keenly, and in the years after the Seven Years’ War French 
writers published jeering satires of mistakes made during the war, as well as thoughtful 
reflections on their society’s responsibility for some of these military deficiencies.  
French generals in particular suffered harsh criticism for their incompetence in battle.  
During the infamous battle of Rossbach, General Soubise had pursued the retreating 
Prussian army that he outnumbered two to one over the crest of a hill, only to discover, 
when he crested the peak, that the Prussian troops had tricked him, and were waiting with 
their cannon and artillery primed.  It was the French army that retreated in disarray, 
suffering many causalities and a mortifying defeat.231  Soubise had much company, as 
other generals displayed similar incompetence, and those stung by the defeat mocked 
them mercilessly in satirical poems and songs.   
 In one poem (of many) Soubise was portrayed as a bumbler, who could not keep 
track of his own troops: 
 
Soubise peered with his lantern in the dark atmosphere 
“I have looked, but my army is gone from my sight! 
Yesterday morning, I know it was here 
Was it stolen, or did it get lost in the night? 
Oh! All is lost! I am a scatterbrained buffoon 
But let us all wait ‘til broad daylight at noon 
Oh heaven, what is this?  Oh, the rapture in my soul! 
Oh, unbound joy, here it is, I can see! 
Ah! Oh no! What is this before me? 
I was mistaken; it is the army of my foe!232 
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 This poem illustrates how non-military thinkers who observed the army’s actions 
understood the French general’s gross level of incompetence, unable to keep track of his 
own troops, or even to distinguish them from the enemy’s.  It also portrays the separation 
that existed between the general and his army.  Instead of being a part of his army, he 
evidently operates outside of it, and joins it or leaves it as he wishes. At the end of the 
poem, Soubise still has not found his army, indicating that he never redeems himself from 
his unfortunate command during the Seven Years’ War.  The French army is indeed 
“lost” in the hands of such befuddled commanders. 
 Another poem mocked the difference between General d’Estrées and the Duc de 
Richelieu.  General d’Estrées had been victorious in earlier battles, and later defeated 
Cumberland at the Battle of Hasselback during the Seven Years’ War, one of the few 
French victories.  He was replaced by Richelieu, who continued the campaign in Hanover 
by merely pillaging the towns in his path.  The poem was set to the tune of a well-known 
song called, “Voilà! La Différence!”  The last two verses appear here: 
Cumberland fears both these men 
And seeks to distance himself from them 
There is the resemblance. 
From one he flees afraid of his valor 
The other he flees afraid of the odor [Richelieu is infected with odors] 
There is the difference! 
In a beautiful field of Laurels green, 
These two warriors can be seen, 
There is the resemblance. 
One knows how to reap these honorable flowers 
The other picks them to pass the hours 
There is the difference.233 
 
 This poem juxtaposes the current generation of the French army with the older 
generation that has passed on.  From the French reading public’s point of view, the 
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predecessors had won their battles, and as explained by the poem, knew how to gather 
honorable laurels, or in other words, win glory for the king.  They demonstrated “valor” 
on the battlefield.  Contrastingly, the current generation knows only how to pick flowers 
and cannot defeat the enemy.  These poems indicate that not only had all of France 
suffered humiliation from losing this war, but that the army had lost a great deal of 
respect from the educated population.  Few writers would have dared to mock the French 
army under Louis XIV, and if they did, it would be in very veiled terms.  Here, the 
reading public openly mocked the military institutions that in theory protected France’s 
borders, advanced her interests, and brought glory to the king.  Even if non-military 
critics were not well versed in the particular rules and regulations that governed the 
internal workings of the French army, they understood that it had reached its nadir and 
urgently required change.  Just as the army’s external critics had a role in ridiculing the 
French army, however, they also had a role in reforming it.  Writers acknowledged the 
part that society at large had played in the failure of the army during the Seven Years’ 
War, and viewed societal change as a necessary element for military change, particularly 
in regards to patriotism.   
For social reformers who looked to patriotism as a cure for France’s societal and 
military ills, the successful model for reform lay in the example of the ancient Greeks and 
Romans.  The French nobility and educated elite had long been well-schooled in ancient 
history, but the post-Seven-Years’-War-era of new nationalism and a sudden interest in 
patriotism made these aspects of ancient societies catch French attention.  Because the 
ancient Greeks and Romans had achieved some of the most sophisticated and laudable 
societies, governments, and militaries, French writers used them as the example of how 
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an ideal army should operate.234  The principles that guided a successful government or 
military were believed to be unchanging, which meant that the lessons of the ancient 
Greeks and Romans could still apply to contemporary France.  Some of the more 
influential writers of the eighteenth century who saw military change as a necessary part 
of social change—Montesquieu, Rousseau, Maurice de Saxe, Charles Rollin, and 
Mably—used the ancients to describe and analyze military successes.  Their works set the 
tone for how reformers, both inside and outside military circles, would consider changes 
necessary to the restoration of France’s virtue.  Montesquieu examined the rise and fall of 
the Romans in order to expose some of the vices in French society and government and 
subtly hint at change.  Rousseau drew from his impressions of the Athenians and 
Spartans to comment on the moral implications of the arts and sciences in French society, 
as well as to advise the nascent government of Poland on how to construct and maintain a 
virtuous, successful state.  Maurice de Saxe was not a man of letters, but one of the most 
victorious generals in the French army from the War of the Austrian Succession.  He 
examined the Romans for concrete details on how to feed, discipline, and train troops, 
and drew comparisons between Roman and French soldiers.  Charles Rollin’s 
multivolume series on the history of the ancients was standard reading for the educated 
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French.235  Mably, like Montesquieu, wrote on all aspects of the ancients, often to 
criticize French society and offer alternative visions of a society free of corruption and 
luxury.  Despite their different methods and intents, these writers looked to the armies of 
ancient Greece and Rome as models of military greatness, from the minor details 
involved in training and marching, to the larger matters of esprit, patriotism, and 
citizenship that motivated and enabled these armies.   
According to these writers, one reason why ancients had such effective armies 
was the individual soldier’s innate toughness and courage, characteristics that came from 
constant exercise and a plain, simple lifestyle.  Montesquieu described each Roman as 
“more robust and hardier than his enemy.”  This toughness naturally gave him courage, 
“a virtue that comes from the knowledge of his own strength.”236  Mably agreed that 
Romans used “constant exercise [to] make good soldiers . . . [by] filling their minds with 
ideas relating to their profession, and teaching them to despise danger, being inured to 
hardships.”237 As described by Rollin, one of the reasons why Cyrus’ troops performed 
well on the battlefield was due to their “frequent exercises, [which] inure[d] them to 
fatigue,” and which also kept the soldiers continually “employed in laborious works.”238  
Rollin continued that the Spartans were able to “support all [the] fatigues” of war and 
“confront all of its dangers,” because the rudiments of their training required them to go 
                                                 
 
235
 Harold Parker, The Cult of Antiquity and the French Revolutionaries: A Study in the Development of the 
Revolutionary Spirit (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937), 2.   
 
236
 Montesquieu, Considérations sur les causes de la gradeur des Romains et de leur décadence (Oxford: 
Voltaire Foundation, 2000), 102. 
 
237
 Abbé de Mably, Observations on the Romans, trans. unknown (N.p., 1751), 130. 
 
238
 Charles Rollin, The Ancient History of the Egyptians, Carthaginans, Assyrians, Babylonians, Medes and 
Persians, Macedonians, and Grecians, trans. unknown vol. 2 (London, 1780), 241. 
 128
“barefoot . . . to suffer heat and cold, to exercise by continually hunting, wrestling, 
running on foot and horseback.”239  Being able to withstand the rigors of battle, therefore, 
necessitated having strong, well-exercised bodies that were accustomed to labor and had 
a high tolerance for pain. 
Such toughness and rigor had to be harnessed and channeled with a firm sense of 
discipline.  According to Rollin, military discipline was the “soul of war,” and Spartans 
maintained their strict level of discipline from learning “the habit of obeying” at an early 
age.240  Maurice de Saxe agreed that discipline was one of the most important aspects of 
war, and pointed to the example of the Romans, who “conquered all nations by their 
discipline.”241  In considering the Romans’ rise to greatness, Montesquieu observed that 
Rome did not have to impose any general laws on the army, because the Roman army 
“was made by a common obedience” without “dangerous liaisons” between any of the 
people in the Empire.242  Saxe agreed that the Romans owed their victories to “the 
excellent composition of their troops.”243  Rousseau had similar observations on Sparta, 
where people were simply “born virtuous, and even the very air of their country inspired 
virtue.”244  As the Prussian army had just demonstrated as well, a certain level of 
discipline constituted a necessary component of a victorious army.   
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Beyond simple matters of training and discipline, however, what made the armies 
of ancient Greece and Rome dominant in the ancient times was the close relationship 
between the citizens, the soldiers, and their country, or, as the French lovingly termed it, 
their patrie.  “The true methods of establishing and supporting military discipline in its 
full force and vigor,” Rollin surmised, “was by first inspiring [soldiers] with a love for 
their country, for their honor, and their fellow citizens.”  In such a way did Cyrus “inspire 
his common soldiers, even with a zeal for discipline and order.”245  Mably in particular 
argued that in the ancient world there was no distinction between citizens and soldiers.  
“At Rome,” he wrote, “everything had the appearance of war in time of peace:  to be a 
citizen and soldier were the same thing . . . if there was any distinction made between 
peace and war, it was found in the fact that the Romans performed their military exercises 
in time of peace with arms twice as heavy as those which they made use of in time of 
war.”246  Mably made note of the same phenomenon in writing about the Greeks, for 
whom, “each citizen was a soldier.  Not knowing how to die for the patrie . . . would 
have been an infamy.”247  Rousseau, in giving Polish officials examples of good leaders, 
emphasized Moses and Lycurgus, because these men “attach[ed] citizens to their patrie 
and to each other.”248   For the Athenians, this love of country extended to a love of their 
liberty beyond the love of any material possessions.  According to Rollin, when the 
Athenians were challenged by a “common enemy, whose view was to enslave them,” 
                                                 
245
 Rollin, The Ancient History, vol. 2, 243. 
 
246
 Mably, On Romans, 128. 
 
247
  Mably, Observations sur l’histoire de la Grèce ou Des Cause de la Prospérité et des Malheurs des 
Grecs (Geneve: Compagnie des Librares, 1756), 31. 
 
248
 Rousseau, Considérations sur le Gouvernment de Pologne (Paris: Librairie Garnier Frères), p. 345. 
 
 130
their “ardent love of liberty” inspired them to “abandon, without the least regret, their 
lands, estates, city, and houses,” to defend their freedoms.249  The motivation for the 
ancients, therefore, to maintain their physical prowess under harsh conditions and live in 
a state of constant discipline was love of citizenship and the patrie. 
Service to the patrie, however, was not a one-way relationship; citizen-soldiers 
were highly honored by the citizens of their patrie, and celebrated during patriotic 
festivals.  The Athenians, according to Rollin, viewed the Republic as a “good mother, 
who generously took [wounded soldiers] into her care, and with great regard to them 
supplied all the duties and procured all relief.”  This care that the citizens of the republic 
had for their soldiers boosted morale, “exalted the courage of the Athenians, and rendered 
their troops invincible . . .”250  Respect for, and generosity towards, the men in arms was 
one important element of the army’s patriotism and morale.  Rollin further described the 
patriotic festivals of both Athens and Sparta, which included ceremonies where “those 
who had distinguished themselves in battle” received “rewards and honors.”  For those 
“citizens who had died in defense of their country,” the Athenians erected “monuments in 
[their] memory” and gave “funeral orations . . . in the midst of the most august religious 
ceremonies.”  All of these public festivals together “conspired infinitely to eternalize the 
valor of both nations . . . to make fortitude a kind of law.”251  The militaries of the 
ancients Greeks, therefore, found motivation in the respect that the citizens of their patrie 
showed them in response to their sacrifices.  Rousseau recognized this importance when 
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advising Poland, citing the celebratory, yet sober fêtes of the Romans and the public 
decorations of the Greeks “that inspired confidence” among the citizens.252 
Speaking through Phocion, a retired Athenian commander who enjoyed 
conversing on matters of politics and war, Mably articulated all the benefits of a 
selflessly patriotic military.  In talking to one of his young admirers, Phocion made an 
ardent plea for the Republic of Athens to be entirely military.  If all citizens could be 
inured to a military lifestyle, Phocion saw the rest of the Republic naturally becoming 
incorruptible and highly virtuous.  
That our Republic could operate a more military fashion, that each citizen 
was destined to defend his country, that each day he was exercised in the 
manner of how to use his weapons that  . . . he became habituated to the 
kind of discipline that would be demanded in an army camp.  Not only 
would the youth be shaped . . . as invincible soldiers but it would give the 
youth  . . . civil virtues.  This would prevent the pleasures . . . of peacetime 
from softening and insensibly corrupting morals; for if civil virtue, 
temperance, the love of work and of glory, occur in preparing military 
virtues, each one will support the other.”253 
 
According to these writers, a well-governed polity, a virtuous society, and a well-
disciplined, victorious military went hand in hand.  Though writing through the 
convention of Phocion’s commentary on Athens, Mably was making the same plea for 
France.  If France itself was “more military,” not only would it have a stronger army, but 
the military discipline would prevent the corruption of society.  Yet as much as these 
classical republicans held up ancient Rome and Greece as the standard for military 
excellence, there were very few areas in which the French military could emulate them.  
As Montesquieu lamented in his Esprit de Lois, the majority of ancient governments “had 
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virtue as law” which enabled them to do things “which we no longer see these days, and 
which dazzle our small souls.”254 
 Eighteenth-century writing about the Greeks and Romans not only enumerated 
their virtues, but also grappled with the reasons why virtue failed and patriotic nations 
fell.  These historical developments spoke eerily to contemporary French conditions.  
One popular subject was the collapse of the Roman Empire, which reverberated strongly 
after the Seven Years’ War, in which France had also lost its empire.  In describing the 
reasons for the ancient societies’ eventual collapse, writers hinted at the aspects of 
contemporary French society and military practices that prevented their patrie from ever 
rising to the heights of the ancients. 
In discussing the fall of the Greeks, Mably stated through his hero, Phocion, that 
the government, “in favor of laziness and cowardice, permitted the separation of civil and 
military functions,” the result being that “we had neither citizens, nor soldiers.”255  In a 
separate work on Greeks, Mably attributed the fall of the Spartans on their “greediness 
for riches.”  Mably lamented that “the Spartan hands that Lycurgus had destined only for 
the sword, lance, and shield, became dishonored by instruments of the arts and of 
luxury.”256  According to Mably, Athens and Sparta fell not because they were 
confronted with superior military power but because they allowed their own systems to 
become corrupted and decay.  When their leaders relaxed their insistence on discipline 
and their strict hold on society, and when their citizens became corrupted by wealth, the 
proud patrie of citizen soldiers dissolved. 
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When looking at the military causes for Rome’s fall, writers again detected 
laziness and a breakdown of discipline and corruption due to an increase in riches.  
According to Mably, “the loss of their [Roman] liberty was not the effect of a sudden 
revolution, attended with the utmost disorder; but the work of several ages,” in which the 
people of Rome became so accustomed to “the prince’s gradual tyranny that they did 
little to hinder it.”257  According to Montesquieu the small size of the early Roman 
Republic “was easy to administer, the army was small, everyone completed their duties.”  
When the borders of Rome extended beyond the Italian peninsula, however, “problems 
started.”258  Mably dated the beginning of the end for the Romans when they conquered 
people who had amassed a great deal of wealth.  With the accumulation of the spoils of 
war, the Romans’ “wants increased and multiplied; luxury [created new] manners; their 
taste became more refined; superfluities were esteemed necessary; and the ancient 
austerity of manners now passed for savage rusticity.”259  The attraction of new wealth 
led to a break down of discipline in the army, as evidenced by “the spirit of pillaging 
which prevailed in the army.”260  Rousseau echoed this theme, noting that decadence 
caused Romans to “neglect military discipline,” and “grievous splendor replaced Roman 
simplicity.”261  Mably charged that the very composition of the Roman army (which, 
according to Saxe, had made that army victorious), came, in the reign of Tiberius, to be 
                                                 
257
 Mably, On Romans, 87. 
 
258
 Montesquieu, Considérations, 153. 
 
259
 Mably, On Romans, 34. 
 
260
 Mably, On Romans, 102. 
 
261
 Rousseau, Discours, 58. 
 
 134
“composed of the most contemptible citizens.”  Under corrupted emperors, “the army 
was nothing but a multitude of robbers.”262  
 These political theorists agreed that modern European militaries and governments 
were the exact opposite of the laudable, victorious ancients, and displayed all the vices of 
the Greek and Roman empires on the eve of their fall.  Mably also went on to compare 
the degeneration of the Roman army with the sad state of military affairs in Europe 
during the eighteenth century.  The armies were filled, he argued, “with the meanest 
subjects.”  Saxe agreed that the soldiers left much to be desired.  The very recruiting 
techniques of the time were “odious; [recruiters] put money in the pocket of a man and 
say to him that he is a soldier.”  These recruiting practices filled the army with “the vilest 
and the most contemptible [people] . . . it was not with such morals and with such armies 
that the Romans conquered the universe.”263   Mably furthermore characterized the 
monarchy, the very type of government that oversaw these armies, as “a species of 
government very fit for a people too much corrupted by avarice, luxury, and a passion for 
pleasure to have any love for their country.”264   So long as France lacked patriotism, the 
achievements of the ideal militaries of the ancients lay out of reach. 
 Two prominent writers in particular translated the observations about the ancients 
and the necessity of patriotism for a virtuous society and victorious army into a workable 
vision for the reform of the French army.  The first, the comte de Guibert created a stir 
among Enlightenment thinkers and military reformers alike with his Essai Général de 
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Tactique, which was published in 1772.  Unlike writers such as Mably and Rousseau, 
Guibert made his observations as an insider, rooted in military institutions with ample 
experience both on the battlefield and as a military administrator.265  Guibert was a 
member of the noble officer corps, whose father had risen to the rank of Lieutenant 
General largely because of his own merit.  Guibert received a thorough education in 
military affairs, and by the time he was thirteen, entered the army as a Lieutenant.  He 
witnessed first hand some of the better generalship of the Seven Years’ War from the 
Duc de Broglie, as well as the disastrous defeat at the battle of Rossbach.  After the war, 
he served on the administrative side of the army, helping Minister of War Choiseul 
institute some immediate post-war reforms.  Guibert had ample qualifications to address 
the problems of the French army, and his text, therefore, attracted the attention of 
officers, veterans, and reformers even though it echoed the adulation for the classics and 
the search for patriotism that had become typical of Enlightenment thinkers.  Judging 
from his instant popularity upon the circulation of his text in 1771, Guibert managed to 
appeal to both groups simultaneously. 
 As the title of his work implies, Guibert wrote at great length about tactical 
choices, battle formations, how to integrate infantry with shock troops, the education of 
the cavalry, maneuvers, artillery, and other practical military concerns regarding the “nuts 
and bolts” of French army operation.  But he also began his Essai with a thorough 
discussion of French society and government and their roles in the French army’s 
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downfall.  Like the “classical republican” thinkers of the eighteenth century, he looked to 
ancient Greece and Rome for the model society.  He was careful to say that he was not “a 
blind admirer of the ancients,” but studied their example because they were “proud in the 
name of their patrie” and all of their “grandeur and glory” they “merited by their courage 
and virtue.”266   Like republican writers, Guibert used the ancients as a point of reference 
from which he criticized European governments and societies.  Also like them, he argued 
that a “virtuous” government was required in order to have a victorious, virtuous military.   
Guibert advanced one step further, however, and openly declared that the best type of 
army for France would be a citizen army. 
 With this citizen army, Guibert presented a solution to the societal and military 
crises plaguing France.  This citizen army called for the mobilization of the entire 
population in times of war.  During times of peace, these citizens laid aside their arms 
and returned to their daily occupations.  Guibert’s vision of a citizen army included a 
“vigorous militia . . . consisting of contented citizens who are interested in defending 
their prosperous state.” 267   By placing the duty of warfare in the hands of French 
citizens, Guibert reasoned that the army would no longer serve as a gauge for social 
celebrity but instead exist purely for defense.  The monarch could not use positions in the 
army as a means to reward his court favorites, and rather than fighting among themselves 
for royal favors, officers and soldiers alike would work together for the defense of their 
patrie.  Because a citizen army would not rely on mercenaries or conscripts, but on 
citizens motivated by love for their country, the army would not suffer from desertion, 
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nor require a great deal of financial assistance from individuals or the state. The onerous 
training required to effectively execute line warfare would not be necessary in a citizen 
army, because citizens would fight in a more ‘natural’ style akin to irregular warfare.268 
  Most of all, a citizen army would be effective.  Guibert explained that 
neighboring nations would not dare disturb France’s tranquility for fear of the terror and 
vengeance any attack would unleash.  If, he stipulated, the citizen soldier 
is in someway violated, in his affairs, his land, or his honor, he will make 
war.  But when he makes war, it will be with the full exertion of his power; 
it will be with the firm resolution not to lay down his weapons until he has 
been paid reparation in proportion to the offense.  His method of war will 
not be like the method that most states have adopted today.  He will not 
want to conquer, but only preserve what is rightfully his. . . . Terrible in his 
anger, he will bring to his enemy fire and sword. . . .This will not be 
barbaric, his violation of the superficial laws of war, for these reprisals are 
founded on the laws of nature.  He will perish, until the last man if 
necessary.  But . . . he will assure, by the fury of his vengeance, his future 
peace . . . 269 
 
 In addition to proposing the mobilization of all society for warfare, Guibert placed 
the responsibility for victory and vengeance in the hands of the individual citizen-soldier.  
Guibert blamed the French government for allowing the morals of society to decay, and 
for encouraging corruption among elites.  The solution, however, did not rest merely with 
changes in the government, but in the individual soldier or citizen, united in common 
purpose by patriotic commitment to the patrie.  The end goal of Guibert’s vision for 
reform was not merely a re-organized officer corps, but a country replete with virtuous 
citizens, who not only pursued their every day occupation, but also served as the first line 
of defense for the patrie. 
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 Guibert recognized the implausibility of this ideal state; monarchical European 
governments feared the potential revolts that might ensue from arming the citizenry and 
would probably continue their attempts to gain additional power by expanding their 
territories. 270    Guibert indicated in his Essai, however, that he had hopes that such a 
military transformation could be possible.  Addressing his patrie, Guibert encouraged his 
nation to adopt a patriotic system, reasoning that ‘[t]his vision will perhaps not always be 
a fantastic dream.  It could be realized in you.’ 271  Despite Guibert’s idealistic approach 
to reform, his Essai found a strong following in France. Voltaire praised the text as ‘a 
work of genius.’272    
 Servan roused readers in both military and non military circles alike with his ideas 
on citizen armies in Le Soldat Citoyen (The Citizen Soldier), which he wrote from 1760-
1771 and later published in 1780.  As the title suggests, he agreed with Guibert that the 
ideal solution to France’s military woes lay in creating a citizen army.  Servan had 
humbler beginnings, having been born into the petite noblesse, and he was initially 
intended for the church.  He abandoned any ecclesiastical ambitions in 1760, and fought 
briefly in the Seven Years’ War as a volunteer with the Guyenne Infantry Regiment.  He 
eventually made his way through the lower officer ranks, and became the major of a 
grenadiers regiment just as his Soldat Citoyen began to circulate among elites.  The work 
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was so well-received in military and court circles, that it earned him the Cross of St. 
Louis in 1783.273 
 In his own words, Servan’s objective in Soldat Citoyen was “to perfect the 
instruments of the Art of War, the soldiers and the armies, both in how to raise them, 
perpetuate them, train them, improve them, and to employ and discipline them.”274  In the 
context of the published literature on the subject of patriotism and army reform, Servan 
sought to approach the citizen-army idea of Guibert from the level of the soldier.  What is 
necessary, he asked, for France to have an army of patriotic citizens serving in the 
humblest ranks?  To answer this question, Servan of course turned to the ancients and 
examined the inner workers of the Greek or Roman soldier.  He acknowledged that his 
predecessors had already made a thorough study of ancient military institutions, 
governments and societies, but had not focused enough on the internal motivations of the 
individual soldier.  “Do we really know,” he asked “enough of the motives, and the 
rewards that inspired in the [ancient soldier] such an indomitable courage?”275  In his 
examination, Servan compared the Greek, Roman, and contemporary French methods of 
creating soldiers, with particular attention to the roles of national character, education, 
and government.  His questions led him to consider closely, not only the process of 
recruitment, but also the process of creating a single citizen soldier. 
 Servan’s assessment of the ancients led to the overall conclusion that the best 
soldiers were raised from birth with the knowledge that their primary duty lay in 
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defending the state.  Among the Greeks, Servan concluded that “the citizens were born 
for the defense of their country.  They had to be soldiers and the republican spirit, the 
education, the love of liberty and of glory . . . made them natural heroes.”276  Servan 
pointed out that citizens of ancient Greece had no choice in whether or not they would 
defend their state.  What made them such ardent fighters, however, was the society in 
which they lived and government that they served.  Servan also pointed to Sparta’s 
famous military society, in which “even games were exercises in courage and virtue.”277  
Again, the soldiers lived in a society that constantly surrounded them with 
encouragement and military morals.  In all these examples, Servan emphasized that the 
government created a “national character” that united all of the “defenders of the 
patrie.”278  The Romans, on the other hand, were consistently at war, thus that their 
soldiers rarely lived in a time of peace.  The constant practice of warfare is what 
ultimately gave Rome, in Servan’s opinion, the reputation as the greatest fighting force of 
all.   
 With these observations in mind, Servan then observed the contemporary French 
soldier, who had quite the opposite experience.  “Our soldiers,” he noted, are not ‘natural 
heroes, but “only very ordinary men, enlisted by force or trickery.”  Even after they 
enlisted in the army, “we neglect their training.”  Unlike the ancients, French soldiers 
came from miserable backgrounds and were not motivated to serve or defend the country, 
because “we do not have the institution for ensuring the happiness of the men who could 
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be soldiers.”  Most of all, the relationship between soldiers and officers was not geared 
toward loving service, as “our discipline is only to inspire in the soldiers more fear of 
their officers than of their enemy.”279  Of all the reforms most needed to amend the way 
the soldier experienced the army, Servan cited “national happiness” as the “most 
essential,” and that part of that happiness would come from the government having “a 
strong interest in each individual.”280  Again, Servan saw that only in improving the 
conditions and motivations of the individual soldier could the army truly reform. 
 Like Guibert, Servan blamed Louis XIV for the problems plaguing the army.  
When “Louis XIV held the reins of the state,” Servan wrote, he used “the most grievous 
principals to make the nation prosper.”  Louvois, Louis XIV’s minister of war, was 
equally to blame for being “hard, cruel, unpitying, who regarded the human race as an 
instrument for his ambition.”  The Dutch wars which had made Louis XIV the 
unquestionable ‘warrior king’ also came under attack as a waste of human blood that 
served little toward the glory or defense of the state.281  Guibert agreed that Louis XIV’s 
reign had signaled the beginning of the problems in the French army, by corrupting the 
officer corps with positions at court and taking them away from their troops.282  The 
situation of the individual in the contemporary army was hardly conducive to being a 
soldier.  In fact, Servan found it to be just the opposite.  “In the final analysis,” Servan 
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pointed out that the sick, hungry, unmotivated bodies, “are not soldiers, because the state 
does not use any measures to render them adept, strong, and robust.”283 
 In order to reverse Louis XIV’s and Louvois’ handiwork, Servan concentrated on 
two main elements: training soldiers when they were very young, and creating a level of 
equality.  As Servan surmised from studying the ancients in comparison to modern-day 
French soldiers, one had to be raised from early childhood with the expectation of 
becoming a soldier in order for him to willingly and enthusiastically serve in the army.  
Young children should have exposure to military lifestyle in their daily lives, and the 
army should recruit young adolescents.  When recruiting teenagers, force should not be 
used or even necessary, as Servan reasoned that adolescents would be naturally attracted 
to “all the good things” a life in the army would afford them.284 
 Believing that people should enroll in the armed forces of their own free will, 
Servan examined the French militia, which had received little attention from French 
writers.  He observed that the army only “raised the militia to complete regiments and to 
serve in times of urgency,” and that this practice had “inspired a horror and an 
unfortunate but understandable distancing of the people from the militia.”  The militia 
was often committed where the fighting was the heaviest and therefore suffered 
disproportionally high casualty rates.  Servan further noted that there were “too many 
exemptions” for serving in the militia, and that the “people chosen to preside over this 
work do so with partiality and injustice,” as nobles and wealthy members of society could 
easily pay a sum to exempt the privileged from service.  Servan then made two bold 
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statements to resolve the situation.  First, that “the interest to defend the state must come 
from someone who loves society.”  In other words, if French citizens were satisfied with 
the benefits afforded by their society, they would be prepared to defend it and the 
lifestyle that their country provided.  This declaration also implied that the people who 
had property and wealth should be required to defend France by serving in the militia.  
Second, Servan took this idea that smacked of social equality one step further, saying the 
“best and most fair way to supply” the militia with men, “would be obligatory military 
service for all citizens, without distinctions from the state, from the age of eighteen until 
the age of forty.”285   
 Part of the attraction for all citizens to participate in the military was recognition 
from society of the soldiers’ or militamen’s willing sacrifice for the patrie.  He 
envisioned “a day of celebration,” when “the veteran defenders of the state mixed with 
these brave and brilliant youth, are praised by their state and encourage those who will 
one day replace them, to be unfailingly good citizens and brave soldiers.”286  Servan 
envisioned a time when the nobility (who had exclusive hold on the officer corps), 
common Frenchmen, and the bourgeois, would all be celebrated together as defenders of 
the state.  Servan was not proposing to level the nobility; in fact he appreciated the idea 
of retaining an elite military officer corps, but nobles and soldiers from bourgeois or 
laboring classes would all share a similar métier and receive similar recognition from the 
state and their fellow citizens. 
 In sum, Servan saw the necessity for a citizen-based military force, in which all 
citizens participated, either in the army or the militia, with an emphasis on dedication to 
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the patrie instead of social rank or family status.  Despite some nobles’ reticence to see 
themselves on a similar plane with any other citizen who served the patrie, Servan 
observed that, “we are no longer in the era where the noble on his horse composes our 
armies and constitutes the bulk of our strength.”287  The French army and society as a 
whole had to recognize this fact and change in a way that reflected the composition of the 
patrie for its assured defense, and for the betterment of society itself.  According Guibert 
and Servan, who were both public readers and military reformers, the new focus of the 
army was therefore not the seated nobleman on his horse, but the common soldier 
standing with his musket.   
 
II. Patriotism and Military Reform:  The Importance of the Soldier 
 
 Military officers and reformers who wrote mémoires to the Minister of War 
proposing tangible reforms for their institution in crisis also considered the workings of 
ancient armies, the utility of patriotism, and the condition of the common soldier.  
Whereas writers who took an interest in military affairs from a societal perspective saw 
large-scale reforms in both realms as a way to revive French virtue, military officers 
approached reform from a much more immediate, practical angle.  They sought to 
institute changes that would render the army more efficient and improve overall army 
performance on the battlefield.  Even with a different approach and more concentrated set 
of goals, however, military officers agreed that patriotism and attention on the individual 
soldier held the key to effective reforms.  Distinguishing themselves from the Prussians, 
French officers saw patriotism, not discipline, as their philosophical appeal to reform.  
They also recognized the “Frenchness” of their soldiers and considered Prussian 
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discipline to be entirely inappropriate in their troops.  Instead, they, too, wished to 
replicate the victorious patriotic armies in the ancients, and used these ancient armies as 
practical models for reform.  Most reformers viewed the citizen-army as a promising, but 
problematic alternative to the current French army.  While they admired this type of army 
in the ancients, they had doubts about how it could operate in French society.  
Discussions for implementing elements of a citizen army, however, focused not on 
making soldiers out of French citizens (which incurred lively debates regarding the 
militia) but of turning their soldiers into citizens.   
 The idea of citizenship, and what constituted a French ‘citizen’ at this time was 
also a matter being discussed in both military and non-military realms.  French officers 
and non-military readers admired the type of citizenship that the ancients had made the 
building block of their societies, and the longed to emulate it.  That type of citizenship, 
however, required being actively involved in a republican form of government, whereas 
French ‘citizens’ lived and operated in a monarchy that few, if any, wished to change.  
After the Seven Years’ War, however, French officers and those involved in military or 
societal changes considered themselves “citizens.”  They managed, in their own 
understandings, to find a happy compromise between being a subject of the king and a 
citizen of the state.  While this kind of citizenship did not infer ‘voting’ a monarch into 
power, it did assume that those self-proclaimed “citizens” took an active role in the 
evolutions of society.  French officers during this period were also presented with a 
unique opportunity to further define and implement a sense of citizenship within their 
soldiers, and use the French army as a laboratory to test modes of citizenship within a 
monarchy.    Officers during the reform period of 1750-1783 did not intend to institute 
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any sense of equality with these ideas, but they did lay the groundwork for drastic 
changes that would later be made to improve the condition and treatment of the French 
soldier. 
 In the wake of the Seven Years’ War, the French army went through a period of 
terrible turbulence where reforms were made only to be reversed in short order.  The next 
thirty years saw a rapid succession of ministers of war with sudden changes bombarding 
the army.  Every facet of the institution was subject to change, from minor details of how 
to organize a battalion to more consequential decisions such as who could be an 
officer.288  Overall, it proved to be a terribly confusing time for the army and all who 
were in it.  No matter who occupied the office of the Minister of War (a decision which 
had largely to do with court politics), or how often an implemented reform faced a speedy 
reversal, the input from military officers interested in reform remained largely consistent.  
The multiple ministers of war received, from 1750-1783, thousands of pages from well-
intentioned officers eager to help in the reform process that aimed at restoring honor and 
glory to their army. 
 In spite of input from the officers, two ministers in particular sought to institute 
more discipline in the army according to the Prussian model.  Choiseul and St. Germain 
both saw value in copying the discipline that had made the Prussian army so successful.  
Choiseul wanted, by Latreille’s account, to “institute under his watch a German military 
system,” but court intrigue soon dislodged him from any position of doing so.289  St. 
Germain made a seemingly simple reform in proclaiming that soldiers would henceforth 
be disciplined with beatings from a club or the flat side of a saber.  In both instances, 
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military officers responded vehemently that such stringent discipline would only 
exacerbate existing problems and be entirely unsuitable for the character and disposition 
of the French soldier.  As one reformer cautioned, “The French soldier will never get 
accustomed to corporal punishment . . . if this unfortunate penalty is established, we will 
have men who make up the numbers in the regiments, but we will have very few 
soldiers.” 290  French offices on the whole largely viewed discipline that involved 
corporal punishment as wholly inconsistent with improving the French soldier.   
 Nearly all reformers who addressed the problem found such punishment to be 
particular to Prussian culture, and therefore singularly “un-French.”  One reformer 
explained that “the German acquired a perfect discipline,” only because “his character is 
to obey.”291  His assessment of Prussian culture found support among other like-minded 
reformers.  Prussians, another reformer argued, “are not citizens.”  Instead, soldiers who 
eventually served in the Prussian army are “an assemblage of wage-laborers 
[stipendaires], vagabonds, and foreigners,” who needed “to be led,” and needed “the 
discipline to keep them there.”  For those who lived in Prussia, “this firm and vigilant 
discipline,” was described as “entrenched,” in the culture, while at the same time 
“scorned by many people.”292  In other words, Prussian discipline was entirely necessary 
to raise and maintain the presence of their soldiers, while at the same time the fact that it 
was necessary bred contempt among the countrymen.  Reformers warned French 
ministers, however, that “the composition of the German army does not agree at all with 
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the French army,” and therefore there is no reason to believe that the strict, corporal 
discipline of Prussia would have any positive affect in France.293 
 Indeed, nearly all reformers were convinced that the effect of the system of 
corporal punishment would have an averse effect on France’s soldiers, and reformers 
were quick to defend the men under their charge.  French officer Sonhart, who served as 
a sous-aide major for the infantry, observed that the “beatings . . . cover with eternal 
shame” the unfortunate recipient of such discipline.  This punishment does not just 
punish the body, but “strikes at the spirit.”  Sonhart found it ironic that a state which 
sought “raised sentiments” among its soldiers would use such “dishonorable means.”  
Such an instrument, he concluded, “cannot be both at the same time an instrument of 
honor and one of . . . outrage.”  In addition to the faults associated with severe discipline, 
Sonhart also concluded that such a means of correction “deprives the soldier of his 
liberty.” 294 
 Reformers largely saw French soldiers as “too honorable” for corporal 
punishment, and entirely contrary to the spirit of the budding French nation.  A soldier 
required “more honor,” needed his soul to be more “elevated” and necessitated more 
“firmness of courage” than what French officers believed necessary of the “ordinary 
citizen.”  Instead of increasing courage, honor, or quality of soul, beatings “demeaned the 
soul” and “darkened” the French soldier’s heart.295  Reformers described the soldier as 
coming from “the gentlest and most honest of people,” who sought, according to these 
reformers, to increase his “esteem” and “zeal to fulfill his duties,” and therefore any kind 
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of corporal punishment would be entirely unsuitable.296  Even the lowest French soldier, 
it seemed, had more honor than the most disciplined Prussian. 
 It might seem strange that soldiers, formerly thought to be of the most vile sort of 
creatures, soldiers would now engender a reputation among their officers for having great 
souls, liberties, and honor—attributes not normally consistent with the station of a 
common soldier.  Yet the loss of the Seven Years’ War, the literature emphasizing 
patriotism, and the reforms instituting physical punishment for soldiers seemed to awaken 
in French officers an awareness of where their soldiers came from, how they lived while 
in the army, and how they could be molded into better fighters.  Reformers turned their 
attentions to the plight of the soldier and sought not to beat him into a form that would 
grant them more victory, but to craft them from childhood into willing citizens that would 
fight for the patrie.  Like non-military writers interested in more general reforms, they 
took their inspiration for reform not from the Prussians, but from the ancient Greeks and 
Romans. 
 Studying the ancient Greek and Roman military institutions—from recruitment to 
retirement—also led French reformers to conclude that their model presented a citizen 
army.    “We would not know a better choice than the Romans,” one reformer began, for 
ancient examples “on the raising of soldiers.”  Unlike current French or Prussian armies, 
Romans “admitted in their legions only citizens, that is to say, men held to the state by 
the consideration of their goods and their faculties.” 297  Because of their relationship to 
the state through property and skills, they served as willing defenders.  The fact that only 
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citizens were permitted to serve afforded the soldier a certain degree of status.  For this 
reason, in battle Roman soldiers would defend their state, symbolized by an eagle, “with 
the most tenacious courage,” and motivate them to “run towards the danger.”298  Drawing 
from the Spartan example, one reformer suggested that in order to achieve a more 
military state, the state should chose the healthiest children of five or six years of age 
who do not have parents, and have disabled veterans raise them.  These youths would 
then join the army at sixteen.299  Even when these reforms sounded extreme, some 
officers reasoned that, even if their reforms required “revolution,” that the “French are 
capable of taking on characteristics of the Roman.”  France, according to this reformer, 
was “a warrior nation, and sensitive to its glory.”300  Taking on the characteristics of a 
Roman or Spartan army, therefore, seemed imminently possible. 
 Taking on these characteristics meant that France would be embracing a citizen 
army, which excited reformers’ imaginations of what that would require from the army as 
well as from society as a whole.  A citizen army had certain “natural” essence, as one 
reformer reasoned, it must have been the first type of military force in human history.  At 
the “origin of war,” he explained, “every cultivator [farmer] was then an intrepid soldier 
by the pressing interest of protecting his wife and children, and to conserve the fields that 
his laboring hands had made fruitful.”  From this humble, but honorable beginning, these 
warrior farmers “engaged the enemy on the frontiers to maintain [their] rights [from 
their] sovereign.” 301  One officer saw the potential in Frenchmen for this type of army, 
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for he “looked in the heart of the French,” and “found treasures.”  For him, it remained 
but a question of “how to use them.”302   Another reformer found the exciting potential of 
having an army composed of French citizens.  “To have good soldiers, he began, “it is 
necessary to begin with making good citizens, and to have the good citizens” the nation 
would have to make them as contented as possible.303  This tantalizing dream of having 
citizen soldiers promised not only an effective army, but a virtuous citizenry, who would 
pull on their innate desires to defend family and homeland and their love of their country.  
Citizen soldiers, in the French mindset, seemed to be a special breed of human that was 
more virtuous and more courageous than the sum of his parts.  To attract and keep citizen 
soldiers, however, France would have to improve itself in order to render citizens and 
soldiers as contented with the state as possible.  In response, French citizens would 
exercise their inherent virtues and even increase them in their service to the state.  A 
tantalizing image, indeed. 
 Tantalizing, but problematic.  The building block of a citizen army usually 
consisted of the militia, providing ordinary citizens with non-military professions the 
opportunities to serve the state militarily.  Machiavelli, who also used the ancients as the 
basis for much of his political and military writing, envisioned a militarized citizenry as 
the best army for a state.  Britain and the America colonies also boasted militias as the 
primary defense for their territories, and the French army had just experienced first hand 
the dedication that the Canadian militia had shown to its patrie and to warfare.  As 
discussed in Chapter 1, however, the French militia operated more like a local police 
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force and the occasional filler for the French army when it needed more men.  Few 
appreciated the militia, however, and those in it had little military inclination.  Reformers 
recognized the militia’s reputation of ripping young men from the arms of their widowed 
mothers, and placing them, without any training, in the area of conflict with the heaviest 
fighting.  M. de Rocher wondered “how many fathers and mothers” out of “fear of the 
militia” abandoned the countryside “to take refuge in the capital” and larger cities, where 
young men could be relatively safe from spontaneous service to the army.304  If the 
French army was to make a serious attempt at a citizen army, or some incarnation of one, 
it would not be through the militia. 
 Reformers, therefore, did not try to make soldiers out of French citizens, but made 
citizens out of French soldiers.  While the soldier had the reputation for being of the 
‘lowest sort’, and had no connection to or love of the French populace, French reformers 
almost universally agreed that better treatment of the soldier and respect for the soldier’s 
position in society would render him a better fighter and a worthy citizen.  Reformers’ 
reactions to Choiseul’s attempt at “German discipline” and St. Germain’s short-lived law 
on corporal punishment strongly suggest that reformers favored better treatment for 
soldiers from the state.  Influenced by the revival of interest in ancient Greece and Rome, 
and the examples they set, French officers began to view soldiers not as equals, but as 
men whose profession at arms allocated them a certain degree of honor and social 
prestige.  By improving the physical conditions of the soldier, elevating his social status, 
and infusing him with patriotism, French reformers would achieve, they believed, certain 
elements of a citizen army.  Soldiers would naturally fight better because they would 
have more love and respect from, and therefore more love and respect for, their patrie.  
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And in the process, these citizen soldiers would inspire virtuous behavior in their fellow 
citizens, who would in turn be attracted to a life in the army and the honor and social 
prestige it would afford. 
 When this period of intense reform began, however, the French soldier had very 
little to recommend him, his position, or his profession, and reformers recognized and 
bemoaned his state.  The difficult conditions of his life took center stage in French 
reforms, because as reformers grappled with how to reorganize and reinvent the army, 
they also debated the very real problem of desertion.  All Europe armies experienced 
levels of desertion in the eighteenth century, but especially after the Seven Years’ War, 
French reformers seriously studied the condition of the soldier and sought to identify and 
rectify the reasons that motivated him to desert his duties, his comrades, and his country.   
 French reformers found plenty of reasons for soldiers’ desire to desert.  His 
condition “from day to day [becomes] more vile and less researched.”305  An officer from 
the Regiment of Limousin found that “most soldiers are in need of everything,” and 
particularly cited the need for adequate clothing.306  These were not just hardships that 
came from difficulties in the midst of combat, but were part of day to day life for 
soldiers, even when not actively engaging the enemy.  “It is certain,” one reformer 
concluded, “that poverty often obliges our soldiers to compromise themselves.”  Soldiers 
partook in “base activities” out of necessity for survival, and then were “scorned” for 
their reputation as thieves and criminals. 307  These physical needs formed the basis of the 
soldier’s moral deficiency, for “scorn demeans the soul and the honor [which is] the 
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source for bravery so necessary in good military men!”308  How could a soldier be 
expected to act bravely when all of society disdained him for merely attempting to eke 
out his own living?   
 Before the reform process began, France’s military institutions only contributed to 
the soldiers’ misfortunes.  Officers had little incentive to familiarize themselves with the 
needs or the thoughts of their soldiers, and there was not “the least union” within the 
military units.  Guibert observed that “the officers no longer have any interest in the 
mutual encouragement” or stimulation of his troops.  And rather than dedicating himself 
to the welfare and effectiveness of his troops, he “lives for himself alone.”309  Throughout 
the reform period, the rules and regulations of the army changed so frequently and often 
so completely that “the troops are unceasingly [and] needlessly tired,” having no 
consistency in how the army operated from year to year.310  The “nation” itself, in which 
the institutions of the army was operating, proved “inconsistent” in its treatment of 
soldiers and its attitudes about warfare in general.311 
 French officers viewed such treatment and such circumstances to be entirely 
inconsistent with the character of French soldiers.  On the whole, reformers agreed that 
“the French soldier is vivacious, impatient, and full of vanity,” who became easily 
frustrated with poor decision making from of his commanders, “useless work” and 
“puerile training.”  If the French army continued to “add to his misery with the 
humiliation of corporal punishment” then “he will desert,” and will have no reason to 
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return if his patrie does not banish such “mortifications.”312  Compared to Prussian or 
even English soldiers, the Chevalier de la Rochelambert found French soldiers “flighty” 
and relatively “light.”  He considered them “less faithful” than soldiers of other nations, 
but instead of rectifying this character with ill treatment, he excused it because of the 
French soldiers’ “love of liberty” and “horror of servitude.”313  The lot of the French 
soldier would require improvement not only in his physical condition—better food and 
clothing—but also his spiritual condition.  French officers devised multiple ways to 
improve his circumstances and to cultivate his natural tendencies, his vanity, and his love 
of liberty.  Reformers therefore sought to make reforms that would excite these 
characteristics of the French soldier instead of subduing them. 
 As one reformer declared openly, “good soldiers are worth more than money!” 314  
And it was generally agreed that the state should increase the soldiers’ pay and change 
the system of payment.  The Chevalier Preudhomme de Borre observed that the “soldier 
of today receives the same pay as the one who served for eight, ten, or twelve years or 
more,” and to him this system did “not seem fair.”  Instead, he proposed “progressive 
pay,” which would reward a soldier in proportion to his service, discourage desertion, and 
increase reenlistment.315  French officer Flavigny added on a practical note that a soldier 
should “receive a payment capable of procuring the most important items that were 
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indispensable to his training.” 316  In addition to fair pay and the possibility of increasing 
payment for long-time service, another officer urged the state to take better care with the 
basic necessities of the soldier, to “assure him healthy and plentiful food.”  He added, for 
the growth of the soldier in the profession, “to keep the old soldiers in their regiments” 
and employ them as examples for the new soldier “at the beginning of his career.”317  
Such mentoring would allow new soldiers to learn their duties from those most capable of 
teaching them and allow them to further cultivate their honor.  For the sake of the 
soldiers’ acquirement of honor, another reformer believed that the King should be the 
ultimate “model [of] how to have honor.”318  If the government invested more in the 
soldier, through basic necessities, pay, and even honor, then soldiers already enrolled in 
the army would come to resemble those “robust” and “courageous” soldiers of Ancient 
Rome.  The added respectability in their profession would also bring them closer to the 
status of citizens than the “vile creatures” that had long been their reputation. 
 Key to this transformation of soldier into citizen was a closer relationship between 
officers.  Throughout this time of reform, officers complained that “the soldier no longer 
has anyone to whom he could have recourse in his small needs,” because none of the 
officers cared for him or dispensed anything other than assignments and punishment.  
“The officers of his company when he addresses them,” one reformer complained, “send 
him to the état major, who only has duties to prescribe and reprimands to give.”  Those 
officers most closely connected with the soldier were “much less an object of consolation 
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and of resource for him, than the subject of his hate.” 319  One officer, known as 
“Griffon,” made the soldier/officer relationship the entire subject of his memoir.  He 
lamented that not only was “the officer not attached to the soldier and the soldier to the 
officer,” but neither group had any “interest of attaching themselves to each other; the 
officer sees the soldier because he must, but whether he is sick or healthy, if he has needs 
or does not, it is all the same to him . . . the soldier knows that the officer cannot do him 
any good, procure him any nicety, or help him with his needs; he only hears 
chastisements.”  Within any reform, Griffon considered it most “necessary to reestablish 
this mutual attachment,” and for each officer to make his first priority the soldier’s 
“interest.” 320  As the Comte de Melfort stated bluntly, “the officer no longer regards his 
soldier as his own, the soldier no longer regards his captain as his father.”321  Poor 
relations between officer and soldier not only decreased the morale of the soldier and 
gave him little recourse for his needs outside of desertion, but they also directly affected 
the soldier’s performance in battle.  “Nothing is so brave,” M. St. Analas touchingly 
stated, “as the French soldier when he believes” and trusts in his commanding officer.  
Likewise, “nothing is so weak or so beaten than him when he lacks confidence in those 
who command.” 322  Forming tighter bonds between soldier and officer therefore were of 
the most urgent nature.  Reformers proposed that officers should be both distributors of 
rewards as well as disciplinarians.  The captain, “finding it in his interest to conserve the 
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soldier,” should learn how to give his men, “particular care.” 323  Though the French 
military system had very few opportunities for soldiers to advance in rank or ever become 
officers, reformers suggested creating a means of reward, through money or distinction, 
that would foster mutually beneficial encouraging relations between soldier and officer.  
If achieved, this new relationship would also make the status of the soldier closer to that 
of a journeyman or apprentice working under a master and learning a respectable trade. 
 While contemplating methods of improving the soldiers already in the king’s 
service, reformers also considered how to recruit soldiers from more honorable parts of 
society, and following their service, how best to return them to society.  Both the Marquis 
de Monteynard and Sonhart favored men from the working classes in society—farmers, 
artisans, even members of the bourgeoisie—to the vagabonds and libertines that often 
filled the soldiers’ ranks.  Monteynard saw recruitment as best done by a captain 
choosing his own men with the help of soldiers already under his command, so as to be 
sure not to “admit dubious young men of these young libertines” found in the bowels of 
the cities.  He considered these types of men to be “hardly robust and improper for 
war.324  Sonhart agreed that soldiers “should be taken from the classes of citizens the 
most proper to furnish” young men “susceptible to military education.”  Sonhart in 
particular considered the “young men recruited from the bourgeois and merchants of a 
little fortune” as having potential to “become excellent soldiers,” because their education 
and upbringing rendered them “susceptible to this energy that characterizes the nation.”  
He stipulated, however, that these young men would have to begin training no later than 
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“the age of puberty,” so that they could become accustomed to “military work” at an 
early age.325  Compared with the recruitment practices of Louis XIV’s army through the 
Seven Years’ War, when, to quote the Maréchal de Saxe, one “put money in the pocket 
of a man and called him a soldier,” recruiters and army officers earnestly desired to cull 
soldiers from areas of society that already provided some education and an honorable 
living. Officers further imagined a pleasant retirement or second career for a soldier after 
he had served in the king’s army.  Flavigny, who had also campaigned for higher pay for 
the soldiers, thought that the state should “give the soldier the ability to learn a métier the 
last year of his service,” so that he would have an appropriate means to make a living for 
himself when he became too old or wounded for the army, or when his enlistment had 
expired.326  Another officer considered it important to give veterans the opportunity to 
“establish themselves” after their service had ended. 327  By recruiting soldiers directly 
from the citizenry and returning them to the citizenry with an active profession 
immediately following their final term of service, officers proposed, in effect, a closer 
relationship between soldiers and citizens.  Soldiers themselves would be citizens (even if 
very young) before they entered the service, and would return to it afterwards.  Such a 
system would ideally make the army seem less onerous to potential recruits, and soldiers 
less distasteful to the populace. 
 Should these reforms to improve the condition and recruitment of the soldier be 
instituted, reformers envisioned a natural improvement among the ranks with a satisfying 
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retirement and social esteem for veterans.  One reformer thought to honor veterans 
publicly, because as “the veterans grow in honor,” they will “inspire in the youth a taste” 
for glory in the service of the state.  “The citizens full of veneration for these brave and 
old defenders” will add to the defense of the state themselves, while also welcoming the 
veteran back into society with honor.328  Veterans who enjoyed the army, and who return 
to honest work in society will become a major asset in helping attract new recruits.  
Citizens who encounter these veterans will, according to this reformer, desire to serve the 
state as well. This proposed transformation must first begin by treating the soldiers as 
citizens, and cultivating in them the characteristics that would make them willingly desire 
to serve the state, out of a genuine affection for it. 
 
Conclusion 
 By the early 1780s, the aristocratic army of Louis XIV had transformed from a 
military institutions built around the nobility to one that had recognized its inherent 
problems and was moving towards a soldier-centered solution.  After the loss of the 
Seven Years’ War, both members of the reading public and French officers recognized 
that the army required reform.  Having ridiculed the incompetence of generals in the 
Seven Years’ War and feeling embarrassed by the losses in America, India, and on the 
Continent, members of the reading public turned French attention to the perfection of the 
ancient Greeks and Romans in warfare.  Reading and writing about the Ancients 
reminded French officers that the most successful and victorious armies required 
discipline and training, but above all patriotism and dedication to the patrie.  Guibert and 
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Servan, two officers prominent in both the army and enlightened society, saw the benefit 
of patriotism for the nation of France as well as for the army.  Guibert wrote convincingly 
in his Essai that France could support a citizen army, an idea that both French readers and 
military reformers welcomed ardently.  Servan followed up a decade later with his own 
work focusing on the composition of the ideal citizen soldier, again with the expectation 
that this ideal could become a reality. 
  During the concurrent reform period, officers came up with entirely new ways to 
think about the French army.  While the majority of their proposals never became 
concrete reforms, they portrayed a change in the French officer’s approach to his métier.  
Consistent with views expressed in the reading public, French officer reform proposals 
centered on improving the physical condition of the soldier as well as his attitude towards 
the Nation that he sacrificed his liberties to protect.  French soldiers had long been the 
most despised members of the French nation, yet in the spirit of the hoped-for citizen 
army, reformers proposed changes that would effectively turn current French soldiers into 
worthy citizens.  Rather than follow the strict, disciplinary Prussian model, which beat 
and drilled its troops into unthinking automatons, French reformers wanted soldiers’ 
motivation and performance in battle to come from an internal and true desire to fight for 
his country.  This goal required not only a bettering of treatment for the French soldier, 
but a transformation in all of French society as well.  French officers decided that soldiers 
merited the respect and admiration of citizens.  They also brainstormed new recruiting 
methods and ways of improving military retirement that would make French citizens 
eager to join the ranks of such an honored, treasured group for the patrie. 
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 These changes in the French army and the debates constantly swirling around 
them became more intense with the onset of a contemporary event that gave tremendous 
support to the ideas of patriotism as the necessary ingredient for a successful military and 
the victorious potential of the citizen army and its citizen soldiers.  From 1775-1783, the 
American War for Independence percolated across the thirteen colonies, and the entire 
French nation watched with rapt attention.  While the military reformers seemed 
concerned with citizen-izing French soldiers, the American Revolution, constantly 
present in French press, literature, pictures, and material culture, endorsed such changes, 
and perhaps even familiarized the French reading public with the idea of citizens 
becoming soldiers as an acceptable, even necessary expression of patriotic fervor.  The 
popularity of the American Revolution even influenced French protest to the Ségur 
resolution, which seemed an affront to the heralded idea of equality. 329  The American 
Revolution would endorse and legitimize the ideas of equality, patriotism, and the 
feasibility of the citizen army that France both embraced and debated in the decades just 
prior to its own revolution.  
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Chapter 4 
A New Rome: French Perception of Citizen Warfare in America 
The historiography concerning the American Revolution’s effect on France has 
focused almost completely on comparing the American and French Revolutions or 
determining if the first had any effect on the coming of the second.  The Treaty of Paris 
formally ended the American war in 1783, just six years before the fall of the Bastille.  
Coupled with France’s close involvement in the American War for Independence, this 
short time span between the two Revolutions argues for some kind of relationship, 
perhaps even a causal one.  The backwards shadow of the French Revolution has 
therefore affected nearly all studies of the American Revolution’s impact on eighteenth-
century France.  Breaking from that approach, this chapter will focus on how the 
American Revolution and its image in France influenced French military thought both 
among army officers and the general public.  In doing so, however, it will build on 
previous work regarding the French army as a potential conduit of revolution between 
America and France.   
A causal relationship between the French and American Revolutions seemed 
evident as early as the days of Napoleon.  Denis Jean Florimond de Langlois, Marquis du 
Bouchet, for example, participated in the American Revolutionary War as a volunteer 
under General Washington.  When Revolution broke out in France shortly after his 
return, he emigrated in fear of his life, only resuming his profession as a French officer 
once Napoleon had firmly established himself as Emperor.  Though he had been an eager 
 164
supporter of the American Revolution, Bouchet condemned it in his memoirs, 
saying that “the English took their revenge on us and in the interest which we had in 
America, lighting the flame which embraced all of Europe, beginning with our own 
unfortunate country.”330  This observation about the American Revolution’s effect on 
France continued to dominate perceptions of the late eighteenth-century relationship 
between France and America until the mid twentieth century.  As writers commemorated 
the centennial of the American and French revolutions, numerous publications heralded 
the amity and influence between the two countries and their respective Revolutions.331   
 For many of these historians, the French army seemed an obvious place for the 
revolutionary handoff.  Whether as volunteers under George Washington’s command, or 
as part of Rochambeau’s army, French officers and soldiers could have been so inspired 
by their participation in this revolutionary moment that they were prepared to initiate 
radical changes in their own country.  Marie Joseph Paul Yves Roch Gilbert du Motier, 
Marquis de Lafayette remains the quintessential figure in this idea of causation.  He is 
well-known on both sides of the Atlantic for disobeying his king’s commands in order 
serve in the American colonies, which he considered a “safe and venerable asylum of 
virtue, of honesty, of tolerance, of equality, and of peaceful liberty.”332  Lafayette wore 
his admiration for the American Revolution on his sleeve, and became one of the first 
major revolutionaries in France.  In both America and France, he is remembered as an 
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important revolutionary figure, and he has played a central role in historiographies of 
both Revolutions for over two centuries.333  Lafayette was so unapologetic in his 
admiration of the American Revolution and his desire for the French to experience their 
own, that popular minds as well as scholarly minds see him as evidence that the 
American Revolution was a principal cause for the French Revolution.  It was with this 
assumption in mind that historians of the 1970s, especially Gilbert Bodinier and Sam 
Scott, combed through the archives in order to establish the definitive path of 
revolutionary transference.334 
  Bodinier and Scott’s research revealed, however, that few officers responded like 
Lafayette to their experience in North America.  Most officers who had participated in 
the American Revolution opposed the French Revolution, and a majority of them, 
including Lafayette, eventually emigrated for fear of their lives as the Revolution 
progressed.  While Forrest MacDonald attempted to prove that French soldiers in 
America may have adopted revolutionary yearnings, his article could only suggest such a 
connection.  If there was any revolutionary bridge-building between the two countries, it 
apparently did not happen in the milieu of the armies.  In terms of numbers, only about 
300 French officers and 5,500 soldiers crossed the Atlantic to America, and even if they 
were inspired in North America to encourage a Revolution in their own country, it is 
unlikely they would have had a large effect.  As further evidence that little connection 
existed between the two Revolutions, both Susan Dunn and Patrice Higgonet have 
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pointed to the lack of similarities between the Revolutions’ goals and events.335  While 
historians have argued that ideologically the American Revolution really had little effect 
on the coming of the French, it did have powerful, if subconscious, cultural effects that 
were initially manifested in contemporary discussions on patriotism and the link between 
citizenship and military power.  Its influence eventually became significant for the out 
break of the French Revolution, but to gage it’s immediate impact on France from 1775-
1783, it is best to approach the question without the French Revolution in mind. 
 Even if historians have shown that the army did not transport revolution directly 
from America to French shores, the image and perceptions of the American Revolution in 
France still powerfully influenced French military thought and reform in the late 
eighteenth century.  When the war broke out in 1775, France was already knee-deep in its 
intense efforts to reform the army, and civilian French writers had been puzzling for 
decades over how to create a more virtuous society and a more efficient army.  While 
military reformers attempted to improve the army by elevating the soldier’s status and 
increasing his sense of patriotism, they witnessed a tangible and contemporary example 
of victorious citizen-soldiers across the Atlantic.  Non-military readers and writers 
likewise embraced the American image of a citizen army fighting out of patriotism, and 
saw in the American Revolution proof that the virtue and patriotism of the ancient world 
had been reborn in the modern one. 
 Historians of French military reform and its social context have previously not 
considered the American Revolution’s effect on the French army during the pre-
revolutionary period.  From 1775 through 1790, however, representations of the 
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American Revolution abounded in news reports, literature, poetry, images, gowns, wall-
hangings, screens, cartoons, and histories; these images even inspired the creation of a 
military society to maintain French-American miltary ties.  These positive images of the 
American Revolution included representations of the American army and militia as the 
ideal citizen-army that French writers had been longing for.  From 1775 until the French 
Revolution, these popular depictions continued to flood the public arena.  Studying 
French perception and interpretation of the American Revolutionary army and militia 
provides insights into the French love of the citizen-soldier model already under 
consideration.   This chapter will first consider the image of the American 
Revolution as projected in the two newspapers that informed the vast majority of French 
readers.  Owing to the biases of newspaper editors in France in favor of the struggling 
American colonies, French readers received a positive, even glorifying image of the 
American military forces that reinforced previously expressed French ideas of victorious 
citizen armies.  These newspapers even went so far as to present the Americans as 
contemporary examples of the ancients, an image that the French readily embraced.  This 
chapter will then consider how the French interpreted this ideal in their own writings and 
images, reproducing and exaggerating the newspapers’ reports of victorious citizen 
warriors reminiscent of ancient Greeks and Romans.  Many French writers even used the 
American Revolution, and France’s support and eventual involvement in it, as a means of 
reframing the French state as a “liberating” monarchy that helped create and guide this 
new republic.  In military circles, the American Revolution was embraced with equal 
fervor.  High-ranking officers clamored to join the Society of the Cincinnati, an exclusive 
military association that maintained French-American relations.  In short, French 
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interpretations of the American Revolution provided contemporary proof of the 
victorious citizen-army that France had idealized but never seen in the modern world. 
 
I. News from Abroad: the Image of America in the Gazettes 
 
While the educated elite in France contemplated and criticized society’s moral 
shortcomings and military failings, a revolution erupted across the Atlantic that the 
French elite watched with great interest.  The events of the American Revolution, as 
described in two leading periodicals, resonated for those attuned to the military reforms 
and discussions of ancient virtue.  The image that newspapers sculpted of the American 
military was at least partially shaped by the widespread currents of classical admiration.  
While surviving records make it almost impossible to know the identities of the 
journalists who wrote on the American Revolution, it is clear from reading their reports 
that they were as steeped in the rhetoric of Greek and Roman patriotism as the officers 
and interested readers who read their reports.  In presenting the American Revolution to 
their readers, the newspapers employed the prevalent classical republican lens which 
offered the American military as a potential answer to the problem of flagging French 
patriotism and the military crisis. 
The two periodicals that regularly published accounts of the events of the 
American Revolution (as well as the events leading up to it) were the Gazette de Leyde 
and Gazette de France.  The Gazette de France was a court paper printed under the 
supervision of the French government and devoted primarily to court activities, new 
regulations that warranted public attention, and international events.  Despite some 
discrepancies in the factual information of the paper, which would discredit it as a 
reliable source by modern standards, the Gazette was generally recognized as an 
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authoritative source for political news.  It was often the first source to print international 
information and thus provided its readers with their initial impressions.  Additionally, the 
Gazette de France was less expensive than other papers and enjoyed a reputation for 
prompt reporting.336 
 The Gazette de Leyde was a French-language paper printed in the Netherlands.  
This gazette served an international audience and was not written under the gaze of a 
government.  Thanks to its timely reporting and international correspondents, by 1750 the 
Gazette de Leyde had become the top-selling newspaper in Europe.337  Jean Luzac, the 
editor of the paper during the 1770s, sympathized with the American cause, often giving 
news from Britain and America precedence over reports from other regions.  In reporting 
American events, he relied heavily on American correspondents in Europe, such as Silas 
Deane and Benjamin Franklin.338  Although the Gazette de France was the more popular 
newspaper in France, the Gazette de Leyde printed more detailed information and had 
greater freedom in choosing what to print.   
 It is difficult to assess the exact number of readers, since one newspaper would 
pass through an indeterminate number of hands at a café, salon, club, or private 
residence, but the Gazette de France and Gazette de Leyde together sold nearly 15,000 
copies twice a week, a sufficient number to ensure widespread readership among the 
elite.339  Owing to its thorough descriptions of major European battles, the Gazette de 
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Leyde in particular helped military professionals stay abreast of developments on the 
battlefield, and French officers were regular subscribers.340  
Analysis of the contents of the papers can help establish the general impression 
that most educated Frenchmen would have formed of the American army and militia.  
Although the papers are replete with inaccuracies, their accounts of the American war—
reports of battles, descriptions of the military, pertinent Congressional resolutions—allow 
us to reconstruct French perceptions of the American army and militia and the ways in 
which that perception conditioned and was conditioned by the context of the French 
moral and military crisis.  The evidence suggests that French readers would have formed 
an impression of the American military matching the ancients’ image that pervaded 
French publications as well as Guibert’s portrayal of citizen warfare and Servan’s portrait 
of the citizen soldier.  As the war unfolded, it appeared as though the Americans were 
employing the major tenets of ancient warfare.  According to the newspapers, Americans 
were tough, disciplined, and most of all, patriotic.  Soldiers felt a distinct motivation to 
defend the patrie, and the entire country supported and celebrated the citizen soldiers in 
return.  Conditioned by the writings of the ancients, as well as a wide range of “classical 
republicans,” French readers would have seen Americans as contemporary ancients—
some even referred to the Americans as “ancients” as they drew closer to an alliance with 
the new republic. 
 According to long-established notions of citizen warfare, citizen armies could 
only fight defensive wars, and beginning with the Battles of Concord and Lexington, 
both newspapers cast the British army in the role of the aggressor and the colonial army 
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and militias as the defenders, fighting to protect their homes.  In reporting on the Battle 
of Lexington, for example, the Gazette de Leyde presented a section of a letter that the 
Provincial Congress of New England addressed to the inhabitants of Great Britain, 
explaining the cause for the conflict, including a graphic description of the “ravages” that 
the British supposedly committed against American citizens.  Following the battle, “a 
great number of houses on the way were pillaged and destroyed, some of them were 
burned, women who were in their beds were chased naked down the road by the [British] 
soldiers, who killed old men in cold blood in their homes.”  The letters placed on British 
troops the blame for “scenes of horror so dark, that they would dishonor the annals of 
even the most barbaric nations.” 341 
Having reported this dramatic event, the Gazette de Leyde added that London 
awaited news from General Gage for his account of the matter, which it duly printed in 
the next issue of the journal four days later.  Gage’s account placed responsibility for the 
battle on the “rebels,” whom he claimed fired at the British troops from behind houses 
and brick walls.  Gage reported that he and his men simply carried out orders, destroying 
only colonial stores of weapons and supplies.342   For some readers, Gage’s account 
might have seemed the more plausible of the two, but in printing the American account 
first, with its dramatic language and graphic imagery, both the Gazette de Leyde and the 
Gazette de France introduced the American war as a colonial response to British 
aggression.   
 From the newspapers’ perspective, the Americans resembled the ancients in their 
natural, war-like conduct.  Like the Romans they seemed “robust and hardier than [the] 
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enemy,” and their hardiness appeared to be the product of Spartan “exercise.”343  As the 
newspapers recounted, the American soldiers and officers had occupations other than 
soldiering—most were farmers or artisans.  The pay for soldiering was minimal and some 
of the wealthier officers provided their own money for supplies.  Unlike European 
soldiers, it was not these citizens’ profession to fight, yet the Americans demonstrated a 
great “ardor for battle.”344  Whereas most of the French soldiers were poorly trained and 
exercised, the Americans appeared naturally hardy, accustomed to “the excessive heat” or 
cold of their environment, as well as to local diseases.345    This toughness alone helped 
them while fighting the British, who “succumbed to the heat and exhaustion.”346  One 
paper described the American army as a group “of men, who, from their childhood, are 
accustomed to work, [and] firing a rifle in good manner.”347  So ingrained was the 
importance of warfare in American culture that they prepared for their duty as citizen 
soldiers from infancy, being educated in weaponry and acculturated to constant hard 
work.  By this account, the citizen-warriors of America matched Servan’s ideal of the 
citizen soldier perfectly, being brought up with the expectation to fight in defense of their 
country and therefore trained while very young.348  These traits were highlighted on the 
battlefield, as the majority of the battle accounts depicted the troops’ “love of combat.”349  
British letters stated that “the Americans equal our soldiers in courage”; they triumphed 
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despite “inconceivable exhaustion” and even Washington reported that the militia 
“assembled in the most courageous manner, firmly resolved to . . . give us as much aid as 
possible.”350  Such accounts paralleled so precisely the training and discipline of Sparta 
and Rome that readers would have inevitably filtered these accounts through that frame 
of reference, evoking images of ancient warriors fighting on American soil.   
 In keeping with the themes of training and discipline, the two gazettes presented 
the American officers as educated patriots, whose concern for their country informed 
their leadership. Because America did not have a traditional nobility, social status did not 
necessarily influence military rank.  The gazettes printed a few brief biographies of some 
of the officers, enough to give the impression that high-ranking officers of the American 
military had a great deal of experience and expertise, earned the respect of their soldiers 
and fellow citizens, and merited their rank. Like the disciplined ancients, these officers 
received “instruction in the art of war in a country where that art is held at the highest 
degree.”351  Because these officers could not expect a rise in social rank or a promotion at 
court, the gazettes inferred that they served out of patriotic duty alone. 
 Though these tough, homegrown American citizen warriors seemed a far cry from 
the upper nobility of the French military, the newspapers also presented more genteel 
aspects of the Americans that must have seemed comforting and familiar to noble 
Frenchmen, perhaps making ancient virtues more compatible with modern mores.  The 
Gazette de France reported an instance in which American General Gates hosted a 
formal dinner party for British General Burgoyne.  Although a board sitting on two 
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barrels served as a dining table, and the meal consisted of watered down rum and very 
plain fare from the officers’ mess, both gentlemen enjoyed each other’s company and 
ended the meal toasting their countries and leaders.352  This anecdote would have 
resonated with French officers, for whom ceremony and protocol often overcame national 
differences.  General Howe recounted in a letter how British General Gage and his family 
(who accompanied him to America) did not have sufficient food until American General 
Putnam learned of their condition and “sent Mrs. Gage a quarter of freshly killed veal.”353  
These actions demonstrated that the Americans were more than mere backwoods fighters 
who believed in their country’s cause—they had goodwill, good manners, and good taste, 
and they recognized the class distinctions in the British army by demonstrating a level of 
deference and politeness to high-ranking British officers.  The Americans might have 
practiced an entirely different form of warfare from the French, but these glimpses of 
American gentility demonstrated that the Americans were not wholly divorced from 
European manners.  The Americans also reportedly acted benevolently towards British 
troops by refusing to starve them out of New York, which the newspapers reported as an 
“example of humanity, which distinguished, during the entire course of the war, the 
conduct of the American commanders.”  This conduct further had an effect in wooing the 
German mercenaries, who throughout the war came “to the side of the Americans.”354  
These gestures of mercy and humanity to the enemy at wartime were reminiscent of 
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Phocion’s maxim that “the one virtue superior to love of country was love of 
humanity.”355   
 As reported in these newspapers, the Americans exhibited intense patriotism that 
rivaled the civic vigor of the Romans and Greeks, investing all their citizens and 
resources into defeating the British and protecting their established rights.  The 
Americans first of all responded to this attack on their patrie by repelling the British 
armies with “full exertion of [their] power.”  Immediately after reporting the outbreak of 
war with the Battles of Concord and Lexington, both gazettes printed abridged versions 
of the “Declaration of the Causes and the Necessity of Taking up Arms,” Congress’s 
explanation of the violence between British and Provincial troops, as well as an outline of 
the conditions necessary for peace.  Like Guibert’s citizen soldier who did “not lay down 
his weapons” until the defeat of his enemy,356 Congress declared the American people 
“unanimously resolved to die as free men rather than to live in slavery . . .We do not fight 
for vain glory nor for conquest.  We will cease hostilities when hostilities have ceased on 
the part of the aggressors . . . but not before.”357  Later in the war, after several 
exaggerated reports of British brutality against American homesteads, Congress reiterated 
that if the British soldiers “persist in their current acts of barbarism, we will take such an 
exemplary vengeance that it will inspire such a terror as to deter them” from any more 
such actions.358  Even near the war’s end, when George Washington reportedly reduced 
his forces, several of his soldiers wished to stay in the army as volunteers.  Washington 
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praised “their zeal and their love for the country,” but insisted they return to their homes.  
The men departed, but “with reluctance, and they gave all the assurances the most solemn 
of their disposition to return, as soon as the interest of their country required it.”359 
In protecting their homeland, the Americans appeared to use all of their resources 
to repel their enemy, including manpower, finances, and supplies.  The Gazette de 
France reported that out of a population of 2,400,000 people, 600,000 men, or one 
colonist of every four, participated in either the American army or local militia.360  Even 
Quakers, a community of pacifists, reportedly constituted their own company of 
soldiers.361 The remaining members of society contributed to the war effort by making 
saltpeter for gunpowder or clothing for the soldiers.362     As Mably had said of the 
Greeks, “each citizen was a soldier.  Not knowing how to die for the patrie would have 
been an infamy.” 363  And indeed, according to the reports of the papers, the entire 
‘nation’ of America mobilized for war and provided military support for any colony 
under attack. Shortly after the battles of Lexington and Concord, the Gazette de Leyde 
reported that Connecticut “offered 10,000 men to New York” in preparation for the 
ensuing British attack.364  In 1777, once the war was well under way, American soldiers 
busily attempting to replace lost supplies from their magazines in Danburg and 
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Ridgefield, “received much help from the other colonies.”365  In reporting the American 
war, both newspapers emphasized a feeling of unity and mutual support among the 
colonists.  As Guibert described in his Essai, the Americans appeared to be “contented 
citizens interested in defending their prosperous state.”366 
 The gazettes were further attuned to the Americans’ domestic political culture, 
which, reminiscent of Rousseau’s description of the celebratory yet sober Roman fêtes, 
consisted of festivals celebrating their independence and commemorating their fallen 
comrades.  Perhaps the most extravagant reports of patriotism appeared in September of 
1777, when the papers recounted how the Americans celebrated the first anniversary of 
the signing of the Declaration of Independence.  In Boston, the Fourth of July was 
“celebrated . . . with all the enthusiasm that can inspire a fête that recognizes the liberty of 
Republican souls.”367  The Gazette de Leyde reported that all thirteen colonies, “broke 
publicly and gloriously the sword which Britain had forged for them; and generously 
took back the rights that God and Nature had accorded to mankind.”368  Both newspapers 
reported the memorials that the army dedicated to their fallen soldiers and officers, 
reminiscent of Rollin’s description of Athens’ “august religious ceremonies” and 
monuments erected in the memory of fallen citizens.  This image was also consistent with 
Servan’s belief that the patrie had to recognize the sacrifice of its soldiers with “a day of 
celebration,” in which the “veteran defenders of the state,” are “praised . . . and 
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encourage those who will one day replace them.”369  According to the Gazette de Leyde, 
the very tombstone of the beloved General Montgomery accomplished this goal by 
exclaiming, “What more noble destiny could the virtue of a patriot desire!” 370   
Accounts of the American soldiers in combat portrayed strategy and tactics that 
were unconventional by European standards, but were consistent with what Guibert had 
encouraged in his Essai.  Rather than meet the British army on the battlefield and fight 
according to the traditional limits of linear warfare, Washington was “content to harass 
[British] troops and refuse[d] to engage.”371  As both gazettes reported, Washington 
further bent the rules of European warfare during the Battle of Trenton, in which he 
crossed the Delaware River on Christmas Eve with about 4,000 troops and surprised a 
group of Hessians encamped at Trenton on Christmas morning.  According to both 
gazettes, the engagement resulted in the death or capture of hundreds of Hessians at no 
cost to the American army.372  As Guibert had suggested to French officers in the Essai, 
Washington’s officers, well-versed in the shape and scope of the landscape, used the 
geography of the battle grounds to their advantage.373  The major battles of the American 
Revolution did conform more closely to European style fighting, yet the gazettes gave 
disproportionate attention to Washington’s strategy of attrition, limited engagement, and 
partisan warfare, which they presented as largely successful.  “The Provincial [army] 
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continually harass [British] troops on their march with sudden attacks . . . unanticipated 
in the woods, the gorges, which America is full of, and against which this army cannot 
present an extended front.”374        
 Because of the geographic and chronological distance between American events 
and the corresponding reports in the newspapers, and because the newspapers relied on 
resolutions, letters, and secondary reports as the basis of their news, often a relatively 
bleak American event could appear to the French readers as a great success or triumph 
over adversity.  The Gazette de Leyde, for example, printed a series of letters and 
resolutions from Congress pleading with citizens to join either the American army or 
militia.  These resolutions appealed to the personal and cultural aspects of the war, 
discussing the protection of wives, children, and property, as well as the desire to live in 
liberty and enjoy the rights “accorded to [them] by heaven.”375  A critical reader might 
see these resolutions as a failure of the citizens to fulfill their patriotic duty. Yet shortly 
after the gazette printed these calls for help, it reported huge rises in the number of troops 
in Washington’s army: 99,000 active duty soldiers, with an additional 47,600 available 
for “occasional needs.”376  The patriotic Americans had responded to their government’s 
call to arms. This series of articles illustrates the optimistic interpretation—and 
sometimes even inventions—the gazettes offered when reporting American news.  A war 
that historically had many unsuccessful moments was actually represented in a 
continually positive light in these newspapers.   
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 In short, as portrayed by the gazettes, the American war matched the French 
understanding of a citizen army in nearly every aspect: the citizens were invested in the 
outcome of the war, fought for a just government, were united in a common cause, and 
were motivated by patriotism.  As a result, they were waging a successful war against one 
of the most powerful armies in Europe, one that had defeated the French army just 
thirteen years before during the Seven Years’ War.  As a perfect illustration of this 
patriotic citizen army, the Gazette de Leyde printed a story of the Connecticut militia, 
which was desperate for more troops.  When the governor appealed to men who had 
extensive families, and thus were exempted from military service, they responded en 
masse.  The reporter for the Gazette extolled them: “The example of these respectable 
citizens proves to what degree patriotism raises their hearts, and how difficult it will be to 
subjugate a people, in which the vast majority know how to sacrifice their familial ties 
and their most valued personal interests to save the patrie in danger.”377  Such praise was 
reminiscent of Rollin’s description of the ancient Athenians, who for their “ardent love of 
liberty . . . abandoned, without the least regret, their lands, estates, city, and houses,” to 
defend their freedoms against a “common enemy.”378  The Americans provided 
contemporary proof that patriotism brought military success.379 
By 1777, as America and France drew closer to a military alliance, the 
newspapers began explicitly referring to the Americans as ancients.  General Washington 
in particular received praise, being compared to the “great men of antiquity” for his 
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willingness to defend and make sacrifices for his country,380 and his strategies put 
journalists in mind of a “modern Fabius.” 381  Concerning the American army as a whole, 
the Gazette de Leyde reported its troops possessing “the most noble motives . . . their 
common goal is liberty, the same principle directed the armies of Rome in the days of 
their glory . . .”382  While French readers must have already seen the parallels between 
their ancient heroes and the American patriots, by 1777 the connection between the 
ancients and the Americans was undeniable.  From reading about the contemporary 
ancients, the reading public must have seen that it was still possible to achieve military 
superiority, and that citizen warfare, very similar to Guibert’s and Servan’s suggested 
models, was the key for doing so. 
 French participation in the American Revolution only increased Americans’ 
already extreme patriotic impulses.  Both the Gazette de Leyde and Gazette de France 
characterized French aid, monetary and military, as assurance that the Americans would 
finally win the war. With the signing of the treaty of Amity and Commerce, Congress 
publicly declared that, “France grants us all the assistance that we asked of them, and 
there is reason to believe that they will not be long in taking a greater part by declaring 
against Britain.”383  The promised provisions of French troops appeared in the gazettes as 
a promise on behalf of France to achieve America’s “liberty, their sovereignty, and their 
absolute and unlimited independence.”  By the gazette’s account, this promise excited 
“sentiments of confidence and affection.”  All that remained for the war-weary American 
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fighters was to “persevere,” and they would be “assured peace, lasting liberty, glory, and 
sovereignty” for themselves and their children.384 
 Both gazettes cast the French army as a benevolent force aiding a grateful and 
struggling patriotic army.  When General Rochambeau and his troops arrived at Newport, 
the Americans greeted them “with illuminations and fêtes.”  Shortly after his arrival, 
Rochambeau needed about 300 men to help construct a redoubt, and the American militia 
responded instantly.  Rochambeau reportedly offered them “bread, meat, whiskey, and 
money,” but the American militiamen refused saying, “you come to fight for us [and] that 
is our compensation,” and for three days they worked “as hard as galley-slaves but with 
the greatest gaiety.”385  All American patriots appeared inspired by the French presence.  
The Gazette de Leyde published a report that heavily complimented the power of French 
influence.  “[S]ince the arrival of the French troops in this country, the army of General 
Washington has accrued more than ten thousand volunteers eager to come and offer their 
arms and their help to achieve and solidly assure the Liberty of their country.”  The 
number of volunteers mounted significantly, because the “Americans take the greatest 
and most righteous confidence,” in the French army, which “protects and defends 
them.”386  While the American citizen army had been capable of defending their land 
from the “barbarous” British army and its mercenary allies, the gazettes also cast the 
French army as necessary to these citizen soldiers.  Such reports did not diminish the 
power or success of this patriotic army, but did elevate the status of the French army, 
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which had been longing for an opportunity to exhibit its military prowess since the 
humiliating loss of the Seven Years’ War. 
 The extent to which the image of Americans as citizen warriors saturated 
educated society is evident in the Affaires de l’Angleterre et de l’Amérique, a newspaper 
used by the French government to garner support for the American war against Britain.387  
Though the paper was primarily a propaganda tool, the editors disguised it as an impartial 
gazette by portraying it as a French-language periodical printed in Antwerp, much like 
the Gazette de Leyde.  The Comte de Vergennes, France’s minister of foreign affairs, 
heavily subsidized the paper and oversaw its publication in Paris.   Edmé-Jaques Genêt, a 
zealous advocate of the American cause, edited the paper and received several written 
contributions from Benjamin Franklin and John Adams, who were in France negotiating 
for military aid.388  They supplied the periodical with copies of the Declaration of 
Independence, state constitutions, and letters and reports from American newspapers that 
were often reprinted in full.  Franklin not only supplied materials from America, but he 
wrote some of the ‘articles’ himself.389  In addition to these contributions, the paper 
included transcripts of several debates in the British parliament, articles from the British 
newspaper The Remembrancer, and the letters from ‘a London banker to M. *** in 
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Antwerp,’ which usually described recent events from the war in a way that heavily 
favored the Americans.  The paper dealt primarily with issues of commerce, but the few 
articles that reported news of the actual war extolled the American army for its virtue and 
military prowess, much like the other two gazettes.  That the monarchy would so heavily 
emphasize the success of a perceived Republican army and disparage the army of the 
English monarchy suggests how deeply the image of the citizen army penetrated the 
consciousness of European elites. 
 As portrayed by the Affaires, the British army suffered from some of the same 
shortcomings as the French army, especially difficulties in recruiting soldiers and hiring 
mercenaries.  When the Revolutionary War began, the British government contracted 
several thousand German mercenaries to supplement their forces in America.  In what 
appears to be a transcript of a debate in Parliament concerning the use of Hessians in the 
American war, the Affaires reported Lord Shelburne’s critique of employing mercenaries 
and the ‘machine fighting’ that resulted. 390  Other members of Parliament were 
concerned over the cost of the Hessians, their likely fraternization with German-speaking 
colonists in Pennsylvania, and the image of Britain abroad if she could not supply her 
own troops.391  In arguing against mercenaries, Shelburne himself alluded to Guibert’s 
Essai, which revealed “the pitiful mechanism of foreign military discipline.  There, you 
would learn to judge the inadequacy of a similar aid, by the difference in bravery between 
the soldiers who fight for their liberty and their possessions, and the machines for whom 
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merit consists solely of maneuvers and who fight without the least interest in the quarrel 
of the Prince who pays them.”392   
 Whether or not Lord Shelburne actually spoke these words to his fellow members 
of Parliament, in printing this speech the Affaires offered a stunning portrayal of the 
British Parliament criticizing its own military according to the now widely familiar terms 
of citizen warfare.  Lord Shelburne’s ideas about mercenaries revealed how widespread 
and accepted Guibert’s Essai had become in Europe, and further supported the French 
papers’ portrayal of the American military as a citizen army.  The British Parliament 
appeared to recognize the difference in the quality of fighting when soldiers fought for 
personal reasons or beliefs rather than for the whim of a monarch.  The Americans, 
fighting for their own interests, would fight more effectively than the Hessian 
mercenaries interested only in being paid.  The idea of a citizen army, which the French 
described in writing and which the Americans enacted on the battlefield, was not a mere 
French fancy but an idea that had begun to shake traditional military thinking.   
 Like the other gazettes, the Affaires presented the Americans as ‘invincible,’ 
replete with ‘war-like virtue,’ a stark contrast to the more traditional British military 
suffering from the same problems as the French.  While it is unlikely that the French 
government purposely used the British and American militaries as a means of criticizing 
the European military system, the Affaires did contrast the reported brutality of the 
British against the virtue of the Americans, and thus made dangerous implications about 
the monarchy.  Even if the French military viewed itself as too honorable to commit 
atrocities like the British, it still used similar tactics and mercenaries, which according to 
                                                 
392
 Affaires, I, 2, 5. 
 
 186
the Affaires could not defeat a citizen army.  Furthermore, the support that the monarchy 
gave to this distant citizen army, which would endanger the crown if implemented at 
home, indicated the level to which reform rhetoric and excitement about the American 
model penetrated even the highest levels of French society.  In France and other parts of 
Europe, the American citizen army was not a fad, but a tempting reality.  
 
II. A Patriotic Citizen Army: How French society reproduced the American Revolution  
 
 The excitement and certainty with which the French readers embraced this 
exaggerated and even fictional American image in the gazettes is apparent in the 
grandiose way French readers and writers replicated the image through a variety of 
mediums.  The gazettes’ presentation of the American army and militia was so popular 
that an eager market devoured the products of French novelists, clothiers, history-writers, 
poets, and artists reproducing the image.  The sheer volume of American Revolutionary-
related literature and visual material that continued to be produced from 1775 to 1789 
indicates that America was a marketable and therefore popular commodity.  The 
American image presented in the gazettes appeared in genres aimed at both men and 
women of high and low social status.  Illustrated books and cartoons meant that even the 
illiterate could appreciate the Revolutionary triumph across the Atlantic.  Fashionable 
women, from either the second or third estates, could wear “America” in their clothes, 
hats, or hair.  Even philosophers and history writers, who adopted a more academic tone 
to describe the events of the American Revolution, produced works consistent with 
popular imagination. This pro-American Revolutionary output shows that not only did 
the French embrace the American image presented by the gazettes, they could not sate 
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their appetite for it.  This penchant for the American army and militia is not surprising, as 
the images pervading France supported and furthered the vision of a citizen-army that 
French readers and writers had debated since the loss of the Seven Years’ War.  As 
military reformers and non-military critics of the army envisioned a closer relationship 
between French society and military institutions, they viewed the American Revolution 
as an endorsement of their ideas.  From the outbreak of the American Revolution in 1775, 
through the outbreak of the French Revolution in1789, laudatory visions of the American 
citizen army pervaded France, confirming French hopes that a citizen army could be a 
reality in the contemporary world.  
 French readers were so eager for further accounts of the American War that its 
first history was published in 1778 as a history of the war to date.  Paul Ulrich Du 
Buisson’s history, entitled A Precise Guide to the Anglo-American Revolution since its 
beginning in the year 1774 until the first of January 1778, centered on the history of the 
people in the war and their attitude towards the fighting.  By his account, the American 
people were fundamentally “farmers and warriors,” who were powerfully armed against 
their metropole.393  Before the English government pushed the colonists into war, “their 
courage had been inert,” but by 1774, it had “become a lively force.”394  By Buisson’s 
account, every kind of American patriot found a way to be useful in the effort against 
Britain, including “an old man of 84 years,” who, when the militia assembled in 
Massachusetts to face the British Army at Lexington, “put himself among the ranks, like 
the others.”  As he took his place, he said, “with truly heroic magnanimity, ‘My death can 
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still be useful; I will put myself in front of one who is younger than me, and will receive 
the bullet intended for him.’”  The old man explained that he was not trying to merely 
save a life, but to “‘conserve a defender of my country.’”395    
 Like the gazettes, Buisson maintained the important distinction that the British 
had been the aggressors in this war, and he furthered the prediction of Guibert that a 
citizen-army, terrible in its anger, would unleash an absolute force against those who had 
disturbed its peace.  Buisson described the early battles of Lexington and Concord as a 
group of “Royalists” who “fired on [militiamen] with their pistols,” killing eight men at 
Lexington.  On their way to Concord, they were met by several companies of militia, 
numbering 2,800 men “burning to exact revenge for the insult they had received.”396  
Shortly after this event, George Washington, whom Buisson described as little more than 
a “very rich inhabitant of Virginia” with a vast plantation, “uprooted his plow for the 
interest of the Republic in danger.”  He raised and supplied an army entirely of his own 
expense.397  Here, du Buisson clearly makes a reference to the ancient Roman hero, 
Cincinnatus, a characterization of Washington familiar to readers of the gazettes. 
 Buisson’s work focused on other famous patriots, and he lingered over patriotic 
deaths and famous funeral speeches, especially the speech that extolled the fallen patriot 
Dr. Warren and called American citizens to arms.  Owing to his “courage and zeal for 
liberty,” Dr. Warren was “placed in the ranks of his own heroes.”  The funeral orator 
declared, “Citizens, he is not dead,” but lives, “in the souls of his compatriots.”  Citizens 
who could not bear arms were told to “embrace” those that could, “and may your last 
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wish for them be that they return victorious or die in like Warren in the arms of glory and 
liberty.”398  Such accounts advanced the image of Americans as virtuous warriors, who, 
Spartan-like, returned either with their shields or on them.  The death of their fellow 
patriots appears here, not as a reason to mourn, but as an inspiration that encourages them 
to act on their own patriotic urges. 
 Buisson also cast the American War as a universal concern.   When George 
Washington decided to invade Canada, he declared that “the cause of America and of 
liberty has become the cause of all virtuous citizens.”  While Washington addressed these 
words to Canadians, French readers, who considered themselves virtuous citizens, could 
not have helped but understand that the American cause was theirs, too. 
 Little changed in the tone and presentation of the American Revolution in other 
histories, even those that were written well after the war ended.  David Ramsay, an 
American writer, produced a history of the war as it transpired solely in the Carolinas, 
and the French translation of his work, appearing in 1788, also perpetuated the gazettes’ 
image of the American Army and militia, indulging in sentimental presentation of fallen 
patriots and sacrifices made on behalf of the patrie.  Like Buisson, Ramsay recounted 
that the American people’s “lively sense of liberty, that in America beats strongly in all 
hearts,” could not withstand living under British rule, and they preferred to “die free.”399  
By rebelling against their monarch, they followed “the duty of the good citizen to defend 
themselves and their threatened patrie.”400  Ramsay also focused much of his book on 
battle accounts and patriotic vignettes.  Sergeant MacDonald, for example, was mortally 
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wounded by a cannon ball, and he “used the few moments” between the blow and his 
death, “to exhort his comrades to remain firm in the cause for their patrie and their 
liberty.”401  Another citizen soldier, Moyse Allen, served as a chaplain in the Georgia 
brigade, and enjoyed a reputation for bravery, always fighting in the front lines in battle 
and “looking on all occasions for the most dangerous and most honorable post.”  By 
Ramsay’s account, “the friends of independence admired his talents, his courage, and a 
large number of other virtues.”  This patriot died heroically while trying to escape from a 
British prison ship.  While he knew he would drown in the endeavor, Allen preferred to 
die “in recovering his liberty,” rather than as a prisoner.402  American battles typically 
consisted of reports of clever American tactics, in which “nothing could equal the 
surprise and the confusion” of the English from surprise American attacks.403  Americans 
owed their success on the battlefield not to training and discipline, but their “sincere 
attachment to the cause of independence.”404  Nothing in these histories, whether written 
before or after the war, altered the gazettes’ image of the patriotic American citizen-
army.  Rather, these works presented accounts of the war that further exaggerated the 
Americans’ competence in battle and their universal love of country and liberty.  Factual 
or not, French readers embraced this image in official histories, as they would in other 
genres. 
 The American Revolution as portrayed in the gazettes entered French psyches in 
subtler ways.  Novelists, such as Michel-René Hilliard d’Auberteuil, set Romantic stories 
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against the dramatic and glorious background of the American Revolution.  In 
d’Auberteuil’s piece, Mis Mac Rea, roman historique, Jenny, a young woman living in 
New York with her father, falls in love with a dashing British officer.  When her elderly 
father flies to the aid of General Washington, Jenny conspires with her maid, Betsey, to 
meet her lover in secret.  She is surprised when he tries to seduce her, but promises to 
marry him as soon as possible.  On her journey to his camp, where they plan to wed, 
however, she is attacked and killed by Indians, who are collecting American scalps for 
the British.  This woeful tale of tragic love could occur against any backdrop, but the 
author chose the American Revolution—a setting which allowed him to feature the 
citizen-warrior aspect of the American Revolution even though it is not essential to the 
plot.  
 D’Auberteuil made a conscious choice with the setting of Revolutionary New 
York, which either served to attract readers interested in America or expand the interest 
in America to readers of fiction.  While part of the story is “the effect of a lively 
imagination,” d’Auberteuil asserted that the “foundation is only too true.”  By setting his 
story against the backdrop of “one of the most brilliant and atrocious wars” in history, he 
was able to contrast “American innocence with the vices of Europe,” while imparting a 
romantic fable.405  D’Auberteuil gave his work a sense of authenticity by describing the 
latest moves of General Washington at Kingsbridge in the opening pages.  When 
Nathanial, Jenny’s father, hears that Washington’s army has been defeated and has fled to 
Whiteplains, he rallies the neighboring young men and leads them to join Washington in 
battle.  “My friends,” he says, “while winter has whitened my hair, it has not frozen my 
courage; I want to march as your leader, and show you the path of duty and honor.”  He 
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did not fear “the bought-men [mercenaries] of Europe,” because “they do not know 
liberty, which has toughened us to fight.”  By the end of his patriotic speech, they have 
rallied “to defend [the patrie] until the last drop of their blood” is spilt.  Like the old man 
in Buisson’s history, Nathanial explains to his daughter that despite his age, he can still 
be useful by “taking the place of a young man,” and preserving the defenders of the 
patrie.  As he leaves his daughter, he reminds her that the tyrants “have only discipline 
and cruelty,” while the Americans have “courage and honor,” and will be “victors in 
turn.”406  D’Auberteuil then presents a beautifully tragic scene of the departing American 
forces.  Like a sentimental image from Valley Forge, the young men, “are poorly clothed 
and have bare feet,” the only provisions they carry with them are “some sacks of flour 
and rice.”  And yet their spirits are “joyful and full of ardor.”  Citizens in every town 
offer these new soldiers “meat and fruits,” and young women, “simple . . . but beautiful 
as virtue herself,” supply them with rum and medicinal syrups, promising to marry them 
upon their victorious return407  The long pause in the plot ends happily when Washington, 
with the help of these new volunteers, wins the day at Trenton and Princeton, “taking the 
fruit of victory from Britain.”408   
While the plot of the novel revolved around Jenny’s relationship with her rakish 
British officer, D’Auberteuil seemed to relish discussing these patriotic events.  Because 
the novel is not a history, philosophy, or political treatise, and therefore is not required to 
have ‘official’ information, one can conclude that the presentation drew from the 
common stock of images that readers would have had of the American Revolution.  
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While the war in America had many facets to it, D’Auberteuil chose to highlight 
America’s supposed citizen-army, perhaps the most intriguing aspect for him, and a 
guaranteed way to attract readers.  The very existence of this novel, and others like it, 
reveals that there was a market for the American Revolution among casual readers.  
D’Auberteuil’s dramatic presentation of brave American citizen soldiers taking the 
initiative to join General Washington, impervious to hardships or self-interest, also 
reveals that non-military readers found this presentation of citizen soldiers attractive and 
plausible.  At the same time, this type of presentation of a contemporary citizen army 
bravely fighting for the patrie would continue to sustain and increase the popularity of 
the citizen army as the perfect military system. 
Poetic representations of the American army made even tighter connections 
between the American patriots and the ancients they apparently resembled.  M. Baubier’s 
poem, Hommage à la Patrie, further perpetuated the image of the Americans as modern 
ancients: 
 
The soul of Fabius wandered the earth 
for the last temple of morals and liberty, 
A place that even for tyrants has worth . . .   
Of Europe’s troubles and chains, he was not impressed 
And he crossed the vast ocean into the west 
Where he saw an improvised land, a Shadow of Rome 
Which touched his noble pride, where the land met the foam 
August Liberty, he saw had settled in Boston 
And as Fabius’s soul embraced that of Washington 
Their two souls melded, and became one.409 
 
In this poetic genre, the author takes the parallels between America and the Ancients to a 
higher level.  The gazettes presented American military men as sharing certain traits and 
similarities with the ancients, to the point where America could even be considered a 
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“New Rome,” but the poet presents an ancient hero not only approving of America, but 
choosing to reside in Washington’s soul.  Fabius had been a Roman commander famous 
for refusing to meet superior forces directly on the battle field, but finding clever ways to 
defeat them, and enjoyed a reputation as an authoritative and just ruler.  French readers 
likely applied these characteristics to Washington, as well, making him and Fabius an 
obvious match.  This poem may have especially touched French sensibilities, as the poet 
has Fabius choosing to live in America instead of Europe.  America, and especially its 
leading citizen-warrior-general, had become an asylum for the ancient warriors that 
French writers had presented so often as heroes for emulation. 
 French readers could literally see the American army in action, and how it 
managed to defeat the British with François Godefroy and Nicolas Ponée’s illustrated 
history of the American Revolution, a series of engravings with detailed captions 
depicting the major scenes and surrenders of the war.  Their version of the American 
Revolution spanned Florida, the Caribbean, and Spain, as well as North America, 
emphasizing the conflict’s global aspects.  Their scenes from North America, however, 
almost uniquely focused on the actions of the citizen army, rather than on the congress or 
the economic potential of a newly liberated American ally.  One scene, for example, 
portrayed the surrender of British General Burgoyne to American General Horatio Gates.  
The caption reads: “Burgoyne’s well-disciplined soldiers put down their weapons before 
the American militia newly-raised from their farms and led by Horatio Gates.”410   
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           fig. 1 
 
While this image is replete with inaccuracies, it faithfully represents what French viewers 
desired to see.  The American militiamen, sporting plumed miter hats on the right of the 
image, are hearty, ordered, and seem to be unsurprised in their victory.  The British army, 
on the other hand, seems weak and distraught, as if unable to comprehend their loss to 
farmers who had just come from their fields.  The numbers of the Americans, and their 
upright posture, also assert their ownership of the land, while the British on the left seem 
bent over and sparse.  To the casual viewer, the winner of such a match would obviously 
be the Americans.  Their citizen army outmatches what appears to be a comparatively 
delicate or feeble army from Europe. 
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 Members of the non-military French elite found their own ways of embracing the 
victorious American citizen by wearing it as a high fashion of the day.  Jouy, a fabric 
company that catered to wealthy women of the third estate, wove dress fabrics presenting 
allegorical American scenes.  In one scene, George Washington is standing in his 
carriage, pulled by leopards, and led by an American Indian holding an American flag, 
while a second Amerindian blows a trumpet.  In the carriage with Washington sits an 
Amerindian woman holding a shield that proclaims “American Independent ANCE 
1776.”  In the left hand corner of this scene, cannon balls, shields, and armor are leaning 
against a self-labeled “liberty tree.”  In the background of this scene, American solders sit 
on horseback with guns and flags.  The freeing of America is evidently a militarily 
important event, and this scene in particular presents America as a militarily strong 
country, led by citizen-general George Washington.  This visible representation of the 
American Revolution again perpetuated the glory of the American citizen army, but also 
shows that the consumers of this image were not restricted to military men, or even male 
French readers, but wealthy ladies of fashion. 
 In addition to these dress fabrics, women could wear their hair in “American 
curls,” or as a way to show off the “Belle Poule,” a French ship which won a naval battle 
against the British in 1778.  Those who were not inclined to wear these physically 
demanding styles could don a “New England Hat,” a high and heavily decorated version 
of an American mob cap.  Women of fashion, whether enlightened salonnières or simply 
fashion conscious, embraced the American cause and, by extension, the American citizen 
army with their choice of dress.  While these hair and hat styles did not sport weapons, 
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soldiers, or ancient figures, they did represent patriotic American women—an important 
part of the citizenry supporting America’s army.411 
 The American Revolution in France was more than a product to be sold or a 
fashion statement to be made.  Philosophes responded to the American War with awe and 
elation, as though this event proved the validity of their previous musings.  These 
philosophes reveled in the role of the citizen in making this revolution and new nation, 
and the citizen’s willingness to take up arms against tyrannical oppression.  According to 
Raynal, Americans understood their own time as “ ‘an era of momentous revolution,’ “ in 
which “ ‘this fateful event will forever decide the regrets or the admiration of 
posterity.’”412  Raynal dated the beginning of the Revolution with the closing of the 
Boston port, an action that caused American “citizens to assemble and discuss,” their 
problems in public places, and publish pamphlets “full of eloquence and of vigor.”413  He 
characterized these pamphlets as a call to action, and quoted their fiery and determined 
language: “‘Rise up, therefore, O Americans!  Never has the region that you inhabit been 
so covered with somber clouds.  They call you rebels, because you do not want to be 
taxed by any other than your representatives.  Justify this pretension by your courage, or 
seal it forever with the loss of your blood.’”414  When Great Britain responded to 
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American resistance by sending troops, Raynal focused on how America became 
“occupied with its defense.  The citizens there became soldiers.”415 
 Like the histories, literature, and images that presented the American Revolution 
to attentive members of French society, Raynal’s account of the Revolution centered on 
the actions of individual citizens uniting against a tyrannical and oppressive government, 
who were eventually pushed to take up arms for the defense of their freedom-loving way 
of life.  By Raynal’s account, Americans recognized the importance of their decision to 
take up arms against Britain, and that doing so would win them the “admiration” of future 
generations.  Unlike rioters in France, who were not viewed in such glorious terms, 
American rebels were enlightened.  It might seem strange that France crushed the “Flour 
War” rebellion in 1775, yet glorified the American resistance to the English monarch.  
The Americans, however, appeared as “enlightened” rebels.  Raynal pointed out that the 
irony of the American Revolution lay in its principles.  “These principles,” he said, are 
“born in Europe and especially in England,” but “have been transplanted to America 
through philosophy.”  The Americans took that philosophy, and then used “the 
enlightenment against the metropole that invented it.”416  Unlike Europeans who 
philosophize, but whose musings produce little action, these enlightened American 
citizens put their principles into practice, and lived the philosophy that Raynal and his 
contemporaries could only write about.  This philosophical base gave the American 
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Revolution a legitimacy that had been absent in any mere peasant rebellion in France or 
England and separated it from the bloody insurrections in Corsica.417   
 Raynal’s one regret about the newly established United States was his inability to 
ever see it for himself.  His closing thoughts on this treatise ring with a touch of sadness, 
as he knows that he will likely not live long enough to fully enjoy the embodiment of 
enlightenment philosophy that he is certain will come with the independence of America.  
“Heroic country,” he laments, “my advanced age does not permit me to visit you.  I will 
die without having seen the period of tolerance, of morals, of laws, of virtue, of liberty.  
But I would have desired it, and my last words will be prayers addressed to heaven for 
your prosperity.”418 
 Gabriel Bonnot de Mably, author of the Conversations with Phocion, affirmed the 
idea that the American Revolution had been a fulfillment of certain Enlightenment 
principles.  Compared to Europe, where governments “do not see citizens as anything 
other than farm animals who are governed for the particular advantage of property 
owners,” America’s emerging republic felt edifying.  Mably expressed deep gratification 
that the “thirteen republics” decided to “draw on the sources of the wisest philosophy 
[and] human principles by which to govern themselves.”419  Specifically, Mably, himself 
a connoisseur and champion of the Ancients, saw in America the revival of Greek and 
Roman glory.  He counted on the new states to “renew the spectacle” of ancient 
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Greece.420  Whereas for a long time “the politics of Europe have been founded on money 
and commerce” leaving no trace of “the ancient virtues,” Mably had hopes that they 
“could be reborn in America.”  He saw the same virtues of ancient Rome thrive in 
America, those of “love of country, of liberty, and of glory.”421  In his excitement about 
the possibilities of the new American Republic, Mably even dared to venture that the 
United States might outshine its ancient forbearers.  He observed to John Adams that 
Americans “find yourselves today in a happier situation than the ancient republics that we 
admire as the most wise and virtuous; and that you can with less trouble stamp your 
establishments with a character of stability that render the laws the dearest and most 
respectable.”422  With so much virtue and with such a promising future, Mably, like 
Raynal, confirmed with a philosopher’s penetrating insight that the American Revolution 
had brought the philosophes’ wildest fantasies to life.  America, due to its citizen-based 
society, eagerness for military glory, and republican foundation would reinvigorate and 
perhaps even surpass the ancients who had served as the pinnacle of civilization for so 
long to Europeans struggling for virtue. 
 This variety of genres portraying the American Revolution and the methods of 
presenting it, from history to hats, speaks to the flexibility of interpretation of the 
American Revolution; it suited nearly any purpose.  It therefore served to strengthen, 
support, endorse, underscore, or emphasize contemporary French interests in patriotism 
and citizen armies for nearly every audience.  The fact that so many different 
interpretations and presentations focused on American parallels to the ancients and the 
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citizen army shows first of all how deeply this desire to “make society more military” had 
penetrated French consciousness.  The attractions of a citizen army were not just 
tempting to military men actively trying to reform the French army, but to the very 
citizens of France on several levels, from high thinkers, to fashionable ladies, to the urban 
illiterate soaking in American images.  
 The interpretational flexibility of this American war more importantly gave 
France a chance to reinvent itself.  Still reeling from the loss of the Seven Years’ War and 
the accompanying humiliation, French readers saw an opportunity to recast their country 
in “American” terms.  Especially after 1777, with French money and, eventually, troops 
officially committed to the American cause, French writers, readers, and artists redrew 
France not as a product of Old World Europe, but as the midwife of a Republic and a 
monarchy of liberty.  Helping Americans triumph in their revolt against Britain was not 
just important for America’s sake, or even for aiding the development of the “New 
Rome.”  If America triumphed as a Republic, then France would no longer be the 
weakened state, wounded by military and colonial losses, but an ally of America’s citizen 
army.  France would be the mentor of the young Republic, providing military guidance 
and old-world expertise, allowing it to think of itself in similarly laudatory terms of 
ancient virtues and victorious armies.  
 
III.  The French Army redeemed and recast 
 
 As the first international conflict involving the French Army since the Seven 
Years’ War, the American Revolution provided France with its first opportunity to 
recapture its reputation as a powerful fighting force.  While Rochambeau’s army had few 
opportunities to showcase its abilities—its only major battle was Yorktown—French 
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authors made much of its participation.   With its armies in the field once again, France 
could regain, or at least begin to rebuild, its reputation.  Those who followed French 
military actions must have felt that the American Revolution provided France with the 
opportunity to avenge their loss to the British in Canada.  In 1763, England robbed 
France of her North American colonies, and in1783, France returned the favor.  In 
addition to interpreting the American fighting forces as the citizen army everyone had 
been waiting for, French authors cast the French army as one worthy of associating with 
the new ancients.  In the hands of philosophes, historians, poets, and artists the French 
army was reborn and reinterpreted not just as an ally of the admirable new Republic, but 
as its strongest defender. 
 Longchamps, in his three-volume Impartial History of the war, focused primarily 
on the French in his account of Yorktown.  He credited Rochambeau with ending the 
siege, adding that the Baron de Vioménil and the M. le Vicomte de Deux-Ponts were 
“particularly distinguished in the attack” for their bravery and cool-headedness.  
Longchamps reserved his greatest praise, however, for the Marquis de Lafayette, “who 
played the biggest part in this great enterprise.”  By Longchamps’s account, Lafayette 
“followed General Cornwallis’s every step, having harassed him without mercy, and 
necessitated his loss of Yorktown.”  Lafayette commanded the respect and admiration of 
all those present, including the English, as “a great man of war,” despite his young age.  
So impressed was Lord Cornwallis with Lafayette’s battlefield performance, “that he 
asked, as a favor, to make the treaty with M. de Lafayette, and to put down his arms 
before no-one else.”423  While this last excerpt from Longchamps’s history might be 
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inaccurate, it effectively highlighted the skills of the French officers without detracting 
from the hardiness of the Americans.  Longchamps also drew comparisons between the 
English and French forces, and while he complimented the English on their bravery and 
generalship, he also pointed out that, “England does not have the same resources as 
France, and the patriotism of the English cannot surpass that of the French.”424  The 
American war provided France not only an opportunity to confront Britain, but also to 
showcase their increasingly patriotic army. 
 Because of French actions in the American Revolution, French poets could now 
put their pens to work on verses that flattered and glorified French Generals.  Just as the 
losses during the Seven Years’ War resulted in the jeering satires of Generals Richelieu 
and Soubise, so the victories during the American Revolution vindicated high-ranking 
officers. One anonymous author commemorated the end of the war with a long poem on 
how France delivered America from its chains of servitude under Britain, in which 
Rochambeau “too valiant to fear any danger” bravely “led French soldiers into the 
fray.”425  The Baron Vioménil received praise as “the idol, the glory, and the blood of the 
state,” and young Comte de Noailles, who entered the American Revolution near its 
conclusion, received encouragement to “pursue,” as a “tender warrior, your brilliant 
career,” so that the English will “taste the dust under the force of your blows.” 426  To 
commemorate the victory at the Yorktown, Caron de Chasnet composed some verses on 
the “double victory” of Rochambeau and Lafayette that he dedicated to their wives.  In 
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addition to praising the two generals, Chasnet lauded their soldiers, who were so 
“courageous” that upon being committed to the American cause by King Louis XVI, they 
“looked to brave a thousand new perils,” and “overcame the wind and the water” in order 
to land on America shores. 427  With French victories, American officers were no longer 
the only ones who merited comparisons to the Ancients, but now “the name of 
Rochambeau” could be counted with Washington’s among those of “Cesar, of Augustus, 
and of Cato.”428  By participating in the American Revolution and allying with the citizen 
army of the “New Rome,” French officers merited ancient parallels.  The entire event 
glorified France, and its authors reveled in it.  As the poet declared, “How this event is 
flattering for France!  It augments its glory as well as its power.”429  Minimizing Britain’s 
influence and allying with her former colonies did increase France’s power, but being 
able to defeat its old foe alongside an army worthy of the ancients glorified France, and 
filled its need for an honorable victory. 
 While French poets were not stinting in their praise of French officers and 
soldiers, their verses pale in comparison to the hearty gratitude that other French writers 
imagined as the American response to French aid.  In his Impartial History, Longchamps 
quoted Washington’s touching sentiments towards Louis XVI’s “attachment to the 
American cause,” which motivated him to send “an army [that is] distinguished as much 
by their officers as by their soldiers” to the Americans’ aide.  This action, Washington 
continued, “inspire[s] in all citizens of the United States the sentiments of inalterable 
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gratitude” for this “shining success that we have just obtained.”430  By Longchamps’s 
account, Washington was not only grateful for France’s help, but recognized the French 
army as one “distinguished” in both its officer corps and quality of soldiers.  Considering 
the image that most French writers had of the American citizen army, this is high praise 
indeed.   
 French authors further cast the French army as the protector and liberator of the 
struggling American citizen army by focusing on American gratitude and relief.  When 
the two armies meet for the first time in a sentimental play, Le Barbier had General 
Washington order his “soldiers and fellow Americans” to embrace the French “defenders 
whom heaven has destined for us.”431  The sentiments of common American citizens are 
represented first by an old Virginian whose only son has died in battle.  He tells his 
daughter-in-law and grandson that this meeting “is sweet for our hearts . . . I would like 
to die of love and of joy in the arms of the French.”  Turning his eyes heavenward, he 
gives thanks to God for “the happiness of fixing my last looks on the friendly and intrepid 
warriors.” 432  His daughter-in-law expresses similar joy in finally seeing “these brave and 
generous defenders of our liberty.”  She agrees with Washington on the divine nature of 
the French army, saying that “heaven avenges us in giving us a good king as an ally and 
protector.”  Even her young son, upon catching sight of the French army, exclaims, 
“Maman, my heart thrills with joy!” 433 
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 The praise of these common Americans speaks significantly to the ways that the 
French writers used the American Revolution to rethink the image of the French army.  
Rather than being an army of conquest, fighting with other European nations for 
dominance of a particular area of land or control of a trade route, the French army at this 
moment was an army defending a young republic, protecting a virtuous citizenry from 
tyrannical oppression.  The American army remained patriotic and victorious, but its 
success was also dependent on help from France.  This American praise allowed the 
French army to gain some of the honor and virtue associated with a Republican citizen-
army without necessitating any actual changes in the French army.   
 The French monarchy likewise received a new image during the American 
Revolution as one that, at least in word, enabled a Republic; because the French 
monarchy understood the importance of liberty and human rights, it could provide 
protection against an oppressive tyrant.  The values and virtues of France’s monarchical 
institution appeared conducive to working with a republic and its new ancient citizen-
soldiers, setting the tone for Louis XVI’s kingship as one dedicated to liberty. 
 French writers cast the American need for French assistance as one enlightened 
nation asking another to answer a virtuous need.  A poem chronicling the stay of Ben 
Franklin in France had him asking Louis XVI to “reclaim, great king, your abundant 
goodness.”  He described the sad state of the people of Boston (who represented most 
American misfortunes in French renderings).  “We are exposed to our worst nightmares,” 
he said, and only Louis XVI, a “great king” could “deign to break [American] chains.” 434  
Aiding America was presented as a unique mission that only France can accomplish, 
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ostensibly because Louis XVI (unlike the British monarch, it was implied) possessed 
goodness and was generous with a free people facing destruction. 
 Louis XVI reaped the full reputation of a liberating monarch in French poetry and 
prose.  Americans supposedly loved him, as they would “come to offer their best wishes / 
to this generous king,” who, apparently “would do all for them.” 435  While Louis is a 
“young king” he also plays the part of the father, not just to Americans, but as the 
“governing Citizen of his subjects.”436  Here, the author seems to attribute Louis XVI 
with some of the qualities usually reserved for George Washington.  While Louis is a 
king, and the undisputed ruler of his domain, he is also a citizen of his own land, much in 
the way Washington was portrayed as the highest-ranking general, but also a citizen of 
America.  As “governing Citizen,” Louis XVI could therefore inspire “enthusiasm” in 
“the Citizen [with his] sacred aspect,” which would “feed forever the fires that burn in 
[the citizen’s] soul.” 437  Because Louis XVI himself is a citizen and a king, he is able to 
empathize with and understand how to best help the struggling citizens of America.  In a 
diorama constructed in 1780 to commemorate the fourth anniversary of the signing of the 
Declaration of Independence, which included Greek allegories to represent various 
American events, Louis XVI appeared in the sixth panel.  His portrait was appropriate in 
this representation as “the protector of letters, the conserver of the rights of humanity, the 
ally and the friend of the American People.”438  Another author depicts Louis XVI 
freeing the Canadians from Britain’s rule.  Speaking for the king, a Canadian calls his 
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brothers to arms, saying, “Brave and generous Canadians, break the chains that hold you . 
. . A young and virtuous monarch will second your efforts and will cover you with his 
shield.”  Unlike the British king, Louis, who is “the protector of public tranquility, prefers 
to the title of conqueror, one of arbiter of his neighbors and avenger of oppressed 
humanity.”439  Not only is Louis cast as a protector of the oppressed, shield of those 
fighting to break their chains, but it implies that the French army’s goals will be the same.  
The king’s “shield” and his force is his army, and if the king is now an “arbiter” instead 
of a “conqueror”, then the French army will reflect the monarch’s new priorities and be 
fighting for more “virtuous” causes, in keeping with some of the characteristics of the 
Americans that the French so highly admired. 
 Perhaps the best representation of how French advocates of the American 
Revolution recast their monarch is in the image below. 
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         fig. 2 
These two drawings from 1786 come together as a single piece of artwork.  The top 
picture is entitled, “Independence of America” and features the French king’s ships 
arriving at Boston Harbor (which oddly looks like a fortress), to give aid to the suffering 
Bostonians.  The Americans are portrayed as supplicating the French for aid against the 
British.  Some have their hands stretched outward towards the French, others toward 
heaven, agreeing with other representations of the French as heaven-sent.  The effect that 
this action has on the French is evident in its companion piece, featured on the bottom, 
entitled, “Servitude abolished,” in which, to quote the caption, “the King exits his palace 
to announce the liberty of the Serfs of his states.”440  Like the freed Bostonians, the serfs 
of France are supplicating Louis XVI for their freedom, and he, being a monarch of 
liberty and friend of the oppressed, grants it (though in actuality Louis XVI only granted 
freedom to the serfs of his domains, not of all of France).  As the picture implies, the way 
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Louis XVI approached the American Revolution influenced, or at least was mirrored in, 
the way he appeared to behave towards his own people. 
 The role of Louis XVI in ‘liberating’ the people of America rejuvenated France’s 
sense of superiority.  As the poet was quick to remind the newly freed American ally, 
without France, the American colonies might still be a part of Britain, and it was only 
because of France’s generous military intervention that America is now a sovereign 
nation.  While France also loaned a great deal of money to the American cause and 
provided international recognition of America as a separate entity from Britain, it is the 
military intervention that captures the poets’ attention:  
This People, without France, 
Would still submissive be  
Yes, despite its courage 
What would it do without Louis? 
Ever since our Bourbon King 
Loaned out his canon  
All lower their flags 
Before its receiver, Washington . . .  
If he is dependent 
On the English no more 
It is because he allied 
With the French Army Corps. 441 
 
Because France set America free, it was not an embarrassed monarchy in the face of an 
ancient-esque republic, but the “midwife” of the republic; helping it be born from a 
corrupt monarchy and guarding it during its early days.  French authors made the point 
that America had depended on France for its liberty, again reinterpreting the role of 
France, and of the French army in Europe from fellow conqueror (of Canada and India) 
to an army of liberation and protection.  Participating in the American Revolution 
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brought the French army one step closer to Guibert’s description of the citizen army, that 
it “will not want to conquer, but only preserve.”442 
 Independent of providing military aid and “granting” liberty to America, the 
American Revolution was an important event for France in its own right.  As one poet 
phrased it, “to honor America is to honor France,” and France’s participation in the event 
would appear “the most remarkable and the grandest to the eyes of philosophers and 
posterity.”  Another poet cast the event as France finally winning a war, after years of 
military struggle.  “That this event is flattering for France! / It augments its glory as well 
as its power. / O fortune! O Joy!  We triumph at last”!443  French soldiers and officers did 
not just honor the Americans with their help and alliance, but they were perhaps more 
self-consciously, “fighting for the honor of the French.”  This poet saw the American 
Revolution as France’s fight, where the French “offenses command the war,” and it 
heralded “the end of an effeminate century,” in which incompetence and luxury had 
weakened the French army and lost them their Empire in the Seven Years’ War.  Now, 
because of the French “success,” a “century of grandeur is opened.”444  By providing 
France the opportunity to fight with and “liberate” a virtuous citizen army of ancient 
proportions, the American Revolution allowed France to view its army as a virtuous 
institution conducive to fighting alongside citizen-soldiers.  At the same time, however, 
the American war was a crowning triumph for France as a victorious military 
engagement, making it the champion of Europe’s most recent war. 
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 The American Revolution was vital in France’s development towards a citizen 
army.  It provided France with its first opportunity in seventeen years to showcase its 
capabilities on the battlefield and demonstrate to Europe that the French army was still a 
powerful foe to contend with.  The American Revolution was also a timely event 
occurring in the midst of the massive reform efforts to reorganize and rejuvenate their 
weakened army.  As French officers contemplated introducing “citizen army” aspects 
into their system by “citizen-izing” their soldiers, they had an opportunity to witness the 
actions of a modern-day citizen army, and then to fight alongside that army against a 
common foe.  Through literature, the non-military writers recast the French army from a 
lost, bumbling, disorganized band of incompetent officers and undisciplined soldiers into 
a patriotic army of “magnanimous souls” who won the admiration of an ideal citizen 
army while liberating it from British chains.  To distinguish the French monarchy that 
aided America in its fight from the British monarch that oppressed it, writers 
characterized Louis XVI as a monarch of liberty, who, rather than conquer as European 
monarchs are wont to do, protects and defends the rights of humanity.  By describing the 
French monarch in these terms, the French monarchical system appeared conducive to a 
citizen army.  Through the prism of the American Revolution, non-military French 
writers and readers could view their country’s fighting force as an honorable, virtuous 
institution, something that French citizens could not only support but perhaps even 
participate in. 
 
IV.  French officers and the American Revolution 
 
 Like French readers and writers who found inspiration in the American 
Revolution from a citizen’s perspective, French military men appreciated the American 
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army and militia as a modern example of a working citizen army.  French officers 
contributed to the idealization of the American Revolution by writing memoirs and 
publishing letters that supported the established image of the American War.   Even if the 
American army was not as glorious, smooth-running, patriotic, victorious, or reminiscent 
of the ancients as the French liked to believe, French officers who had participated in the 
war still presented the American army in those terms.  Reports to leading officials in 
France, such as Lafayette’s letters to Vergennes, touted the success of the American army 
and militia.  Upon returning to France, officers scrambled to join the French branch of the 
Society of the Cincinnati, a newly-formed American club to honor its officers and 
maintain brotherly ties forged during the war.  The society not only signified pride in its 
members’ military victory, but it also signified that the French had served with, and in 
some cases as a part of, the heralded American citizen army.  The American war could 
even be a rich cache of inspirational stories used to educate French soldiers in their 
patriotic duties.   
 When French officers returned from America, either having been part of 
Rochambeau’s army or as former volunteers under George Washington, an eager market 
awaited their first hand accounts of their time abroad.  Many officers seemed only too 
happy to comply, adding accounts that confirmed earlier French images of how the 
American army and citizenry operated.  François-Jean Chastellux, Rochambeau’s second 
in command, confirmed in his account of American travels that “North America is 
entirely military, entirely war-like,” and raising new troops never proved to be a 
problem.445  He spoke well of the members of the American army, whom he observed at 
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Kingsbridge.  There, “the troops were poorly dressed, but they had a good appearance; as 
for the officers, they left nothing to be desired, in as much as their countenance as for 
their manner of marching and commanding.”446  One American officer, General Heath, 
had been a farmer before the Revolution, but Chastellux was pleased to learn that “his 
natural taste tends toward the study of war,” and had many French works on tactics, 
including “the one by M. Guibert for which he makes a particular case.”447  The tight 
relationship between citizens and soldiers also proved true, as Chastellux related a story 
of his hosts, Mr. and Mrs. Hill, caring for an ailing soldier in their home.  Mrs. Hill had 
welcomed the soldier to stay with them, even though she had never been acquainted with 
him and he had no means to pay her for the room and services.448  In 1787, the year 
before Chastellux’s account would be made available to the public, the Almanac 
Littéraire advertised it as an interesting new work.  Part of the description of the book 
included an anecdote confirming the citizen warfare image of America.  Colonel 
Langhedon, finding a particular meeting had become too tedious for him, excused 
himself saying, “Sirs, you can talk as much as you like; but I know that the enemy is on 
our borders, and I am going to take my guns and mount my horse to combat [them] along 
side my fellow citizens.”449  The editors of the Almanac Littéraire knew that this was the 
kind of story their readers longed to see.  Chastellux’s fellow French officers, such as 
Rochambeau, Jean-François-Louis de Clermont-Crèvecoeur, Louis de Récicourt de 
Ganot, Jean-Baptiste Antoine de Verger, Louis-Alexandre Berthier, and the Chevalier de 
                                                 
446
 Ibid., 85. 
 
447
 Ibid., 85. 
 
448
 Ibid., 59. 
 
449
 Almanach Littéraire, 1787. 
 215
Pontgibaud all presented similar stories of courageous fighting, supportive citizens, and 
American military prowess, worthy of ancient Greek and Roman associations.450 
 Rather than correcting any misconceptions surrounding the American Revolution, 
returning French officers appeared more interested in adding to the positive writings 
about America and continuing the idealization process of its citizen army.  Perhaps they 
wanted to publish their letters, perhaps they appreciated the ready audience, or perhaps 
they thought it was more important for members of the French public to indulge in their 
fantasies of a citizen army.  Either way, French officers implicitly approved of these 
characterizations by entering the genre with their first-hand accounts.  All of these 
published accounts gave readers a strong reason to accept the representations of America 
that had been circulating throughout France.   
 Senior French officers who served in the American Revolution maintained ties 
with America and flaunted their service in this popular war through the Society of the 
Cincinnati, an American society founded in 1783 by American officer Henry Knox.  
Knox created the Society as a means to stay in touch with fellow officers, help the 
widows of fallen comrades, and perpetuate the importance of Revolution through future 
generations.  Each former colony had a chapter, and as a sign of amity and gratitude, the 
Society magistrates extended membership to French colonels and generals who had 
fought on America soil.  Membership in the society included the privilege of wearing an 
emblem in the shape of an eagle attached to a blue and white ribbon that symbolized the 
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French-American alliance.  As this medal was issued by a foreign army, Lafayette had to 
garner special permission from Louis XVI for officers to wear it.  Louis XVI was so 
excited about the Society that he not only granted permission—which made the 
Cincinnati eagle the only foreign decoration allowed besides the Golden Fleece—but he 
endorsed the Society by requesting membership for himself.  French reaction to the 
Society was overwhelmingly positive.  French officers who did not meet the membership 
criteria presented their arguments for admittance and felt unappreciated if they were not 
granted it. 
 Two principal reasons accounted for the popularity of the Society of the 
Cincinnati among French officers.  Despite the French reform efforts that followed the 
Seven Years’ War, the French army remained unchanged in certain areas.  French 
officers still saw medals and promotion as among their top priorities, and they openly 
requested what they felt was owed to them.  The Duc de Luzerne wrote Washington on 
behalf of one of his compatriots, the Chevalier Lemeth, who had participated in the battle 
of Yorktown, but who had not received the rank of Colonel until two months after the 
conclusion of that battle.  Luzerne reminded Washington that Lemeth “was grievously 
wounded at the Siege of Yorktown.”  In response to the battle scars, Louis XVI had 
“rewarded him for this in giving him the rank of Colonel,” but because he did not obtain 
the rank until after the war, “he finds himself excluded from the Society.”  Luzerne 
argued that, “if he is not admitted by a special grace [from Washington], his wounds and 
his zeal merit some favor.”451  French officers considered the Society of the Cincinnati as 
an organization that would honor French approaches to battlefield compensation.  Just as 
wounds won officers rank and recognition in the Seven Years’ War, so Luzerne reasoned 
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that Lemeth’s wounds “merited” him a place in the Society.  French officers found the 
military decoration that came with membership particularly appealing, as it allowed them 
to publicly proclaim their inclusion in the newest elite military society. 
 The Society of the Cincinnati also proved valuable because it recognized officers’ 
experience with the citizen army.  Membership and the corresponding medal not only 
announced the officers’ participation in the war, but signified their association with 
citizen warfare.  Like the plays and poems featuring the role of France in the American 
Revolution, the Society proved to be an important part of how France recast itself as a 
protector of free men.  The Society first appeared in France with the following 
description: “The officers in the American army, having generally been taken in the 
number of citizens of America, have the highest veneration for the character of this 
illustrious Roman, Lucius Quintius Cincinnatus, and being resolved to follow his 
example, in returning to their homes, think that it would be suitable to name their society 
the Cincinnati.”452  The very existence of the Society confirmed that the American army 
consisted of Romanesque citizen soldiers that upheld the ideals of the Roman citizen 
himself.  Just as French officers still concerned themselves with promotions and 
pensions, they also continued to value their personal reputations.  What had changed, 
however, was the type of reputation they desired.  Whereas during the Seven Years’ War, 
many officers wished to receive honors for individual feats of bravery that would elevate 
themselves and their families, officers now sought to base their reputations on fighting 
for virtuous causes.  The Comte de Bressey wrote to the Society requesting admittance, 
because of his “pardonable ambition of having my name known in the world and 
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transmitted to posterity as the Brother, friend, and companion of such noble advocates 
for, and defenders of the natural Right of mankind.”453 
 Admittance into the Society became so highly valued among high-ranking 
officers that many officers even viewed it as necessary for advancement.  Bouchet 
pleaded with Washington for membership in the Society, not just as a reward for his good 
service as a volunteer in the American army, but because his career seemed to depend on 
it.  Shortly after his return to France, he again sailed to America strictly to present his 
case in person before George Washington.  Unlike others, he did not list his multiple 
services to the American army, but emphasized that “returning home disappointed in my 
expectation would ruin both my character and all prospect I may have of preferment in 
the army.”454  His predicament shows just how important fighting with the American 
citizen army had become to French officers; fighting with the Americans was not just a 
fashionable experience, but a legitimizing one as well.   
 Requests for admittance into the society continued throughout the 1780s, which 
kept the American Revolution in the forefront of most noble officers’ minds, even if it 
became a potentially threatening institution.  The Society quickly became controversial in 
America, because it had a hereditary clause that allowed membership to be inherited by 
the eldest son of a member.  This aspect of the Society also received criticism in France, 
most notably by Mirabeau, who, influenced by Benjamin Franklin, wrote Considerations 
of the Society on the Cincinnati.  Despite his eloquent words, however, the Society 
remained extremely popular in France until the early years of the French Revolution, 
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when it was temporarily abolished.  William Doyle has recently contended that the 
Society of the Cincinnati and the controversy surrounding it provided the “first overt and 
direct attack on the principle of Nobility in Europe itself.”455  Indeed, the Society of the 
Cincinnati provided an opportunity for French officers to contemplate the contradiction 
of being involved with a Republican citizen army, while trying to maintain the privileges 
of officers in an aristocratic army.  French officers’ eager embrace of the society also 
suggests, however, that perhaps they did not see any contradiction between maintaining 
their noble privilege and being involved in a citizen army. 
 Finally, the American Revolution held military significance for the French army 
by providing a laboratory in which writers interested in with military matters could 
observe the citizen army in action.  Outside of the sentimental and self-congratulatory 
literature that came from French involvement in the American Revolution, some authors 
knowledgeable of contemporary military debates observed the difference between the 
way the American and European forces operated.  Chevalier Deslandes, who composed a 
didactic piece on the importance of the American Revolution, observed that the American 
fighting forces were mostly effective because they depended on citizens’ internal 
patriotic motivation.  It was “patriotism, and not demeaning discipline,” which fills 
Americans “with heroic courage that distinguishes them from the old bands of Europe.”  
In America, “they elect the generals,” who then “show themselves worthy of the choice 
of their country.”  Under their orders, “brave men will feel double their force, will 
perform miracles, and will associate their glory with that of the immortal militias that, in 
all the ages and in all the countries consecrate their valor to the august cause of 
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liberty.”456  Hilliard D’Auberteuil also considered the effectiveness of a citizen army in 
his book of collected essays on the history and politics of North America.  After relating 
the American victory at Germantown, he observed that “When one drives hirelings 
[stipendaires] to war . . . they must be maintained by discipline and tactical 
combinations.”  In contrast, “among the republicans armed for the defense of their 
country, animated by the vengeance and the movements of a just indignation, [a soldier] 
will always stay at his highest strength and personal bravery, and these qualities assure 
them victory.” 457 
 Both of these observers noticed that internal patriotism proved more effective in 
battle than mere discipline.  Many French military reformers and non-military authors 
had made the same observations from studying ancient Greeks and Romans in the 
aftermath of the Seven Years’ War.  D’Auberteuil and Deslandes, however, also noticed 
that this kind of patriotism could be found in a republic or connected with fighting for 
liberty, but that these aspects were not so easily managed in France.  Even if King Louis 
XVI could be considered a “governing citizen,” a citizen army still implied existing under 
a republic, free from the aristocratic hierarchy inherent in the French army officer corps.  
This may be why the American citizen army underwent some scrutiny in published books 
by men who were not actively participating in the army’s attempts at reform.  While 
French officers must have been aware of the American army’s apparent success as a 
citizen army, and while French officers who had served in America perpetuated the 
positive image, very few reform mémoires mention the American Revolution or the 
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American army.  There are several reasons why officers searching for solutions to their 
military problems, and already attracted by the prospects of a citizen army, would not 
have thought to mention the American example.  For one, French reformers were in 
search of new systematic ways to organize the army and train and recruit their men.  The 
American army and militias, having been newly established and constantly improvising 
under new conditions, had little of an existing system to study.  More importantly 
however, it was one thing to admire the American citizen army, and even ally with it, but 
entirely another to suggest that the French army try to model itself after it.  Doing so 
would upend the entire structure of the French officer corps, and, even more seriously, 
imply that France should become a republic.  While fully supporting the American 
Revolution and lauding the American military system, admirers of the citizen army had 
always placed Louis XVI as a liberating monarch, not as a problematic prince.  With 
texts likes D’Auberteuil’s and Delandes, French observers could admire and study the 
American army without ever suggesting anything antimonarchical for France.  
 Reformers’ ideas of turning French soldiers into citizens could use incidents from 
the American war to inspire patriotic sentiment in their own troops.  In a collection of 
vignettes meant to provide moral and patriotic instruction to both soldiers and officers, 
Laurent Bérenger included a tale of bravery from the American Revolution.  The story 
had first appeared in the Gazette de France, but Bérenger gave it a Spartan twist, likening 
the event to the Battle of Thermopylae.458   His account is as follows: 
During the war of the English against the United States of America, 28 
soldiers were stopped on a bridge, [by] a considerable corps under the 
orders of General Knifausen.  Their courage calls to mind the day of 
Thermopylae.  Twenty one of these new Spartans were spread across the 
bridge, the three brave ones who survived them were fighting entrenched 
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behind the bodies of their compatriots, resolved to die like them.  A 
reinforcement arrived, they let out cries of joy, the redoubled their effort; 
the American troops arrived, repulsed the English, animated by these three 
heroes, and remained invincible in this important post.  Such actions of 
these twenty-four brave men should never perish in the memory of man.459   
 
This story combines the principal beliefs about the American army and militia—as a 
patriotic citizen army, reminiscent of Ancient Sparta, that demonstrated immense courage 
and heroic fighting—and presents it in a didactic form for the benefit of French officers 
and soldiers.  Perhaps the French army could not replicate the American army’s 
“system”, but it could emulate the values that the American soldiers seemed to embody 
and execute on the battlefield. 
 In 1779, the comte de Guibert, who had authored the famous Essai Générale de 
Tactique that called France to develop a citizen army, tried to quell French enthusiasm 
about the new form of warfare by printing retractions of his earlier work.  His Essai had 
been so popular, however, that readers did not embrace his more recent, and more 
reasoned argument for why the American Revolution did not fulfill his idealistic vision of 
citizen warfare.   During the early years of the American Revolution, when many French 
officers seemed keen on joining, Guibert warned them that the entire American 
population was not hungering for independence.  Rather, he perceived that “some of 
Montesquieu’s ideas were fermenting in the heads of some principal citizens” who had a 
voice in Congress and desired independence.  He also rightly perceived that that the 
American colonies were so diverse that they would not easily unify, and few people had 
any understanding of war or any of the equipment or structures necessary to execute it 
successfully.  Guibert predicted that France would not have the funds to fully help the 
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American cause, and that the American colonies would inevitably gain independence on 
their own eventually, but he conceded that there “was no better time” to “humiliate and 
fight England.”460   
 Ironically, Guibert ultimately proved that the appeal of the American citizen army 
and new Republic was too strong for France to resist providing it with monetary and 
military aid.   In 1779, Guibert published a new essay called “Defense of the System of 
Modern War,” that repudiated his earlier ideas on citizen warfare in his highly popular 
Essai.  Whereas in the Essai Guibert had lauded the citizen army as the ideal military 
form and hoped that it might become a reality in France, in the “Defense” he stated that 
Prussian warfare was, in fact, the best type of warfare for Europe.  Guibert was aware 
that his current treatise seemed to contradict the success of the American citizen army 
against the British.  Early victories “flattered” philosophes’ beliefs that “love of liberty” 
would give rise to a new nation skilled in the art of war.  Guibert argued however, that 
these early American victories “only come from English faults” and mismanagement.  He 
acknowledged that “love of liberty” could “make heroes among some individuals,” but 
organizing a large group of men to fight required discipline.461  While Guibert presented 
by far the more accurate view of the nature of the American Revolution, few, if any, 
supported his ideas or followed him with the same gusto as they had greeted his Essai 
Général.  By the time Guibert published his new book, just seven years after the Essai, 
French readers were already immersed in the promises of the American army and militia.  
His first Essai had lighted too great a flame to be extinguished by a clarification and 
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clear-headed analysis of the American Revolution.  Once his Essai came to life across the 
Atlantic, nothing could induce its readers to see the American citizen army as anything 
other than the fulfillment of Guibert’s prophecy. 
 
Conclusion: 
 The American Revolution could not have occurred at a more opportune time for 
France.  When it commenced in 1775, French reformer-minded thinkers inside and 
outside the military were looking for a way to improve the army’s performance and 
restore virtue to French society.  Most writers in military and non-military circles argued 
that the future of the French army and society required the cultivation of a strong sense of 
patriotism among both citizens and soldiers.  Published works on philosophy and society 
pointed to the example of the ancients, where citizens served their country as soldiers, 
and soldiers likewise received respect from citizens for their heroic deeds performed in 
the name of their patrie.  Reformers inside the military tried to address the moral needs of 
soldiers by treating them as French citizens: increasing their pay, providing them with 
meaningful civilian work after their service was completed, and encouraging non-military 
citizens to accept them in society.   
 As French writers and readers considered these reforms and wistfully 
contemplated the victorious and virtuous armies of ancient Greece and Rome, a 
contemporary example of this kind of patriotic citizen army appeared across the Atlantic.  
As reported through the gazettes, the American army and militia, as well as the whole 
American citizenry, seemed to behave in a manner reminiscent of the ancients, fulfilling 
the dreams that overly optimistic writers had imagined for France.  This American 
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fighting force even executed remarkable victories against the typically European British 
army, giving the impression that a citizen army could be effective in a European war.  
French readers of the gazettes were so impassioned by these reports that they eagerly 
reproduced heroic episodes and American symbols in literature, art, and fashion.  When 
France committed funds and troops to help the struggling American colonists, writers 
grabbed at the chance to turn the French army from a European army of conquest, into a 
brave defender of human rights and free citizens.  Even Louis XVI appeared in these 
representations as a monarch of liberty and preserver of human rights, making the 
monarchy seem perfectly compatible with a citizen army.   
 The American Revolution, in effect, confirmed the pre-existing French ideas 
about citizen warfare, and because the American army and militia was a contemporary 
military phenomenon, it made citizen warfare seem like a concrete possibility for the first 
time since the days of Ancient Rome.  Non-military French readers, and even those who 
were illiterate but caught glimpses of the American War through art and images, also saw 
an example of a citizenry that at the same time could be military.  In France, where 
citizens and soldiers had been diametrically opposed groups for centuries, this was a 
novel idea.  French citizens could respect, include, and even wish to emulate French 
soldiers.  More importantly, the American Revolutionary images repeatedly presented 
soldiers and citizens working together out of love for their patrie.  French soldiers and 
citizens entered the period of army reform after the Seven Years’ War with loathing for 
each other, but entered the late 1780s with much more common sympathies.  These 
American Revolutionary representations must have, in subtle but powerful ways, changed 
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the way citizens viewed soldiers and the way citizens viewed their own role in times of 
war.   
 The French army did not import revolution directly from American to French 
shores.  Few veterans, after all, had overt Republican political sympathies.  The French 
army did play a central role, however, in getting French citizens and soldiers to think of 
themselves in revolutionary ways.  Because of the French army’s crisis and intense time 
of reform after the Seven Years’ War, members of the army and the wider society 
became open to possibilities of how the army and non-military society could relate to 
each other.  The recasting of the French army in literature, histories, philosophies and 
images about the American Revolution also presented the army as a citizen-friendly 
institution, coming to the aid of a frightened and struggling citizenry, and the citizenry as 
the essential support behind the army’s victories.  This presentation of the citizen-soldier 
relationship as something symbiotic, even brotherly, would make it possible by the end of 
the 1780s for French citizens and soldiers to join forces in taking down the Bastille and 
carrying out a Revolution of their own.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
The Arsenal of Revolution: The Council of War and the Emergence of the Citizen 
Warrior in France 
  
 This dissertation has traced the creation of the citizen army in France though a 
largely cultural lens that focused on the transformation of the French soldier from “the 
most vile and miserable” of subjects to a respectable—and respected—citizen. 462  The 
aristocratic army of Louis XIV contained elements that eventually doomed it to failure in 
the Seven Years’ War.  A close examination of the French army fighting in Canada 
showed that French officers alienated important allies and disregarded potentially 
successful tactics because they prioritized their personal gains from the war.  Beginning 
after the Seven Years’ War, the French officer corps focused on how to improve the 
army, especially the rank and file soldier.  Inspired by ancient Greek and Roman armies, 
French reformers believed that soldiers would perform more effectively on the battlefield 
if they felt patriotism.  A sincere love for their country would motivate them to train 
harder, obey their officers, fight bravely, and abandon the “odious” practice of desertion.  
French officers worked to improve the lives of their soldiers, by providing better food, 
pay, clothing, and training, as well as discussing how to better prepare older soldiers to 
re-enter civilian life and even inspire fellow-citizens to fight for the patrie.  At the same 
time, the American Revolution presented France with a working example of a 
contemporary and victorious citizen army, and French writers seized the opportunity to
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read their hopes for the French army into the victories of the American forces.  Writers 
capitalizing on the war’s popularity portrayed the French army as one that defended free 
citizens from oppressive tyrants, and recast the French army as a friend to all citizens.  By 
1781, the French army had become, in literature and image, if not in fact, a citizen army. 
 In practice, however, the French army did not align with the idealized image that 
saturated public venues, largely because the officer corps itself lagged behind in this 
period of reform.  Like the rank and file, the French officer corps required a great deal of 
reorganization in order to become a more efficient and effective fighting force.  While 
some officers eager for reform tried to rearrange the workings of the officer corps, a long-
standing commitment to noble privilege in the army prevented any permanent reforms 
from taking shape.  Military reformers had tried to reorganize and reconstitute the officer 
corps since before the Seven Years’ War, but had achieved limited results.   The French 
army suffered from inexperienced officers who lacked the necessary education and 
experience to command their troops, and skewed systems of promotion rewarded court 
favorites with high military rank who knew little of warfare but coveted the 
accompanying social status.  The resulting officer corps was bloated with wealthy or 
favored nobles competing for even higher status but often inept in matters of war, while 
nobles who did not have the privilege or means to reside at court either resigned their 
military duties or stagnated in lower ranks, never to be promoted.  The reforms in the 
second half of the eighteenth century tried various measures to give all members of the 
nobility equal opportunities for promotion, emphasize talent and merit, make the officer 
corps more professional, and free it from the corrupting influence of wealth, while at the 
same time maintaining the privileges of the noble class.  Such reforms proved nearly 
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impossible for the ministers of war, however, as competing pressures for a meritorious 
officer corps based on egalitarian principles at times conflicted with the genealogical 
privileges that court nobles expected to maintain.  Reformers and ministers constantly 
vacillated for 30 years, at times instating tough privilege-curbing regulations, and then 
quickly conceding to the court nobility’s expectation for military honors and preferential 
treatment.  This chapter will examine the long-standing contradictions working against 
the emergence of the French citizen army, and how building tensions throughout France 
finally ruptured the aristocratic army of the old regime, making way for the citizen army, 
born from the initiative of French citizens and soldiers. 
 
I.  The Need to Professionalize 
 The officer corps had been trying to reform its systems and practices for decades, 
since before the Seven Years’ War, but their attempts had not been as united or as 
successful as their efforts to reform the status of their soldiers.  The loss of the Seven 
Years’ War had forced the army to confront problems with their systems of promotion 
and awarding rank, the inherent inequality between court and provincial nobles, financial 
abuses, and how officers did (or did not) fulfill the duties of their positions.  Their 
attempts at reform climaxed with the Ségur resolution of 1781, which effectively 
restricted the officer corps to those nobles whose families had been in the nobility for at 
least four generations.  This measure amended few, if any, of the “abuses” in the army, 
and instead locked in some of the privileges that reformers had been attempting to 
eliminate for years. The lack of improvement after the passing of this resolution 
confirmed in some minds that the decadence and expectations of court nobility had 
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contributed to the French army’s failings, and heightened the division between reformers 
seeking a more egalitarian, professional and efficient officer corps, and those who 
believed that noble privilege could not be sacrificed. 
 Efforts to render the nobility more egalitarian and refocus promotion and career 
status on personal merit, rather than wealth or court connections, began in 1751, when 
Louis XV instituted the Ecole Militaire.  This institution, located in Paris, would oversee 
the education of up to 500 young nobles whose families did not have the financial ability 
to send them to the colleges or academies where most young men intended for the army 
received their education.  Admission to the Ecole Militaire required applicants to submit 
original documents proving that their family was from noble lineage and had provided 
the king with officers in the past.  Preference was then given to young men whose fathers 
had died while in the service of the king.  While in school, students studied subjects that 
would be relevant in their careers as officers: mathematics, technical drawing, history, 
and contemporary foreign languages.  Upon completing their studies, the French 
government found them a position working under a colonel and continued to provide 
financial assistance until the new officer had obtained the rank of captain.  Additional 
financial aid was available if officers who had studied at the Ecole Militaire needed extra 
equipment for particular expeditions (such as the invasion of Corsica) or if they needed 
additional schooling for their positions.  This specialized training for poorer members of 
the nobility demonstrated the ministry of war’s commitment to maintaining the direct 
relationship between the army and nobility and to restoring a sense of “equality” among 
nobles who would compete with their merit—not their pocketbooks—for positions in the 
army.  The ministry of war took an additional step to provide equality by opening twelve 
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new branches of the Ecole Militaire in 1776 in order to increase the number of 
scholarship students they could teach.  In these schools, paying nobles, and even 
bourgeois, could also attend and study alongside the members of the poorer nobility, but 
only the scholarship students were guaranteed commissions.463    
 The ministers of war whose tenures followed the creation of the Ecole Militaire 
campaigned to further ‘level the playing field’ between wealthy nobles and their poorer 
counterparts by reducing the necessary expenses of low-ranking officers.  Minister of 
War Belle Isle, who served in that position from 1758 to 1761 increased the pay of 
subaltern officers and prevented colonels from selling commissions in their regiments.464  
The Duke de Choiseul, who followed him in 1761, continued to reduce the financial 
burden on young officers by having the state assume many of the administrative tasks 
that usually fell to captains.  Such a measure again reduced the expense that young 
officers had to bear, but put a larger financial strain on the army.465  To curb some of the 
excesses in the army, Choiseul stringently regulated the number of officers on active 
service, so that no more would be serving during peacetime than absolutely required for 
training and supervising troops.  This reduction in the officer corps, however, resulted in 
many officers being cut off in the midst of their careers, with no further hope of 
advancement, and they attacked Choiseul vigorously for denying them their vocation.  
Choiseul had also made “diehard” enemies at court, and his influence waned.  He left the 
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position in 1770 to a minister who would not take up his unfinished work or continue to 
cut wasteful spending and positions, Louis François, marquis de Monteynard.466 
 Monteynard was not indifferent to the cause of equality within the officer corps, 
but he was less-capable than Choiseul or Belle-Isle to resist the “complaints that assailed 
him” at court.467  Monteynard had inherited a fiercely discontented high-nobility from 
Choiseul, putting his tenure as minister of war at a disadvantage from the start.  Wanting 
to satisfy and appease the discontented officers, Monteynard often acted against his own 
designs for the officer corps, and “overthrew all the ordinances of his predecessor.”468  
King Louis XV confounded matters by passing out brevets to the favorites of his 
mistress, Mme Du Barry, then placing the responsibility for them with the ministry of 
war.  Mme Du Barry also selected Monteynard’s successor, the Duc D’Aiguillon, who 
followed her line of thinking and once more caved to court pressure to provide more 
senior-ranks for those seeking the social status that came with military service.  Even 
though D’Aiguillon attempted to cater to the court by creating more positions for 
colonels, he lost much of his popularity when there was not enough money left in the 
treasury to pay retiring officers their pensions.469  By 1775, nearly all measures taken by 
Belle-Isle and Choiseul to purge the French army of wealth’s corrupting influence had 
been overturned.  There had been a great willingness among officers interested in reform 
to effect change, but at every turn they met stiff resistance from those who saw their 
status and privilege jeopardized with these new measures.    
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 Attempts to reform the officer corps were renewed with the Maréchal de Muy, 
D’Aiguillon’s successor, who worked to remove wealth as a factor in promotion by 
rewarding seniority.  In each battalion, the oldest captain would be promoted to major, 
and replace the superior officers in command when they were absent.  Six years of 
serving as major and garnering experience in higher commands would earn the individual 
the rank of lieutenant colonel.470   In order to prevent eager young officers from buying 
rank or from advancing too rapidly as a court favorite, de Muy enforced a seven year-
minimum service requirement before officers could be promoted to colonel, and a five-
year requirement to be captain.  Future colonels also had to have had experience 
commanding a regiment of two battalions for at least three years, and no one could 
achieve the rank of captain until he was at least twenty-three years old.  These strict 
regulations counteracted the “abuse” of commissioning too many colonels during 
D’Aiguillon’s tenure, and ensured that the men holding higher ranks would have the 
experience necessary to execute them well.471  De Muy’s reforms did not receive much 
support from the court or king, however, as they curbed privilege and the king’s 
discretion to assign rank at will.  De Muy died in 1775 after years of poor health, having 
seen few of his reforms permanently established.472  
 St. Germain exploded on the scene as the next minister of war, determined to 
slash the army’s budget and eliminate any branches that did not fill absolutely necessary 
functions, but his enthusiasm for reform met equally strong ire and resistance among 
privileged officers.  St. Germain showed little concern for how these cuts would affect, or 
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displease, members of the court nobility, as it was their branches of service that hit the 
bore the brunt of his assault.  St. Germain attacked the maison militaire, the branch of the 
army responsible for the king’s safety, which had become largely ceremonial and a 
perferred place for court nobles to serve, as it required little training and came with a 
great deal of status.  In St. Germain’s eyes, the maison militiare introduced and sustained 
a steady influx of corrupting luxury into the army.  He succeeded in cutting only 750 men 
from the organization (instead of the 2,700 he had initially intended), but managed to clip 
some of the noble officers’ court privileges.473  He also completely eliminated the 
Grenadiers and the Musketeers.474  St. Germain conducted a thorough examination of 
“favors” granted from the treasury to officers and court favorites that assigned them to 
honorable offices complete with a high income.  He eliminated most of these positions.475  
He also assailed the venality of ranks, “which had for a long time contributed to the 
destruction of emulation among officers.”476  These reforms, intended to reduce spending 
and the influence of wealth, had only a small immediate effect on the state of French 
finances, but caused a great deal of animosity among court nobles.  Officers whose 
positions had been eliminated or who had been forced to retire early demanded 
compensation for the full amount of time they had intended to serve, and in order to pay 
them, St. Germain had to allow some venality to remain.  He did manage to reduce the 
amount that ranks had been sold for by a fourth of their worth, but St. Germain was not 
satisfied with such a small decrease.  Some officers complained bitterly that the end of 
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venality had hurt the esprit of the officer corps, that there were not enough officers to 
fulfill their duties, and that the work of the subalterns had become more burdensome to 
make up for the missing men.  St. Germain received even more condemnation for his new 
rules governing the promotion process for young officers.  Rather than entering the army 
at whatever rank a young man could purchase, St. Germain ruled that every officer must 
serve for one year as a non-commissioned officer, and execute those duties without 
access to wealth or the comforts reserved for officers in order to learn the work of the 
army and how to care for his men.  Young gentilhommes would then progress through the 
ranks by seniority, and no exceptions would be provided for “exceptional youth” with 
friends at court.  Incensed nobles argued that a full year of service did not allow them to 
manage affairs or property, and was therefore an unjust requirement.477 
 St. Germain, who viewed himself as a friend to soldiers, eliminated the death 
penalty for deserters.  Counterbalancing this measure, however, was his infamous 
institution of the blows with the flat of a saber, or a baton, as a means of discipline.  
Soldiers had previously been given prison sentences for disobedience, and while the 
blows were intended to instill a sharper sense of discipline, they backfired as being “not 
in keeping with national character” and dishonorable for soldiers and officers alike.  
Complaints against St. Germain clouded his successes in giving the French army a 
stronger and more uniform composition.  His reforms did improve the institution of the 
army, but those achievements were drowned out in the huées against his reduction of 
offices and beating of soldiers.478  St. Germain’s tenure was a tragic one, because while 
he managed to accomplish a great deal that would help the army as a whole, court nobles 
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were prepared to up-end everything that had offended their sense of privilege and what 
they merited by their families’ positions at court.  By 1777, St. Germain stepped down 
from his post, exhausted and suffering poor health. 
 The Prince de Montbarey followed on St. Germain’s heels as the minister of war.  
He, too, tried to institute precise rules that would regulate the advancement of officers, 
but he made limited progress, as his primary duties focused on preparing the French army 
to enter the American Revolution.   De Montbarey made some changes in the 
organization of the army, but nothing to challenge noble privilege.  Since Saint 
Germain’s fall from power, the “years passed without being marked for the army by any 
useful innovation.”479  
 The period of the French army and reforms in the officer corps from 1750 to 1781 
was one of attempted reform constantly thwarted.  The officer corps desired reforms that 
would render it more efficient, more effective, while at the same time honoring noble 
privilege.  While on paper, these basic designs did not seem necessarily contradictory, it 
was nearly impossible to professionalize the officer corps and emphasize equality among 
nobles competing for rank without impinging on the privileges of wealthy court nobles.  
The search for equality became even more intense during the years of the American 
Revolution, with the combination of poor and paying students at the Ecole militaire in 
1776, and St. Germain’s bold reform that placed all new officers at the same level of 
gentilhomme.  With powerful court nobles protesting such measures as an affront to their 
status bestowed on them by right of birth, such potentially beneficial reforms were short-
lived.  The ministers of war were not able to reconcile the desire for a more efficient 
army, while preserving genealogical privilege that had nothing to do with the tasks 
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officers had to perform.  By 1781, the officer corps was trapped in a bad cycle of well-
meaning but short-lived reforms. 
 Officers who later reflected on this period before 1781 expressed their 
dissatisfaction at the lack of permanent reform, recognizing that there had been too many 
ministers of war who wanted to please the higher court nobility rather than strictly 
enforce more efficient regulations.  Chevalier de Keralio characterized this period as one 
of constant change, in which ministers of war responsible for instituting reform were 
either too concerned with their popularity among the officers or did not know how to 
make necessary reforms last.  M. le duc d’Aiguillon “only busied himself during his 
ministry by pleasing the army; he gave out prodigious commissions of colonel, pensions, 
Croix de St. Louis, without choice or discernment.”  The comte de St. Germain seemed 
promising at first, as he brought “his great experience,” and “profound understanding,” 
which inspired the “greatest confidence” in those longing for reform, but their hopes were 
dashed by “the military men of the court.”  M. Keralio blamed them for wanting “neither 
order nor discipline,” and overturning St. Germain’s promising reforms and the end of his 
ministry.  St. Germain’s successor, Me. le Prince de Montbarey, again retarded the 
reform effort, because he “wanted to please everyone [and] made prodigious promises 
that he could not keep.”  He only succeeded in “discontenting the nation and the army.” 
480
  Chevalier de Keralio understood that the ministers of war who served from the end of 
the Seven Years’ War to 1781 were either too weak to institute meaningful reform, or too 
overwhelmed by members of the court nobility to make lasting reform. 
 The constant changing of the minister of war and their inconsistent, short-lived 
reforms made this period one of general confusion for the army, where officers struggled 
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to keep up with the constant changes made within the “constitution”—a series of rules 
and regulations that governed the workings of the French army.  The comte de St. 
Germain had been most appreciated as having “tried to give to France a constitution,” but 
before any of his reforms had a chance to take root, he had “succumbed to the difficulties 
[of the court nobility] and left his work imperfect.” 481  Another officer characterized this 
time from the Seven Years’ War to the early 1780s as twenty years in which many 
ministers made ordinances, but “according to different principles,” that produced nothing 
but confusion for the French army. 482  French civilians had been disenchanted with this 
period as well, and one author considered the ordinances of the ministers of war as 
“ridiculous, always in contradiction with their predecessors, and often with themselves.”  
The ministers have “without ceasing created, reformed, cancelled, re-created, and all 
discombobulated to the point that the military men seem to be toys between the hands of 
capricious and fanciful children who only please themselves with changing and 
destroying.”483  The years of fluctuation between ministers favoring rigorous reforms, 
and those who abandoned those measures to favor the court nobility only increased 
officers’ urgency for a lasting reform that would make a measurable difference in the 
operation of the officer corps and extend beyond one minister’s term.  As the tone of 
these complaints about the reform period revealed, officers and interested civilians alike 
had reached their threshold for well-meaning but fruitless reforms.  They were ready for 
something permanent and effective. 
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 The one reform that, at least initially, promised permanent and meaningful results 
came from the ministry of the Comte de Ségur, who had every intention of amending the 
officer corps.  The Ségur Resolution of 1781 aimed to provide a certain degree of 
professionalism while protecting the privileges of court nobles by effectively closing the 
officer ranks of the army to any individual whose family had not been among the nobility 
for at least four generations.  It prevented wealthy new nobles from entering the officer 
corps, thus retaining all those positions for the nobles of older, more prestigious families.  
For decades, historians believed this new measure evinced a “noble reaction” against 
encroaching roturiers threatening to dominate the officer corps.  David Bien’s 1974 
article countered this view by showing that the officer corps contained few non-nobles.  
Rather, Bien argued that Ségur issued this resolution to block entry to incompetent 
recently ennobled men who did not have a family tradition of serving the king.484  By 
Bien’s reckoning, many in the army perceived this resolution as a professionalizing 
measure that prevented wealthy new nobles from buying ranks that they were not 
otherwise qualified to hold.  It also helped older and less wealthy military families in the 
provinces to compete for available positions and promotions.  The Ségur Resolution 
made exceptions to the four-generation rule for the sons of the few non-noble officers 
who had earned the coveted Croix de St. Louis, a decoration that indicated long-term 
service as an officer in the king’s army, highlighting one of the potential ways that this 
resolution could have worked to  professionalize the army.485   
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 Even if the Ségur Resolution did work to professionalize the French officer corps 
it also solidified the relationship between the officer corps and the nobility by tightening 
restrictions on who could be eligible to serve as an officer.  While the vast majority of the 
French officer corps had always consisted of members of the nobility, it had never been 
necessary to make an official resolution declaring the service of non-nobles illegal.  This 
was also the first time that a law was created to define who was truly “noble”, by 
officially differentiating between nobles of long standing and those who had just recently 
joined the estate.  On one hand, many officers likely applauded this professionalizing 
measure, because it rid the army of a corrupting influence and affirmed the merit inherent 
in officers whose families had long served in the army.  On the other hand, it also 
severely limited who could be in the officer corps and worked against the rising tide   
egalitarian expectations that were becoming popular in France, especially during and 
after the American Revolution.486 
 While perhaps seen as the most promising reform to date, the Ségur resolution did 
not resolve any of the problems that had plagued the French army and deferred effective 
reform even further.  Even with the absence of the wealthy nobles who had recently 
sprung from bourgeois families, French reformers continued to plead for the same, much-
needed reforms.  The number of generals, for example, still distressed French officers, 
who became more adamant in their mémoires to the minister of war calling for 
meaningful change.  French officers had complained in the 1760s and 1770s that too 
many officers viewed the rank of general as the only suitable goal for a military career 
and that the multiplicity of generals had made the army less efficient.  By the 1780s, 
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reformers referred to this problem as the “first and most striking of [military] abuses.”  
By this time, France boasted “1,261 Lieutenant generals, maréchaux de camp, or 
brigadiers,” which was more than “all the rest of Europe combined.”487  The comte de 
Guibert characterized this problem as a “universal pretension,” and an “embarrassment to 
employ the general officers during the peace.”  This number of generals “ruined the 
finances of the king,” because of their excesses and the large pensions due to them.  The 
general officer also “disgust[ed]” the inferior ranks, because he “commands maneuvers 
poorly, swears, yells, insulting the officer, striking the soldier, and by his ignorance and 
his rigor give everyone at every moment a revolting and ridiculous spectacle.” 488  In less 
than a decade, the problem with the number of generals had gone from one of 
inconvenience to one that severely hindered the ability of the army to function, drained 
French finances, bred discord in the army, and proved to be an international 
embarrassment of decadence and waste.  By failing to make any meaningful changes in 
the officer corps, the Ségur resolution established an undeniable link between poor army 
performance and the court nobility.  The stinging observations that followed made the 
need for reform all the more urgent, not only by reiterating unresolved problems, but by 
reflecting the same tired frustration at the lack of effective systemic change.   
 Recognition of the Ségur resolution’s failure coincided with the widespread 
excitement over images from the American Revolution that portrayed a successful citizen 
army defeating the British empire without the benefit of luxury goods or excess generals.  
Officers in America did not come from a pre-destined “race” of men who were the only 
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ones eligible to serve in the officer corps, but from concerned citizens who had enough 
education and talent to lead troops.  George Washington in particular had captured 
French imagination as the ultimate citizen-general, who did not come from noble birth, 
but who used his wealth, education, and patriotism to inspire his army and lead them 
through an ultimately victorious war.  The Gazette de France had referred to Washington 
as a “modern Fabius,” citing his war-of-attrition approach to fighting the highly 
organized, skilled, and disciplined British army.489  In poetry, the souls of Washington 
and Fabius melded into one.490  Other writers called him the “Atlas of America” and his 
figure appeared on women’s dresses as well as screens and other domestic artifacts.491  
Throughout nearly all the literature on the American Revolution produced during this 
time period, Washington stood as the central figure, embodying all the virtues of a 
patriotic citizen-soldier, while at the same time showing mercy and dignity, leading his 
entire nation to victory against an oppressive tyrant and his disciplined army.  It would be 
difficult to assess reactions to this omnipresent image among French officers and civilian 
readers, but whether fantastical or realistic, Washington’s image represented what an 
officer could be—when he was separated from favoritism and privilege. 
 Separating officers from these abuses had been attempted during the ministries of 
Choiseul and St. Germain, but reformers attacked the problem with renewed vigor after 
1781, this time by trying to alter systems of promotion in a way that would reward merit 
while honoring noble privilege.  A new system would have to limit the authority of 
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younger, high-ranking officers while rewarding the long-term service of older officers 
who occupied the lower ranks.  Guibert recognized that current promotion practices 
caused “languor and stagnation” among the officers, making the French army “mediocre 
and ruinous.” 492   But the officer corps’ tie to the French nobility would make “a good 
hierarchy of superior and inferior ranks” and a “reasoned and moderate promotion in the 
number of officers,” a difficult system to institute.  Chastellier du Mesnil argued that a 
“reasoned and moderate” system of promotion must be based on seniority.  He pointed 
out that younger officers who performed brave actions in battle would often receive 
promotion as a reward, bypassing “the older officers that served with zeal and distinction 
during peace and war,” and who would likely lose their opportunity to “arrive at their 
turn in the companies.”  Mesnil found such a practice “detrimental to the good of the 
service,” as older officers’ experience made them “more appropriate” for advanced 
ranks.493  While Mesnil’s mémoire made a specific case about the “officers of fortune”, 
and their “disruptive” role in the army, his complaint spoke to a larger trend of 
inconsistency within promotions.  The individual who received the higher rank was often 
not the older or more experienced officers, but “the young men as vain as they are 
ignorant, who torment . . . their subordinates.”494  In other words, Mesnil’s suggestions of 
promotion would work against the noble families that were highly favored by the king 
and abolish their privilege to enter the army with a high rank.   
 Mesnil was not alone in his observations; many officers recognized the court 
nobility’s destructive effect on the army, owing in part to their relative youth when they 
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assumed command.  One critic pointed out that “those who are 23 years old and are rich 
want to be colonels; and by the age of 30 all the world bores them,” leading to feelings of 
indifference towards his position and his army.  This practice also bred discord among 
the high nobles.  The “pretension to merit” signified by their high ranks caused “jealousy 
in the corps,” indifference for the current status of the army, and a sense of “distaste for 
all those who are not preferred.”  The critic found “this distaste . . . inevitable” as there 
were “more men with pretensions than there are places.” 495  By allowing young, wealthy 
nobles, even those with long family histories in the nobility and the military, to obtain 
high ranks so early in their careers, the French army invited indifference into the highest 
positions, and sowed rivalries and petty jealousies among commanders.   
 When these young colonels led soldiers into battle, their inexperience and thirst 
for heroics spelled doom for the subordinate officers and their troops.  Young men did 
not know how to lead, how to read the terrain or anticipate the movements of the enemy, 
and therefore would give incompetent orders.  This issue was all the more ironic, as the 
body of troops would undoubtedly possess older, more experienced officers, whose lower 
rank made them powerless to prevent the inevitable disaster.  The Baron d’Arros 
complained that the French army provided “a young man of seventeen or eighteen years 
with . . . four detachments of infantry, that have at the helm ancient captains full of 
experience, but it becomes useless to them.  The young hero, proud of an authority that 
will triumph over our enemies, taking hold of command, without consulting the area, 
without knowing the forces that he will combat, marches blindly against enemies, who 
are strengthened by the traps they have set for him.”  The older officers might try to point 
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out to their commander that “he exposes his troops, that they did not put enough prudence 
in his enterprise, too much vivacity in his expedition.”  Too proud to listen to his 
inferiors, however the young man will tell them to “‘obey . . . I know my business, [but] 
you do not know my mission.’”  Because the young nobles contain “a false love of glory, 
an imprudent courage, a dangerous recklessness,” he will destine his troops to “certain 
death.”  The “carnage of the brave men that he commands,” is enough of a crime in and 
of itself, but d’Arros further explains that a battle lost in such a slaughter “often changes 
the destiny of the army,” and the war, as a whole.496  Baron d’Arros may have spoken 
from experience, as he held the rank of captain when he penned this mémoire in 1784, but 
whether he had been a witness to such reckless youth and wasted lives or spoke out of 
general knowledge, it is clear that he had very little respect for the men whom he feared 
commanded the majority of the French army by the 1780s. 
 Reformers also accused the high nobility of being “ruined by luxury.”497   One 
described these “citizens of a distinguished rank,” as “useless to society,” who, instead of 
inspiring acts of bravery or selflessness by their example, encouraged “the emulation of 
vanity.”  These high nobles “live in opulence,” while doing little to serve the state, and 
therefore their lifestyle only “apes dignity,” and is but the “ghost of glory.”498  This critic 
accused the guilty members of the high nobility of play-acting as military leaders by 
having all the trappings of military ceremony, pomp, and honor, without having any of 
the skills, discipline, experience, or accomplishments necessary to merit these 
accoutrements.  Though officers of the court embraced the wealth and luxury 
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accompanying their rank, these elements also kept them from actually executing their 
duties, and made them an embarrassing spectacle before their subordinates.  As the 
chevalier Keralio remarked, “it is fair to say that the indiscipline is not in the subaltern 
officers, but in the men holding the highest ranks of the army, who will always be 
detestable . . . those that one so appropriately calls the high nobility.”499 
 The provincial nobles of the lower ranks, who inhabited the opposite end of the 
spectrum from the Court nobility, typically came from families that had long been 
steeped in French military service, but who lacked the wealth to maintain places at court 
or support the expenses involved in serving in the higher ranks.  These officers likely 
received their education at one of the Ecoles Militaires that Louis XV had begun and 
Louis XVI had maintained specifically for members of the poorer nobility, and served in 
the ranks of lieutenant, captain, and major in the king’s army.  These men would stay in 
one rank for a great deal of time, while wealthier or better-connected nobles snagged 
available promotions.  Despite these officers’ considerable experience, they rarely 
achieved a rank higher than lieutenant colonel.  This status frustrated the provincial 
nobles and reformers, who saw these men as the core of the French army.  The Baron 
d’Arros lamented this “crowd of brave officers without wealth, and without places” in the 
advanced ranks that suffered from “inertia” because of the lack of promotion 
opportunities or recognition.   These officers were the “men of real merit” in the French 
army, who had long waited to receive credit for their service, and to compete with the 
high nobility for rank and career opportunities.500 
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 The mémoires of the baron d’Arros and the other strong-minded critics of the 
army reflect the virulent concerns of reformers in the last decade before the French 
Revolution.  The Ségur resolution had not rid the army of young, incompetent, wealthy 
men who dominated the upper ranks, because these men came not only from new noble 
families but from the court.  The biting criticism in these complaints against court nobles 
reflects both reformers’ frustrations with the situation and their desire to stem the 
growing division between court and provincial nobles.  Many believed that a Council of 
War, called to redefine the French systems of promotion, finances, and the continuing 
problems within the officer corps, would be able to make definitive rulings and create a 
more permanent and effective “constitution.” 
 A Council of War was particularly suited to this task, because it would be able to 
do the work that a minister of war could not.  Before 1787, when the Council of War 
assembled to make definitive pronouncements regarding army matters, the minister of 
war had been in charge of realizing recommended reforms and constant turnover in the 
ministry meant constant changes to the rules and regulations of the army.  For the 
previous twenty-six years, by Guibert’s account, the army has been, “floating from idea 
to idea, never conceiving of a general plan.”501  A council would “give a consistence and 
a base to the administration of the department of war,” so that every member of the 
department would not feel “threatened by a sudden change.”502   
 Unlike a minister of war, the Council of War would be able to make difficult 
decisions without becoming too embroiled in politics.  “When a man is inept,” explained 
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one anonymous reformer, “it is necessary to fire him.  A minister does not dare . . . but 
the Council of War can decide his retirement,” which would relieve the army of an 
incompetent person, and prevent those who were not prepared for certain duties from 
ever receiving high ranks; the minister of war would become “an intermediary between 
King and the Council of War.” 503  If operating outside of the court, the Council of War 
would be better able to “maintain the execution of laws, prevent continual fluctuations of 
principles, put in order and economize expenses, and erect a blockade against pretensions 
and to demands for favors.” 504  By consisting of several people, a Council would render 
decisions more as a result of thoughtful debate than the whim of one person.  Especially 
in “a nation where the imagination marches always before judgment,” one reformer 
reasoned, it would be a great benefit to have a council “composed of the most serious and 
experienced of men, who have seen the most.” 505   
 Adding to the now-dire urgency for a Council of War was the simultaneous 
crumbling of old regime institutions.  Discussions of military reform took place against a 
backdrop of crisis in the crown’s finances, an Assembly of Notables that had been 
convened to discuss the possibility of new taxes, and the growing unrest among civilians 
in France.  In the same year that the Council of War came to order, five of the venal 
financiers for the state declared bankruptcy, dooming Finance-Minister Calonne’s fiscal 
program.  Amidst the financial crisis, the Assembly of Notables gathered to discuss the 
future of French politics, tax policy, and finance, and its members did not sympathize 
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with the nobles of the court, which promised drastic reform indeed.506  Their sentiments 
mirrored Chevalier de Keralio’s who likewise argued that “if the court continues to 
dominate the army, [we] must lose all hope.” 507  The great changes anticipated 
throughout the governing system made the Council of War a part of this critical moment, 
in which it could not fail to institute new measures, or a new constitution, for the army to 
follow.  As Guibert ascended to his position as the head of the Council in 1787, he was 
conscious of participating in a momentous occasion.   “Never,” he said, “have the 
circumstances added more to this moment of immediacy to form the Council of War and 
to charge it with the renewal” of the army.  Few officers were likely thinking of 
Revolution in 1787, but the Council of War would set the stage for it.  
 
II.  Great Expectations and Great Disappointment: The Council of War, 1787-1789 
 In 1787, the Council of War began its work of instituting reforms for the entire 
army, creating a new constitution, improving soldiers’ conditions, cutting department 
spending, and curbing the court nobility’s privileges.  Officers, soldiers, and civilians 
alike had great expectations that the Council’s reforms would resolve all of the “abuses” 
that had been mounting for thirty years.  As Guibert informed the king, if the Council of 
War does not reform the military, “the army will stay without organization, the 
constitution with all its vices, the soldier in misery, all the military state in languor and 
apathy, and the minister himself settles for retiring with distaste.”  As a “military man, 
[and] as a citizen,” Guibert swore to the king to “give to these corps a new constitution, a 
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better composition and the ways to fulfill the functions with diligence and with zeal.” 508  
By 1789, the Council of War had passed numerous resolutions on details as small as what 
soldiers were to wear, to larger questions on army organization.  But instead of fulfilling 
reformers’ expectations, the Council of War only solidified noble privilege and 
institutionalized the unofficial divisions within the officer corps, locking in many of the 
traditions that reformers had been combating for decades.   
 The Council of War reintroduced previous tensions regarding the soldiers’ 
condition in the army by simultaneously improving their living standard while increasing 
discipline in a way that reformers could not have helped to see as contradictory.  The 
Council augmented soldiers’ salary by six deniers (half a penny) a day, “looked to 
improve their food,” and provided access to gardens in several provinces to help soldiers 
sustain themselves.  The most senior soldiers of the Order of St. Louis received an 
additional pension.509  As a sign of soldiers’ elevated status, officers were no longer 
allowed to address them with the informal “tu,” but had to use the more respectful 
“vous.”  To help promising soldiers who had not received much education, the Council 
required each regiment to establish a school for potential non-commissioned officers to 
teach them reading, writing, and basic mathematics.510  These measures did continue the 
reforms that began after the Seven Years’ War and formalized the officers’ commitment 
to their soldier-citizens, but seemed contradicted by the reintroduction of the beatings 
with a cane or the flat of a saber as a means of discipline.  Guibert explained that this 
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regulation differed, because the blows could only be administered in a private 
“punishment room” by senior-ranking officers, which would have “corrected the 
principle inconveniences” of humiliation and dishonor to honor.  Guibert’s reasoning, 
and the Council’s others measures on behalf of the soldier, however, did not satisfy the 
expectations of officer and citizen. 511   
 In 1789, either in preparation for the meeting of the Estates General, or as an 
official complaint to the new National Assembly, officers and civilians prepared lists of 
complaints about the army in every province.  They expressed their disappointment and 
anger at the decisions of the Council of War concerning soldiers on the grounds that 
soldiers, being citizens, deserved a great deal more respect than being beaten for their 
service.  The Regiment de Fores acknowledged that “military discipline . . . is necessary 
to maintain order, [as] it prepares [the army] for victory.”  Discipline, however “must not 
be founded on slavery and fear,” which “destroys the general enthusiasm, this national 
honor that characterizes the French military man” and makes him loathe to “degrade the 
soldier in the eyes of his fellow citizens.” 512  According to the Regiment de Fores, by 
disciplining the soldier in this manner, or by treating him with any level of distain, the 
army was also harming and depriving the nations’ citizens: “The soldier constitutes the 
army like the people constitute the nation: their rights are confounded, because each 
soldier is a citizen, and each citizen can become a soldier.”  Because the line between 
citizen and soldier had crumbled, the nation’s greatest interest was in “freeing the soldier 
from the slavery in which he moaned, and to never abandon him to the arbitrary 
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ministers, that in their frequent changes destroy almost all the work of their 
predecessors.”513  The officers from the infantry regiment of Aunia heartily agreed.  They 
defined a soldier as a “French citizen [who] is born free,” who “sacrifices his individual 
liberty . . . for the liberty of all, for the security of their days, of their property, and for the 
glory of the state.”  The “patrie,” is therefore obligated to “reenter the soldier into his 
rights,” since he “elected to give up those rights in the first place to protect his fellow 
citizens.”514  When the Regiment of Auvergne sent their complaints to the National 
Assembly, they snidely swiped at the Council of War adding, “the august assembly will 
not be indifferent to the sort of patriot warriors, always ready to spill their blood for their 
country.”515  The work of the reformers in the 1760s and 1770s to “citizen-ize” the 
French soldier, supported by descriptions of American citizen armies evidently turned the 
soldier into a citizen in the minds of many officers.  They therefore responded adamantly 
when the Council of War made some changes to improve the soldier’s condition, but 
reinstated the hated blows.  From the perspective of these officers, the decree countered 
some of the progress they had made on behalf of the soldiers to that point.    
 Guibert and the Council proved more successful with its reduction of French army 
expenses, but those reforms elicited angry reactions from officers of the court.  Guibert 
and the Council resented maintaining a large army during times of peace, which did very 
little and cost a great deal to the state.  Much of this large, inactive army consisted of 
specialized corps, whose function was more ceremonial than war fighting, such as the 
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maison militaire (the king’s personal troops), that attracted wealthy sons of the high 
nobility and gave them prestigious rank in the army and society.  St. Germain had tried to 
reduce the maison militaire, but had been thwarted by concerns about “young men of 
quality, for whom a military career was their only option.”  Critics had complained that 
the army was forced to compromise a better military constitution “for the sake of these 
young lords, the particular advantage of some of the [great] families already replete with 
fortune and favors from the king.”516  Guibert and the Council agreed with the critics, and 
cut the maison militaire drastically, as well as many of the ranks and positions in the 
officer corps that served as holding places for wealthy nobles who desired high ranks, but 
for whom there was no current opening.  These positions awarded military rank without 
requiring any actual service, creating a terrible fiscal strain on the state.  Guibert put an 
end to “this monstrous inactive army, that increases the number of ranks in the army to 
excess, opens the door to an immense abuse.” 517  Since this practice was “a continual 
object of distaste” for other officers and led to the “extinction of emulation for the active 
army”, Guibert received some praise for ending the abusive practice. 518  These measures 
struck a heavy blow to the high nobility, however, and increased the tensions that already 
existed between the wealthier court nobility and the poorer provincial nobility. 
 Those preexisting tensions exploded when the Council instituted a system of two-
track advancement, an idea that ministers of war had considered before, but never dared 
to create.  In 1780, minister of war Maréchal de Ségur contemplated developing different 
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promotional tracks for the provincial and court nobles as a means of professionalizing the 
army, but feared it would create too much disorder and resentment within the officer 
corps.  Guibert and the Council did institute this reform in 1788, which would start court 
nobles and provincial nobles on different promotional tracks, keeping the lower-ranking 
officers in the more functional positions of the army, and allowing the court nobility to 
have the advanced ranks, but without as much direct military involvement.  Officers from 
the provincial nobility would enter the ranks as a cadet-gentilhomme or as a second 
lieutenant, and then advance through the lower ranks by seniority.  The highest rank that 
these nobles could achieve, and few would obtain it, would be lieutenant-colonel, but 
those who held the rank would command in place of the colonel whenever he was absent 
(and he would likely be absent frequently).  Since the majors oversaw the instruction and 
discipline of a regiment, and the colonel (or lieutenant colonel in his place) commanded 
the regiment, this type of advancement would in effect allow the provincial nobles to 
command the majority of the army’s functions and forces competently.   
 Officers of the court nobility had to follow a different process of promotion that 
involved much less service than the provincial officers, but more service than they had 
been accustomed to under the old system.  After entering the army with the 
recommendation of the king, these young men would serve in unpaid positions for five 
months a year and replace regular officers as needed.  In five years, these nobles would 
be eligible to be a full colonel in the king’s army.  The fast-track advancement and the 
prestige in being part of the “first nobility” or the “upper nobility” would attract the 
courtiers who preferred the military honors and high rank to actual service, and allow the 
Council to have more control over who advanced to what rank.  Isolating the court 
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nobility into a different group sequestered from the regular nobility would also prevent 
wealthy nobles from competing for rank with the provincial nobility, the “backbone” of 
the army.519       
 The Council of War instituted the two-track advancement with the aim of 
increasing the professionalism and the effectiveness of the French army while at the same 
time preserving the privileges of the wealthy court nobility.  While on paper, this system 
may have seemed reasonable to some, provincial nobles perceived it as formal 
declaration of the court nobility’s superiority.  Even if it had always been unlikely that a 
member of the provincial nobility would obtain the rank of general, it had remained a 
possibility.  Now, there was almost no legal opportunity for provincial officers to achieve 
such a high rank, regardless of their merit.  Incensed officers argued that the nobility’s 
members had always had equal value before the king, and that this “ridiculous 
ordinance,” divided “the ancient and respectable corps of the French nobility.”520  Nobles 
from the Baillage of Toul found this practice to be inherently unfair, and they asked that 
the “merit and the services [be] reunited in the military state,” by making all gentlemen 
“eligible for all ranks and dignities.” 521  Other provinces, like the Bailliage de Tourain, 
specifically demanded a return of the “the most perfect equality established” between all 
the officers of France. 522   
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 As Rafe Blaufarb has pointed out, this plea for equality to be returned to the 
French nobility was not a forward-looking call for the égalité of the French Revolution, 
but a plea to return to a time when the nobility was not corrupted by luxury, decadence, 
or favoritism; when each noble officer rose through the appropriate ranks because of his 
personal merit to increase the glory of the king.523  This ideal time may have never 
existed, but the provincial officers seemed to recognize a pattern of the court nobility 
pulling closer and closer into itself in the 1780s.  The ségur Resolution had restricted the 
officer corps to nobles who had at least four generations of noble blood in their veins, 
enclosing the officer corps around a smaller group of more elite nobles.  This measure 
helped the provincial nobility by eliminating wealthy competition for rank.  The next 
tightening of the officer corps, however, brought the upper nobility closer to the king, the 
court, the highest ranks, and the honors and privileges that went with them, while 
instituting a model that increased the provincial nobility’s distance from the center.  
Perhaps they also feared that they had become the new “fringe of the nobility” whose 
status and place in society could be reduced even further in favor of the court nobles. 
 Guibert answered these complaints on behalf of the Council of War, arguing that 
the reforms had intended to standardize military practices and eliminate abuses.  Before 
the Council, he reminded them, “nothing was more arbitrary,” than the systems of 
promotion in the army, and now the Council “is making things uniform.” 524  Guibert 
reiterated that the king had requested the Council to “establish a better order of things, 
like the destruction of these abuses and the re-establishment of an order that is more 
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intelligent and more economical in all the parts of the department of war.”  Reflecting on 
the volumes of mémoires addressed to the Council of War as they considered what to 
institute, Guibert argued that, “the cry of the public joins that of the intentions of the 
king.”  According to Guibert, “it was the opinions of the army itself that solicited all the 
changes” in order to “finally establish some stability in the ideas and some coherence in 
the principles” of the military constitution.525  Guibert’s responses to the critics of the 
Council of War were to no avail.  As the ultimate sign of how the two-track advancement 
had upset the nobility, Guibert faced disgrace when he offered his services to the 
province of Berry in March of 1789 to represent the second estate in the Estates General.  
Guibert could not even deliver his address before being shouted down with cries that he 
had “humiliated the nobility,” and he sought sanctuary in a neighboring cathedral.526   
 The Council of War’s decisions and the French army’s protest of them left the 
French army in a very precarious position in 1788 and 1789.  The army had not simply 
divided over the past decade into provincial nobles against court nobles, but had fallen 
into a state of confusion.  There was a consensus within the Estates General that “the 
council of war of 1788 so overturned the army that it has disgusted the officers and the 
soldiers; nobody knows their place anymore.”527  But it was not just the Council of War 
that had “discombobulated” the army, but the differing and competing ideas of what the 
French army was.  By the 1780s, the French army had had a long history of being a 
strictly aristocratic institution, but it had failed in the Seven Years’ War, and then had 
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been recast during the American Revolution as an army that was compatible, and shared 
similar values, with a citizen army.  Decades of reform had citizen-ized the soldiers in the 
minds of many officers, and as the events of 1789 would show, in the soldiers 
themselves.  Throughout the latter half of the eighteenth century, these changes were 
hobbled by an uncompromising commitment to the contradictory principles surrounding 
noble privilege.   
 These competing ideas of what the French army was, and therefore how it would 
operate made the army extremely ineffective during the riots in the provinces and in Paris 
in 1787, 1788, and 1789.  While members of the Council of War and their adversaries 
had been battling for a working constitution, the Estates General had been summoned, 
France’s finances had exploded, and peasants had begun to resist giving over their 
precious grain during a season of famine.  The French army had become embroiled in this 
move towards revolution—the state of the army was consistent with the state of the 
nation.  As the broken army tried to respond to the violence building around it, some 
officers tried to maintain a hold on their aristocratic duties, others exhibited their 
displeasure by refusing to follow orders and subdue the populace, and soldiers defected to 
the side of their fellow citizens.  By resurrecting beatings for soldiers and instituting the 
two-track advancement for officers, the Council of War added to the confusion regarding 
the direction of the French army, creating an environment where officers and soldiers 
became reticent to follow orders.   
  
III. Aristocratic Rupture and the Rise of the National Guard 
 259
 From 1787 through 1789, riots broke out across France over the scarcity of grain 
and the price of bread.  The season of 1789 marked the third successive crop failure, and 
especially from June through August, residents of the provinces feared starvation as they 
waited for the new crop to be harvested.528  The dwindling grain supply resulted in a 
great deal of violence between peasants, artisans, and town authorities over its 
distribution.  In the small town of Limoux, for example, a crowd of nearly a thousand 
people forced itself into the town hall and demanded that the authorities seal the granaries 
in the town to prevent it from being removed.  They increased their demands the next day 
by insisting that taxes be abolished and the grain distributed to the needy of the town.  
When the authorities refused, protestors stormed the municipal offices and dumped the 
account books into the local river.529  Even if authorities succeeded in removing the grain, 
it was susceptible to being forcibly seized by jobless and starving vagabonds as it 
traveled across the countryside.530  Adding to the urgency and intensity of these riots was 
the opportunity for peasants, artisans, and town dwellers to voice their complaints in the 
cahiers de doléances, a collection of complaints to be sent to the Estates General, and 
ruminate over the fiscal inequities in French society.  The scarcity of grain and the 
political climate, combined, made the various regions of France resist government 
interference. 
 In scenes reminiscent of the Flour Wars of 1775, the most recent clash between 
soldiers and peasants over grain, French troops arrived in several of the rioting regions to 
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disperse the angry populace, regulate the distribution of grain, and protect bakeries—but 
this time the army proved much less successful in quelling the violence.  In some 
instances, troops did successfully disperse rioters.  On April 20, 1789, in Avançon, for 
example, armed peasants inspired villagers from a nearby town to sack the château at 
Valserres, whose lord was absent.  Fortunately for the lord, a light cavalry unit scattered 
the peasants and town dwellers before they did any damage to the castle.531  In other 
areas, the army responded to rioters, but was attacked in turn, and was much less 
successful in controlling the violence.  Such was the case when the villagers from the 
areas surrounding Amiens attacked a convoy of 11 carts of wheat under an escort.  The 
officer “commanded them to disperse,” and when they did not, “he was obliged to repulse 
them by force, [but] they continued to assail him with rocks.”  He ordered his troops to 
fire on them, killing two and wounding five peasants.  Only then did the rioters allow the 
wheat to pass by.  The commanding officer left soldiers in the area over night to prevent 
further uprisings, but the peasants threw one soldier into the water, “burned the brains” of 
another, and let the third one go.532  Similar scenes occurred throughout France, and 
many towns requested the presence of soldiers to maintain the peace.  The Duc de 
Baurron complained that “the citizens of Falaize are without defense towards a populace 
whose seditious dispositions have manifested in a very worrying manner.”  Because “the 
help of the ordinary police are insufficient in our town, the maintenance of good order 
and public security demand the continual residence of a regiment.” 533  While during 
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previous riots, the Duc de Baurron’s request would have been reasonable, the riots of the 
1780s proved difficult to suppress, even when the soldiers carried out their duties against 
the populace, which they often did not. 
 One difficulty with restoring order in the provinces was the relative shortage of 
troops for the size of the problem.  The fact that these riots occurred throughout France 
over the same two-year period, instead of being localized in one general area as the Flour 
Wars had been, inhibited the French army’s ability to respond sufficiently.  One officer 
supposed that “if there is a chain of troops established on the frontier for preventing the 
exportation of grains,” then it might give the people of France confidence that the grain 
would stay in France and provide the necessary “liberty to transport [it] from province to 
province.”  There were not, of course, enough available troops to line the frontier.  Even 
if there were, “the people are so fired up,” he said, “that there would be the greatest 
danger to employ the troops here unless they arrive in great force.”534  The French army 
found itself in a position where there were too many places needing troops throughout the 
country to concentrate them in just one location, but at the same time, so many places had 
such violent riots that they could not be quelled but by a large concentration of troops. 
 Adding to the army’s problems in responding to this crisis were officers and 
soldiers who either chose to be insubordinate or sided with the rebelling populace.  The 
recent unpopular rulings of the Council of War gave provincial officers little incentive to 
follow orders.  Some officers followed a passive-aggressive approach, such as the 
officers of the Austraise-Infanterie who responded to the request for troops in Grenoble 
in 1788, but did so very slowly.  Other officers submitted their resignations when asked 
to lead troops in quelling the riots, such as officers from Brittany who refused to carry out 
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orders in Rennes.  In Toulouse, one officer submitted his resignation, reasoning that “it 
was not the business of the army to attack citizens.”535    
 Troops followed a similar suit, being insubordinate or having cause to join the 
rebelling populace.  In d’Aversus, for example, M. le Cte. Esterhazy met with difficulty 
when transporting grain, because the soldiers who had come to guard it sided with the 
rioters.  The soldiers had quieted the area to allow for the transport of grain, but when 
inhabitants complained that the price of bread was too high, the soldiers agreed, and 
refused to enforce the new price.  A similar event had already occurred at Douay, where 
“the soldiers of the troops of the king were themselves asking for a diminution for the 
price of bread, preventing” them from executing their orders. 536 Like the officers who 
were reluctant to obey orders, French troops could have been insubordinate in order to 
protest the recent declarations from the Council of War, but they were most likely 
reacting to their officers’ long-term attempts to “citizen-ize” them. 
 As discussed in Chapter 3, reformers of the French army had been working to turn 
the French soldiers into citizens for decades.  While reform on paper would not instantly 
translate to changes within the ranks, the increased appeal to patriotism and identification 
with a form of citizenship likely translated in ways that the French officers had not 
originally intended.  French officers responded to the loss of the Seven Years’ War by 
consulting Greek and Roman texts and contemplating ancient citizen armies, with the 
ultimate intention of rendering the French army more effective.  Turning French soldiers 
into patriotic citizens, who would naturally desire to fight for their patrie, agreed with 
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“French national character,” unlike the discipline of cold, mechanical, Prussian 
“automatons.”  Reformers’ attempts at citizen-izing the soldiers must have succeeded, 
because by 1789, soldiers were sympathizing with civilians, something they had never 
done before.  The increased sympathetic relationship between soldiers and the civilians 
they were supposed to subdue emerged as a likely unforeseen consequence of this 
“citizen-ization” process, which rendered the French army ineffective in terms of 
enforcing royal will in the countryside, or coercing the peasants and city-dwellers into 
paying taxes.  Despite a long history of mutual loathing, by 1788, soldiers had been 
slowly citizen-ized, and evidently saw civilians not as domestic enemies, but as fellow-
citizens, and sympathized with their plight. 
 The other event which had occurred since the Flour Wars of 1775 that would have 
made soldiers reluctant to fire on citizens was the re-imaging of the French army that 
occurred during and after the American Revolution.  Jacques Godechot views the 
American Revolution as a significant contributor to the soldiers’ new attitudes towards 
civilians.  Some of the soldiers “had fought in America side by side with the colonial 
insurgents from 1778-1783,” and were therefore “not immune to the appeal of new ideas, 
to the glamour of the great principles of liberty and equality.”537  Godechot is not alone in 
this perception.  In 1959, Forrest MacDonald conducted a study of the French soldiers 
who served in the American Revolution.  He compared where American Revolutionary 
veterans had served in France to the regions that saw the most violence during the French 
Revolution.  McDonald discovered a direct correlation between where returning 
American Revolutionary veterans served and those areas of greatest violence.  He 
interpreted the data as an indication that the French soldier had absorbed the ideas of 
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liberty and equality in America, and wanted to end economic feudalism in France.538  
This correlation could have several explanations, but it is not the only indication that the 
veterans of the American Revolution could have impacted how their fellow soldiers 
responded in the late 1780s to civilian riots. 
 As discussed in chapter four, however, the greatest impact of the American 
Revolution was not felt in France because of returning veterans, but because of the 
plethora of written or illustrated sources about the American Revolution that saturated 
popular culture in France.  French ideas about the importance of ancient virtues and 
citizenship had been reinforced by the images of America that flooded the French public 
sphere.  These images not only depicted the American citizens as competent fighters who 
had experienced the sufferings of military life, but showcased the French army as the 
ultimate champion of civilian rights.  By 1783, the image of the army was no longer that 
of an instrument that the king could use against the people, but one that the king used to 
defend his people.  The relationship between soldiers and civilians had therefore become, 
in some minds, far less adversarial and far more rooted in mutual duty and obligation. 
 This new understanding between civilians and soldiers seen in the French army 
was matched by a new understanding that civilians and citizens had of their relationship 
with the army and their rights to serve in that army.  Just as the members of the second 
estate voiced their expectations for the French army in their complaints against the 
Council of War, so members of the third estate presented their expectations for the army 
in the cahiers de doléances.  Like the soldiers, they, too, saw their role as French citizens 
changing, and many expressed eagerness to serve in the army as officers in order to 
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support the patrie and fulfill their duties as citizens.  While officers had envisioned 
making the army more professional by opening the officer corps to talented and 
experienced individuals of the second estate, the majority of citizens envisioned making 
the French army an actual citizen army, by opening the officer corps to anyone from any 
estate with the talent and desire to serve.  Like the soldiers who refused to fire on the 
citizens, these civilian citizens also campaigned for a citizen army. 
 Members of the third estate imagined an army with an officer corps open to all 
men of military merit, regardless of class or wealth.  One province recognized the “order 
of the nobility” as “very necessary in a monarchy,” but wanted to see it gradually relieved 
of its “pecuniary privileges” and “honorific prerogatives” to become more in line with the 
province’s “public rights.”  These changes included that the “third estate be no longer 
excluded in the future the rank of officer of the army or the navy,” as these exclusions 
only “snuff out emulation.”539  Another province similarly pointed out that the nobility 
“enjoys fiefs, and has privileges and honors” because it is “solely obligated to go to war.”  
These privileges, however, were obsolete, because “this obligation . . . has passed entirely 
to the people, who have neither fiefs nor privileges nor honors, and does not even have 
the same enjoyment of their rights,” even though it is more attached to the patrie. 540  
Residents of the province of Limousin asked that the king “declare that children from 
honest families can be admitted to the service in the capacity of officers,” regardless of 
the family’s social rank.   The bailliage de Reims simply asked that “the members of the 
third estate” be allowed to “rise to the rank of officer, then be promoted to all the highest 
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ranks, according to their merit,” which in 1789 had just been placed of out reach of even 
the provincial nobility. 541 
 The military-hopefuls writing to the Estates General suggested measures that 
would solidify the new relationship between soldiers and civilians as partners. They 
encouraged the army not to conscript or bribe men to be soldiers, but to rely on voluntary 
enlistment as “the best way to recruit troops.”  If the French army paid soldiers well and 
kept its promises of providing respectful treatment, then “well-born men would enroll 
voluntarily,” and the army would no longer be a collection of the most miserable 
members of the state. 542  Each province would “recruit a portion of its population,” 
whose soldiers would be more inspired to defend its natal territory and the people in it.  
As a safeguard against any French troops acting violently against the population, new 
soldiers would “take an oath to the king and the country, and notably to make no use of 
their arms against the nation, nor to spill the blood of its citizens.” 543  The French army 
had pledged itself, in literature, images, and its own rhetoric, as the defender of free 
citizens during and after the American Revolution, and civilians expected the French 
army to sustain and realize that new approach. 
 In keeping with their insistence that no one should be conscripted into the French 
army, citizens also demanded the end of obligatory service in the French militia.  This 
hated institution, which, as discussed in chapter one, was a means of providing extra 
cannon fodder for the French army out of untrained, unwilling, impoverished peasants, 
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came under universal attack.  None of the cahiers de doléances complaining about the 
milice resented the idea of citizens being involved in military service, only the aspect of 
the milice that compelled them to serve.  The parish of Croissy-sous-Chatou condemned 
the milice as “the greatest scourge of the army” because it was responsible for forcing the 
only sons of poor families to enlist in the army and leave them devastated by his death. 544   
For people in the provinces, the “burden of the milice” combined “all the injustices 
possible”, but the baillage of Nemours felt certain that “natural equality and French 
honor” would not allow the milice to continue, as the rich men who could escape it were 
“touched by the misfortune of their fellow citizens.” 545  In place of the hated and soon-to-
be abolished milice, the parish d’Essonnes envisioned replacing it with “provincial and 
voluntary militias,” that would allow all members of the third estate—including the 
wealthy ones—to contribute to the defense of the country. 546  These cited examples 
present a general sense of the universal hatred of the milice as a pressed service that 
targeted poorer members of the third estate, and the simultaneous eagerness of each 
province to erect a volunteer military service that incorporated the entire third estate.  By 
these accounts, it was not the military service that the provinces objected to, but the fact 
that it was an obligation.  In order for the milice to become a citizen-militia, it had to rise 
out of the incentive of its volunteers. 
 French citizens who supported the notion of a citizen army were not going to wait 
for the French line army to institute it.  From 1787 through 1790, many provinces 
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exercised their self-proclaimed right to a volunteer-only citizen militia at the same time 
that representatives to the Estates General were articulating it.  As the French army failed 
in containing the riots and chaos in the provinces, French citizens took it upon themselves 
to provide protection and order in the forms of their own citizen militias.   
 In the late spring and summer of 1789, the city of Lille responded to violent 
outbreaks over the scarcity of grain by creating its own army of bourgeois citizen 
soldiers—a forerunner to the National Guard that would soon become an official branch 
of the army in Paris.  The French army had sent troops to Lille to maintain order, but 
when violence did break out, they could not contain it for long.  Despite “the power of 
the troops, the orders given by M. de Momroiser, and all possible prudence,” one market 
day in late April ended with a great deal of turmoil, and “the pillage of several market 
stalls and all the bread stores.”547  The market had begun as usual, but by 11:00, large 
crowds had gathered at the grain stalls, and troops arrived to calm and dismiss them.  The 
crowd became violent with the arrival of some women who “excited the men, and the 
greatest part of the remaining grain was pillaged.”  The riot turned against the town’s 
bakers, who were “robbed, their houses broken into, and most of them very badly 
treated.”  Two men accused of hording “were assaulted in their houses, and all their 
windows broken with stones.”  Finally, the crowds dispersed around nightfall.  The 
commander of the troops “took the wisest measures to assure the peace of the village,” 
posting guards at the entrances to the bakeries, “so that the town does not go without 
bread.”548 
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 If the riot had been solely about grain prices and availability, then the French 
troops’ actions to guard the bakers and their stores may have been sufficient to maintain 
order, but M. Esmangart knew the demonstration had also been “excited by the 
pamphlets [billets] that come from different neighborhoods with the motto ‘win or die’,” 
accompanied by the “symbol of sedition” in this country.549  Despite the troops’ initial 
attempts at controlling the violence in Lille, they either became ineffective and 
abandoned the town, or were recalled to another area, as the next letter from Lille came 
months later from a new band of home-grown soldiers.  Having organized themselves to 
combat the violence, they addressed the minister of the army in hopes of obtaining 
legitimacy and more weapons.   
 The letter presented this new citizen militia as entirely necessary for the security 
of Lille, and operating under the jurisdiction of the new government and the king.  The 
anonymous author described the violence towards government officials in the town as 
extreme, requiring immediate action.  In mid July, “towards the evening, badly 
intentioned men arrived in a mob at the home of M. Desoursins, the pensioner of the 
village of Lille, and they savagely pillaged the house.”  The homes of the subdelegate and 
the intendant were also attacked and “entirely burned down.”  The letter-writer separated 
himself from the violence, attributing it to peasants who “would not be pleased but by 
blood” and were actively “searching for victims.”  In response to this violence, and out of 
a need for self-protection, “some good citizens hurried to unite, and to enroll themselves 
in a militia that all the honest men desire very much to be established.”  Though the 
uniting of these new citizen soldiers did restore temporary peace, the letter-writer pressed 
that “it is necessary to arm ourselves, and to arm ourselves promptly” in order to contain 
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the rioters permanently.  Many of the citizens of the town agreed, and gathered at the 
Hotel de Ville to elect the new officers.  As a result, “M. the comte de Thiemes, M. le Ch. 
de Brayan and M. Beghemi of Benslin were respectively named commanding general, 
commander in second, and third,” and “two thousand citizens” pledged to be under their 
command and “under arms.”  This newly established army had proved successful thus 
far, as “the union, the intelligence, the zeal of the leaders of the committee and the 
volunteers reestablished the calm for a little time, the blood of no citizen flowed, [and] 
only two of the guilty perished under the glory of the law.”  The letter-writer emphasized, 
however, that while the citizen army of Lille was initially successful, “it is only with 
keeping arms at hand that one could prevent the calmness from erupting [into violence] 
again.”550  Successive letters confirmed that the committee and the new citizen militia 
had become legitimate and permanent: it held formal ceremonies where members of the 
militia swore oaths to protect the people, and it continued the requests for government 
sanctions.551 
 The actions at Lille and the letter-writers’ methods of relating them differentiated 
the citizen militia from temporary organizations that kept the peace, like the milice when 
it acted as a police force, and characterized it as a permanent fighting force.  In keeping 
with the cahiers de doléances’ requests for equal participation in the army, the citizens of 
Lille saw their role of citizen as having a military component.  Civilians had never had a 
role in the army during the old regime, as the army had been the property only of the 
noble officer corps and of the conscripted soldiers who, once in the army, resigned 
forever their connection with peasants of the country or artisans of the town.  These 
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citizens were acting more like the widely circulated image of American militiamen 
organizing a legitimate fighting force, recognized and funded by the government, entirely 
of their own initiative.552 
 The fall of the Bastille, which followed closely on the heels of Lille’s new citizen 
army, represented the culmination of citizens and soldiers combining forces and 
determining the direction of military violence. The story of the Bastille is familiarly told 
as one in which the people of Paris, frustrated by the oppressive old regime, freed the 
political prisoners from the Bastille prison, a symbol of oppression itself, and declared a 
Revolution in France on July 14, 1789.  At the same time, the fall of the Bastille 
represented a new military order.  Just as in Lille, citizens in Paris had proclaimed 
themselves part of a new “national guard” with the aim of controlling the violence in the 
city. As in other provinces, many soldiers and the local police, the gardes-français, 
sympathized with them and aided their efforts.  In an earlier altercation in Paris, some 
gardes-français had refused to fire on the rioters, which cemented their growing role as 
the new allies of the Third Estate.  As more troops poured into Paris to quell the rioting at 
the behest of Louis XVI, civilians grew anxious and wanted to arm themselves.  While 
the Bastille may have been a symbol of aristocratic oppression, it was more importantly a 
military arsenal, and these self-proclaimed citizen-soldiers needed weapons in order to be 
effective.  Officials hesitated to arm the volunteers for the guard, but these men 
discovered that most of the weapons in Paris were being held in the Bastille, and on July 
14, gathered to retrieve them.553  When they heard that French citizens met with 
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resistance when they demanded arms from the Bastille, large numbers of gardes-
françaises and soldiers ran to the citizens’ aid.  Together they laid siege to the Bastille 
and emptied it of weapons.  While many soldiers did stay loyal to their regiments, up to 
75 men per regiment deserted during the days surrounding July 14.  Others recorded 
hearing soldiers declare that they would dismantle their weapons if ordered to fire on the 
people.554  Samuel Scott has counted 54 regular soldiers who helped Parisians dismantle 
the Bastille, but argued that there must have been many more participants who were not 
recognized.555  The fall of the Bastille, while it stands as a symbolic beginning of the 
French Revolution, also represents the forging of a citizen army, when the line between 
who was a citizen and who was a soldier blurred to the point where trained soldiers of the 
line army could protest with citizens, and citizens could arm themselves to serve 
alongside the soldiers as allies with the same mission. 
 This new relationship between citizens and soldiers, and the possibility of being 
both a citizen and a soldier at the same time, became formalized with the creation of the 
National Guard in Paris.  Like the Fall of the Bastille, the creation of the National Guard 
is very similar to the bourgeois citizen army in Lille.  In Lille, town leaders had decided 
to create their own army to regulate the violence, and on July 15 in Paris, the National 
Assembly did the same.  Like the fall of the Bastille, Paris’s National Guard was not the 
first exhibition of the new attitudes in France towards citizens and soldiers, but its 
creation in Paris “would assure the success of the municipal revolution everywhere else” 
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in France.556  By July 13, 1789, the National Assembly had already decided that “the 
people should guard the people,” and though the king was reluctant to agree, wanted to 
create the kind of bourgeois-citizen militia that was already in place in other areas of 
France.557  In addition to institutionalizing the existing citizen-soldier relationship, the 
National Assembly acknowledged the influence of the American Revolution by 
appointing Lafayette as its chief.558  The choice of Lafayette reflects the degree to which 
the experience of France in the American Revolution, both at home and abroad, shaped 
the early days of France’s citizen army.  The National Assembly, in choosing Lafayette, 
communicated that they had in mind the type of citizen militia that America had 
purportedly enjoyed—of hardy citizens prepared for their country’s defense.  Lafayette’s 
previous experiences fighting in a citizen army during the American Revolution made 
him a legitimate choice, both to the new leaders of the French government and to the 
people so eager to create their own citizen militia. To have an “American” in charge of 
Paris’ citizen-militia speaks both to the influence of the American Revolution and their 
intentions for the National Guard. 
 When organized in this fashion, the National Guard attracted all kinds of 
volunteers from traditional soldiers to traditional citizens who wanted to be a part of its 
ranks.  The former gardes-françaises of Paris joined, as well as a large number of 
deserters from the Swiss regiments of the French army.  Lafayette obtained permission 
from the king to allow deserters from the army to join the National Guard, as many 
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already had, and the choice became so popular that many soldiers deserted their army 
regiments with the aim of joining the National Guard.  The National Guard also consisted 
of artisans, and citizens from all walks of life, truly making it a National Guard, and not 
just a small collection of zealots.  Following the example that the capital had set, many 
local chapters of the National Guard appeared all over France.  Some provinces, such as 
Rouen, boasted multiple corps of bourgeois militia, so eager were citizens to join 
France’s new national fighting force.  Neither was this new force subservient to the 
French army of the old regime, for its leader, Lafayette, “the most popular man of the era, 
was on equal footing with the minister of war.”559    France’s citizen army had come into 
being during the last two years of the old regime, and the day after the fall of the Bastille, 
it had been institutionalized as the citizen army of France, with an American veteran at its 
head. 
 
Conclusion 
 Was the French citizen army a product of the French Revolution or the old 
regime?  Two arguments stand out as reasons for attributing the creation of the citizen 
army to the French Revolution.  First, the timing of the creation of the National Guard as 
a new fighting force, simultaneous with the fall of the Bastille and the outbreak of the 
French Revolution, would seem to indicate that the citizen army represented a sudden, 
revolutionary, break with the old regime.  Additionally, the National Guard did not 
replace the French army institutionally, suggesting that the National Guard was perhaps a 
citizen fighting force, but not a citizen army.  For these reasons, one might think that the 
real citizen army of France emerged during the French Revolution with the Levée en 
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Masse as a reformed line army. As Alan Forrest pointed out, the “citizen militias and 
National Guard units were created locally, their powers remained limited to the defense 
of property and local policing,” whereas the line army, dysfunctional though it may have 
been, remained the sole instrument for the defense of France.560  This perspective again 
suggests that the French citizen army did not emerge until 1793, and was purely the result 
of the French Revolution.   
 I argue that by 1789 the French line army, while still in existence, had become 
nearly useless principally because it still operated under aristocratic assumptions and 
ineffective policies that were no longer tolerated by the wider populace and many of the 
officers. By 1789, any aristocratic military organization was no longer able to operate as 
an effective fighting force. 
The National Guard and the other citizen militias springing up throughout the country 
acted as the “new army of France,” because they could be effective, where as the line 
army could not.  Furthermore, the National Guard, like the militias of the American 
colonies and England, did represent a citizen army: it was an armed force created from 
the initiative of its members for the defense of France, consisting of both veterans and 
civilians who had never taken part in military training.  While it never combated the 
armies of Prussia or Austria, it did arise as a direct response to the presence of a military 
threat—the king’s regiments, which arrived in Paris and the provinces to calm rioters and 
collect grain that peasants could not spare. The National Guard, therefore, did represent 
the institutionalization of a citizen army as the army of France.   The National Guard 
and citizen militias of France stand not only as the beginning of a new military era, but as 
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the end result of decades of effort on the part of French officers and civilian writers 
interested in reform.  The citizen army did not spring up in France suddenly and 
unexpectedly, but had been cultivated slowly since the end of the Seven Years’ War and 
was realized as a concrete possibility during the American Revolution.   As Roger 
Chartier observed, something must be “conceivable” before it can be enacted, and the 
citizen-ization of the soldier, combined with the impact and examples of the American 
Revolution, made the citizen army of France conceivable.  This dissertation has argued 
that the National Guard, and the other citizen militias which took control of France in 
1788 and 1789, would not have been possible without the decades of reform after the 
Seven Years’ War, and the citizen-soldier example and popular cultural impact of the 
American Revolution.561  While the citizen army bloomed during the French Revolution, 
it had been planted and tended during the old regime. 
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Conclusion 
 
 Throughout this dissertation, I have argued that the citizen army of France did not 
arise as a result of the French Revolution with the Levée en Masse, but was a product of 
the old regime.  It rose in conjunction with the Revolution, in the form of the National 
Guard, leaving the Bastille in ruins in its wake. Even as the National Guard was instituted 
the day after July 14, it represented decades of intellectual and cultural change within the 
French army and French society as a whole.  The real “revolution” in military thinking on 
the part of officers, soldiers, and civilians, occurred before its dramatic realization of 
1789.  From the last days of the aristocratic army’s dominance to the eve of the French 
Revolution, the old regime provided the intellectual environment, inspirational texts, and 
military urgency necessary to imagine a citizen army for France and draw inspiration 
from one across the Atlantic, before it finally came to life in Paris and the provinces. 
 France’s citizen army does owe a debt to its predecessor, because the aristocratic 
army that Louis XIV had constructed over the course of his reign had not been built to 
last.  By institutionalizing an army that had for decades relied on aristocratic assumptions 
and traditions, he made a system that nearly any well-born or wealthy gentleman could 
navigate and exploit.  As the army grew, venality of office became necessary for the 
French army to support itself financially.  By the 1740s, the French army had become 
overwhelmed with officers competing for opportunities to display their valor in battle.  
Many of the wealthier, higher ranking officers in the army—because they had either 
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bought their ranks or had received them as a sign of royal favor—did not have the 
necessary education or training to competently command troops.   
  Soldiers of the aristocratic army represented the “ying” to the officers’ “yang.”  
Because they came from the opposite side of the social spectrum, they were not eligible 
to partake in the glory or honors of war.  Officers regarded their soldiers as the “most vile 
and miserable” of subjects who joined the army only for promises of regular food and 
shelter and opportunities for adventure and pillage.562  Soldiers’ less-refined nature stood 
them well on the battlefield where they executed partisan tactics against enemy soldiers 
and civilians as well as French subjects.  Louis XIV’s use of the army to coerce taxes, 
convert protestants, and quell rebellions fostered hostile relationships of between soldiers 
and the civilians that they “protected” from foreign invasion. 
 Perhaps the only commonality that soldiers and their officers shared was their 
separation from civilian society.  Whereas officers could glide between military 
campaigns and decadent court life fairly easily (and while the luxuries of the court 
accompanied them on campaign) their status as officers in the king’s army who nobly 
shed their blood for the state distinguished them from civil society.  Likewise, once a 
young man joined the army, he turned his back on his previous life as a peasant or urban 
worker and became fully inculcated in a new society with different values and objectives.  
Even when soldiers and civilians intermingled during winter logements, each group 
suspected—and resented—the other.  For these reasons, the aristocratic army, as late as 
1750, seemed as far away from a citizen army as it would ever be.  But it contributed to 
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the rise of the citizen army through its dramatic decline, which turned French attention to 
a wholly different military system.  
 A monumental defeat that shook the French aristocratic army to its very 
foundations, the Seven Years’ War, especially in the North American theater, challenged 
French methods of making war.  The soldiers’ reaction to their Canadian compatriots 
foreshadowed the type of army that the French were about to embrace.  Because all men 
in Canada bore to protect their territory from the rival English settlers or hostile 
Amerindian nations, they constituted a citizen army.  French soldiers, when they had to 
lodge with Canadian residents over the winter, did not despise their hosts, as they did in 
France, but embraced the Canadian lifestyle as one conducive to their militant values.  
Many soldiers married canadiennes and acquired land with plans to settle in Canada at 
the conclusion of the war.  In addition to being accustomed to constant warfare, the 
Canadian militia had a patriotic approach to their fighting.  For them, unlike for French 
officers, the Seven Years’ War would determine if they kept their homeland or submitted 
to English—and Protestant—dominance.  Especially in the final months of fighting, their 
commanding officer and governor-general, Vaudreuil, rallied them with cries to defend 
their patrie.   
 Having failed to rescue Canada from the clutches of the English, the French army 
and Canadian officials returned to France in disgrace to face a series of scandals and 
trials.  Because only a small portion of the French army ventured to Canada, and because 
many of the Canadian military officials retired quietly, it is difficult to measure the 
impact of Canada’s citizen army on French military thinking.  Even if French officers did 
not take note of Canada’s citizen-militia during the Seven Years’ War, they observed 
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military practices in their own army that led to their humiliating defeat.  Beyond 
difficulties with supply and the failure of the navy to contend with the British fleet, the 
Seven Years’ War in Canada exposed weaknesses within the very culture of the soldiers 
and officer corps.  French officers’ urgent need to display their military prowess proved 
detrimental to the French army’s ability to win battles.  In order to position themselves as 
the defenders of France, and provide themselves with sufficient time in combat to exhibit 
their zeal for the service of the king, French officers dismissed their Amerindian allies 
and scorned their Canadian compatriots.  Such behavior did allow French officers to 
achieve personal gains from the war, but resulted in a collective failure.  The French 
army’s humiliating losses in all theaters proved so striking to French officers and 
civilians alike, that rather than amending the current aristocratic system, many envisioned 
a wholly new approach to warfare: a citizen army. 
 French response in the wake of this defeat marks perhaps the first and greatest 
“revolutionary moment” during the old regime, because of officers’ and civilians’ 
collective desire for a French “citizen army” based on patriotism and the example of the 
Ancients.  The rise of the National Guard, and much of the revolutionary activity that 
came with it, would not have been possible without this initial intellectual turn.  This 
phenomenon found expression in published works of philosophes and other French 
writers, as well as the mémoires of French officers.  Philosophes envisioned the 
restoration of civic virtue that would result from a citizen army, while officers calculated 
that patriotic troops would perform more effectively on the battlefield.  Both contributed 
to a long-term dialogue pondering the potential realization of this citizen army, and 
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officers even began to implement reforms that would effectively “citizen-ize” their 
soldiers.   
 Not only was this combined intellectual endeavor necessary for the eventual 
embodiment of a French citizen army, it exposed the first steps toward civilian and 
military worlds intermingling.  As further evidence that the discussion of a French citizen 
army was a collaborative process, French officers even referenced civilians’ writings on 
patriotism and citizen armies in their mémoires.  Civilian society revealed its interest in 
military officers’ perspectives on patriotism and the future of the French army when 
Guibert circulated his Essai Général de Tactique.  Though his essay dealt largely with 
tactical issues, it garnered widespread interest from educated civilians and made Guibert 
the darling of the Enlightenment.  Servan’s Soldat Citoyen, published in 1781, likewise 
received praise from both military and civilian circles, exhibiting military and civilian 
minds were thinking on similar terms.   
 The American Revolution gave military and civilian “patriots” the strongest, most 
visible rallying point during the old regime and expanded the conversation about 
patriotism and citizen soldiers into the fashionable, the poetic, the dramatic, and even the 
illiterate sides of France.  It provided seemingly concrete evidence that all of the 
optimistic thinking about patriotism could and would produce an effective and victorious 
citizen army.  The American Revolution did not introduce France to any new ideas, but 
confirmed what French writers and reformers were already thinking.  As Alexis de 
Tocqueville stated, “the French saw in [the American Revolution] a brilliant confirmation 
of theories already familiar to them. . . . it was conclusive proof that they were in the 
right.  Indeed, the Americans seemed only to be putting into practice ideas which had 
 282
been sponsored by our writers, and to be making our dreams their realities.”563    The 
excitement and the certainty with which nearly all writers, illustrators, even dressmakers 
embraced the American army, militias, and their leader, George Washington, evinced the 
growing closeness between military and civilian circles.  Whereas civilian societies used 
to shy away from soldiers, and the officers of the army used to distain civilians, images of 
the American Revolution glorified both parts of society as mutually supportive elements 
of a citizen army.   
 Studying the effect of the American Revolution on the French army reveals its 
importance for the coming of the French Revolution as mediated through the public’s 
continuing fascination with ancients and the idea of the citizen-soldier.  Lafayette 
recognized the importance of the American Revolution to the beginning of the French 
Revolution when he presented George Washington with “the key to the Bastille” in 1790.  
Lafayette explained that this emblem was “a tribute, which I owe, as a son to my adoptive 
father, as an aide de Camp to my General, as a Missionary of liberty to its Patriarch.”564  
With this gift, Lafayette symbolically placed the French Revolution at the Americans’ 
feet, implying that the events of 1789 and 1790 owed a debt to Washington and the 
American Revolution.   
 The American Revolution did impact the coming of the French Revolution by 
reinforcing French tendencies for patriotism and equality, and it challenged the French 
monarchy to endorse the American Revolution’s republican values.  The image of Louis 
XVI freeing his serfs while his officers arrived in frigates to free the Bostonians 
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represented how French attitudes towards the Americans had to be consistent with the 
French elites’ attitudes toward their own people.  While historians in France who study 
the French Revolution have traditionally been very reticent to engage in the possibility of 
the American Revolution affecting the French, some are starting to reexamine the 
relationship between the two Revolutions.  Marie-Jeanne Rossignol has recently 
reminded French historians of the American Revolution and government as a model for 
the French in the late 1780s.565  Eric Peuchot has combed the records of the early days of 
the National Assembly to uncover many references to the American Revolution and the 
influence of the American political example.566  The American Revolution further 
affected the coming of the French by acting as a catalyst that made “revolutionary” 
French ideas seem possible; observers not only had a desire to reproduce the image of the 
American Revolution in every literary, fashion, and intellectual genre, but in their actions 
as well.   
 The influence of the American Revolution on the coming of the French has been 
difficult to detect because of the absence of definitive textual evidence, but that influence 
is evident in French concerns and actions in the final years of the old regime.  The heated 
reaction to the Council of War’s decision to reinstate harsh discipline for soldiers and to 
enclose the court nobility in a cocoon of high rank and privilege evinces that civilians, 
soldiers, and provincial nobles alike had internalized the ideas of patriotism and equality.  
The requests of the cahiers des doléances for an officer corps open to anyone with merit, 
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the disdain for the privileges that benefited the noble class, and the desire for the end of 
compulsory military service exhibited the wide reach of the American Revolution’s 
influence.  These words found support in the actions of self-proclaimed bourgeois 
militias in Lille and other provinces, and in the fall of the Bastille and creation of the 
National Guard in Paris.  French civilians had expressed a desire to perform military 
duties for patriotic reasons, and then took action without any official sanction or further 
military reform.  Likewise, many French soldiers and provincial nobles supported 
civilians against higher orders to seize grain or quell riots.  Having been continuously 
surrounded by images and texts lauding the Americans for putting these French ideas into 
practice, it is hardly surprising to see French soldiers and civilians behaving likewise 
when their ideas were challenged.  French images of the American Revolution had 
intensified the patriotic citizen-army model, and then pushed its enthusiasts into action. 
 Part of that action took shape in the form of the National Guard, or the collection 
of citizen militias simultaneously yet independently springing up in different regions 
throughout France from Marseille to Lille.  The fact that these military organizations 
sprung from the initiative and desires of the volunteers who comprised them marks the 
National Guard as the final embodiment of French patriotic imaginings.  According to the 
texts in which civilian and military writers explored the values of patriotism and the 
virtues of a citizen army, all military service had to be voluntary.  Patriotism served as the 
strongest motivation to induce citizens from all realms of society rush to the service of 
the patrie.  This willingness to fight appeared as marked component of texts and images 
describing American military successes against the British—citizen-soldiers, from 
Ancient Sparta to Revolutionary America, all leapt from their foyers at the first hint of 
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the patrie being in danger.  Voluntary service, inspired by patriotism, comprised the 
essential ingredient to French concept of a citizen army. It is this component that the 
National Guard could boast, but the Levée en Masse could not.  Whether or not the Levée 
en Masse included more men, fought foreign armies, or institutionally restored the line 
army is irrelevant; the National Guard was the only French force that relied entirely on 
the patriotism of its willing participants. 
 And yet, although the modern, specialized warfare of the late twentieth century 
made the citizen-soldier of France obsolete, the army of the Levée en Masse has retained 
a sacred place in French memory.  Alan Forrest has explored how the legend of this army 
as the embodiment of a “nation in arms” has maintained a political and patriotic 
resonance up to the modern day.  “In the process of creating an integrated French nation,” 
he argued, “military service was a political weapon as much as it was a means of 
supplying the army with troops,” and it is this “political faith” which has ensured that 
Levée en Masse legend will continue to dominate French national memory—and even 
historiography.567  The designation of the Levée en Masse as the French citizen army is 
also an endorsement of the French Revolution, a confirmation that it was the Revolution 
that gave France its coherence, its unity, and its patriotic nationalism.  To credit the old 
regime with such elements vital to French memory and political culture would complicate 
their national story.   
 But the recognition of old regime as the incubator of the citizen army would 
project a more intricate, and maybe even more accurate, view of the old regime, the 
Revolution, and the relationship between the two.  As the creator of a citizen army, the 
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old regime does not come across only as an oppressive, decadent, corrupted society, but 
also as a patriotic one, struggling with its own contradictions in an effort to create a more 
effective army that emphasized merit as well as privilege.  By emphasizing the 
importance of patriotism to the army, and by taking steps to align elements of the line 
army with the citizen armies of the ancients and North America, reformers, civilian 
writers, and officers of the old regime did create, and implement, a citizen army in 
France.  Conversely, in being credited with the Levée en Masse, a conscript army that 
some likened to the hated milice, the French Revolution appears regressive.  It robbed 
patriotic citizens of the opportunity to rise of their own accord and fight for their patrie 
by demanding that service of them.  Patriotism became secondary to obedience to the 
government.  Such implications may be reason enough for the Levée en Masse to retain 
its place in French memory, but historians must recognize that the old regime provided 
the cultural and intellectual foundation necessary for any citizen army to arise in France. 
 Even if the French citizen army only lasted a few years before returning to a 
conscription army, the elements that led to its creation are responsible for more than the 
National Guard.  The cultural and intellectual ferment of the old regime brought military 
and civilian spheres together as part of a single French society.  Whereas officers and 
gentlemen, soldiers and subjects, had occupied separate, hostile communities in the 
seventeenth century, they all could identify as citizens by the end of the old regime.  The 
military crisis that shattered certainties in the wake of the Seven Years’ War opened 
possibilities for a different approach to the French army.  The era of questioning and 
reform that followed created an atmosphere in which the American Revolution became a 
meaningful sign that ancient modes of patriotic warfare had not been lost to history.  
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Finally, it was with the interest in patriotic citizen armies that the old regime had 
fostered, that soldiers, provincial officers, and civilians eventually challenged the court 
nobility for dominance of the army.  In these ways, the old regime shares in the 
Revolution.  Early modern ideas were necessary for a modern institution; old regime 
ideas were necessary for a revolution. 
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